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Introduction

Thoughts on the Study of Perpetrators in Holocaust Diaries
“Normal men do not know that everything is possible.”
– David Rousset, 1947
I: The Problem
The twentieth century has been referred to as “the century of genocide.”1 From
the intentional eradication of the Herero people of South-West Africa in the first decade
of the 20th century to the “ethnic cleansing” in Bosnia and Rwanda in the last, more
people were systematically exterminated in the last hundred years than in all of previous
recorded history. This seemingly modern proclivity toward ideologically- or raciallybased mass murder has been pondered and researched as much as any other topic. And
while scholars have devoted a great deal of time to determining chronologies and
identifying the mechanics of extermination, less work has been done probing the thought
processes of those victims personally affected by genocide. This thesis seeks to
investigate a basic problem: how victims understood and represented their tormentors.
II: The Thesis
Attempts to explain the Holocaust since the 1950’s – from Hannah Arendt’s
systemic arguments about totalitarianism and seminal theory of “the banality of evil” to
Daniel Jonah Goldhagen’s purported discovery of “eliminationist anti-Semitism” in
1

Found, among other sources, in Mark Levene’s “Why Is the Twentieth Century the Century of
Genocide,” in Journal of World History 11.2 (2000), and in Eric Weitz’s A Century of Genocide: Utopias
of Race and Nation (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003).
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German society – have focused largely on perpetrators and their attitudes toward
victims.2 While the actions and mentalities of perpetrators have been closely studied,
their victims have received comparatively scant treatment. This thesis seeks to redress
that historiographical omission by examining the way a genocidal Zeitgeist leaves certain
marks in the writings of targeted people. It posits not only that these marks exist, but also
that they indicate forms of psychological resistance. It also suggests this resistance is
similar in many ways to distancing mechanisms employed by perpetrators and that this
evidence points to a “crisis of imagination” for victims and perpetrators alike in which
the capability to envision negation and to identify with the “other” is detrimental to selfpreservation.
In Holocaust diaries, perpetrators can appear, not appear, or appear in some less
threatening and linguistically mutable way. Therefore, each chapter in this thesis focuses
on a different strategy Holocaust diarists used to deal with perpetrators. Chapter one is
important because it lays out the basic groundwork for the more theoretical chapters to
follow. In it, I examine the work of diarists Éva Heyman, Hannah Senesh and Dawid
Sierakowiak. While perpetrators are present in these chapters, they are often depicted in
what might be termed “visual,” “descriptive,” “photographic,” or “journalistic” terms.
For various reasons, although “Germans” appear occasionally, not much effort is devoted
to analyzing or questioning their specific natures, desires or motivations. In order to
establish a kind of starting point, or a type of diary that bears some kind of resemblance
to the other diaries I discuss, the writings of Abel Herzberg from Bergen-Belsen are also

2

See Hannah Arendt’s The Origins of Totalitarianism (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1951) and
Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil, (New York: Viking Press, 1964). See also Daniel
Jonah Goldhagen’s Hitler’s Willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust (New York:
Alfred A. Knopf, 1996).
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examined at length in chapter one. Chapter two examines the ways jokes, metaphors and
tropes frequently come to stand in for Nazi perpetrators in the diaries of Etty Hillesum of
Amsterdam, and Emmanuel Ringelblum of Warsaw. These diaries manifest ways in
which authors could confront perpetrators indirectly through the manipulation of
language. If the theme of chapter one is the “presence” of perpetrators in Holocaust
diaries, the subject of chapter two is the “dissolution” of these concrete figures into
shadows and phantasms. Chapter three examines a final characteristic of Holocaust
diaries: the “absence” of perpetrators. Here I provide an in-depth examination of the lack
of perpetrator analysis in the diary of Warsaw physician Janusz Korczak. Although
Korczak saw perpetrators up-close, both as a prisoner and as an administrator of the
Warsaw ghetto orphanage, he only discussed perpetrators on four occasions. In three of
these instances, Korczak plainly resisted the very thought of perpetrators – and so the
references to them are veiled and subtle. It was only in Korczak’s very last entry, written
just hours before his death, that he recognized the futility of avoiding perpetrators, and so
addressed them head-on. A brief conclusion will sum up my findings and suggest
directions for further research.
III: Victims and Perpetrators
For victims, the “crisis of imagination,” can be defined as the tension between
awareness/surrender and denial/resistance. These categories are important because their
presence is apparent, explicitly or implicitly, in all the texts I examined and indicate the
author’s orientation to the world in written form. The way these categories are combined
provides an intellectual and emotional “fingerprint” that gives us clues as to how
individual victims coped with trauma. The extent to which hope was essential to these

4
victims and the importance of not seeing themselves as perpetrators saw them – as “lives
unworthy of life” or as corpses waiting to happen – cannot be overstated.3 The sources
seem to indicate that a complete, conscious awareness of the possibilities of annihilation
and negation on the part of the victim impeded the capacity for resistance – decreasing
chances of survival. Only by mentally keeping the reality of genocide at bay could the
victim cope with a world in which perpetrators sought to erase him or her spiritually and
culturally and physically.4 Traces can be found in many Holocaust diaries of a tendency
to avoid what seems obvious – the Nazi attempt to impose a final, physical solution to the
so-called “Jewish Problem.”5 This is not to say that diarists had identical levels of
awareness of how systematic and thorough the “Final Solution” was. For instance, the
head of the Warsaw Judenrat, Adam Czerniakow (1880-1942), was plainly aware of the
genocidal complexity of Nazi plans and his powerlessness against them – hence his
suicide, while other diarists (one thinks of Anne Frank, for example) were unable to see
the bigger picture. However different understandings might have been, violence was
endemic toward the Jews of Europe during the Second World War and one wonders why

3

Euphemisms were very important during the Holocaust. Phrases like “unnütze Esser,” (useless
eaters) or “lebensunwertes Leben” (life unworthy of life) were essential to defining who was human or less
than human during all phases of the Shoah, but especially in the beginning during the medical phase. See
Henry Friedlander’s The Origins of the Nazi Genocide. The phrase “Final Solution” (Endlösung) is itself a
euphemism that lends itself to radical interpretation. See Berel Lang’s Act and Idea in the Nazi Genocide
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990).
4
See David Rousset’s The Other Kingdom, (translated and introduced by Ramon Guthrie, New
York: Reynal and Hitchcock, 1947) and also Primo Levi’s Survival in Auschwitz: The Nazi Assault on
Humanity, (translated by Stuart Woolf, New York: Collier Books, 1993) and The Drowned and the Saved
(translated from the Italian by Raymond Rosenthal, New York: Summit Books, 1988), Elaine Scarry’s The
Body in Pain: The Making and Unmaking of the World, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), and
Jean Améry’s, At the Mind’s Limits: Contemplations by a Survivor on Auschwitz and its Realities
(translated by Sidney Rosenfeld and Stella P. Rosenfeld, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1980).
5
It is not being suggested that Jewish victims should have seen the genocide in its sinister entirety.
The question is not whether they understood the actions taken against them as a matter of high policy, but
whether they could recognize that they and their communities were in grave danger and whether they found
ways to mentally avoid the implications of the implacable Nazi enmity amid the violence, deportations,
slavery and mass murder that surrounded them.
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questions like “Why me?” or “Why are they doing this to us?” or especially “What kind
of person does this to another one?” did not appear more frequently in diaries from those
years. The absence of questions like these indicates denial and avoidance. These
mechanisms of avoidance, which kept awareness of genocidal intent from impinging
upon consciousness, are of particular interest here.
Implicitly, this thesis argues that perpetrators experienced a dynamic comprised
of a tension between awareness/opposition and denial/surrender. For them,
comprehension of genocidal intent provoked mental opposition, whether in the form of
the controversial psychological “doubling” Robert Jay Lifton describes, or in the
drunkenness and mental breakdowns common among the Einsatzsgruppen troops in the
east.6 Conversely, the ability psychologically to deny the victim’s reality and humanity
allowed individual perpetrators to surrender to the Nazi imperative of genocide as state
policy between 1939 and 1945.7
Undeniably, some sort of relationship existed between perpetrator and victim.
This thesis is concerned with one side of that relationship. The historiography is replete
with examples of how perpetrators required elaborate psychological mechanisms and
rationales that enabled them to dehumanize Jews and inhibit their understanding of them
as human beings. Here, the problem is examined from the other side by probing how
Jewish victims writing diaries during the Holocaust displayed parallel distancing and
resistance mechanisms that limited their understanding of the Nazis’ humanity, though

6

See Leni Yahil’s The Holocaust: The Fate of European Jewry, 1932-1945 (translated from the
Hebrew by Ina Freidman and Haya Galai, New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), p. 259.
7
See Christopher Browning’s Ordinary Men: Reserve Police Battalion 101 and the Final Solution
in Poland, (New York: HarperPerennial, 1993) and Yisrael Gutman, and Michael Berenbaum (eds.), The
Anatomy of the Auschwitz Death Camp (Bloomington - Published in association with the United States
Holocaust Memorial Museum): Indiana University Press, 1994).
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for very different reasons. This method allows us to analyze Jewish perceptions of the
perpetrator and permits us to ask how the individual writer of a Holocaust diary
understood the desire of a Nazi to negate him or her physically and spiritually through an
analysis of how that knowledge was reflected in the language used in their diaries.
Together, this thesis interrogates the question of how victims represented and made sense
of perpetrators in diaries written during the Holocaust.
IV: Source Material
As primary sources, I have used only Holocaust-era texts, among which are
included diaries, notes, letters and memoirs written during the period 1939-1945. When
selecting sources, I decided that it was important only to look at the responses of Jewish
victims written during the Shoah. Valuable memoirs written after the fact, like Primo
Levi’s Survival in Auschwitz, Elie Wiesel’s Night, or Jean Améry’s At the Mind’s Limits,
are to be distinguished from works written concurrently with the genocide because they
were composed in the aftermath of trauma, not in the crucible of the extermination
process itself. Hence, they may contain perceptions or philosophies that were not present
among those persecuted at the time. Memoirs written after the fact, while important, have
the disadvantage of being composed after the dominant, post-World War II narrative of
the Holocaust had already begun to crystallize, transforming memory and imagination.
Rather than include memoirs, I initially examined about 25 diaries that seemed to
represent a broad spectrum of Jewish life throughout Europe during the Holocaust. In
order to develop a diverse portrait of Jewish understanding of perpetrators I consulted
diaries by men and women, teenage boys and girls, Eastern and Western, assimilated and
unassimilated Jews, intellectuals and workers. When available, letters and notes from the
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time were used as well.8 In the end, however, due to the constraints of space and time,
only about seven diaries are analyzed at length in this thesis. Every other source cited is
secondary to the diaries and used only for interpretive purposes.
The diaries provide evidence of a fulcrum located in the perpetrator–victim
relationship at which the victim’s desire for survival met the perpetrators desire for
negation. By “negation” I mean the place where the idea and the act of genocide meet –
where both Jewish victim and Nazi perpetrator come together in a moment of
annihilation (almost invariably the annihilation of the victim).9 My reading of these
sources indicates that a deep, conscious awareness of this negative focal point was
anathema to both parties and that a close examination of the language used to describe
each other reveals this aversion when psychological defense mechanisms are operating
most forcefully.
The construction of this thesis and its applicability to the broader field of
comparative genocide studies is based upon the central supposition that an unequal yet
reciprocal relationship existed between perpetrators and their victims.10 Simply put, the
existence of a perpetrator requires the existence of a victim. During the Holocaust, these
relationships may have been brief or even momentary (like, for example, those of the
physician conducting “selections” at Auschwitz-Birkenau and the people who passed

8

Alexandra Garbarini finds that letters, notes and diary entries, because most were designed for an
audience broader than the individual, are best read together as “interrelated genres, “‘To bear witness where
Witness must be borne’: Holocaust Diaries 1939-1945” (PhD dissertation, University of California at Los
Angeles, 2003).
9
See Klaus Theweleit’s discussion of negation and armoring in Male Fantasies, vol. I, Women,
Bodies, Floods (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986).
10
For some, any comparison of perpetrators and victims is difficult to acknowledge and is even
perceived as disrespectful to the victims. That is not the intention of this paper. The point of this
comparison is to demonstrate common human reactions to “inconceivable” experiences, or what in
religious terminology might be referred to as “radical evil,” not to suggest any kind of moral or legal
equivalency.
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before him), or of a much longer duration (such as the relationship that developed
between members of the Judenräte across Eastern Europe and the German occupation
authorities). In many cases, the relationship was largely imaginary because direct
communication between victim and perpetrator rarely took place (think of guards in a
watchtower and concentration camp inmates on the ground).11 However, to say that the
details of this relationship were imaginary does not change the fact that both sides
thought about and had opinions and impressions of the other. Here, I have tried to
determine what victims thought of perpetrators, not come to a conclusion about what the
perpetrators actually were. In the specific case of the destruction of the European Jews,
Holocaust diaries are central to our understanding of the meanings of this relationship
because they provide the historian access to a complex vision of the victim’s mental
universe during that defining genocidal moment.
Diarists had a wide range of imaginative reactions to their circumstances. But if
we recognize that some kind reciprocal relationship existed between persecutors and
persecuted and that the dynamics of this relationship were as important on one side of the
equation as they were on the other, then Holocaust diaries should be especially valuable
when it comes to understanding genocide in general. Victim responses during the
Holocaust should give us an indication of the cognitive processes of those experiencing
the “incomprehensible” as well as provide clues to what kind of responses we might
expect from victims of other genocides (though those responses would undoubtedly be
influenced by culturally and historically specific elements as well). It is important to be
clear, however. While the idea of a “relationship” implies a mutually dependent or

11

Thanks to Professor Jeffrey Herf of the University of Maryland who brought this to my attention
during a discussion of this topic.
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symbiotic link, no moral equivalency between victims and perpetrators is suggested, nor
are concepts as different as volition and compulsion forgotten.
V: Historiography
Recent research by Christopher Browning, Michael Burleigh, Robert Jay Lifton
and others demonstrates that, in the case of the Holocaust, the commission of genocide
was not easy for individual perpetrators to perform. The evidence indicates that Nazism,
far from being infernally efficient at transforming “ordinary men” into killers, was at best
only partially successful.12 The common stereotype of the icy, emotionless Nazi is as
much a mask behind which a real human being hides as it is a myth that was assiduously
cultivated by the leaders of the “thousand-year Reich.”13 Those perpetrators closest to
the actual process of genocide in the killing fields and death camps, as opposed to high
officials and lower Schreibtischtäter (whom we contrast with victims caught in the
maelstrom of the Holocaust) did not just leap blithely into the bloody fray. Instead, they
required a great deal of internal or external pressure and conditioning to perform their
jobs.14 In fact, among most historians of the Holocaust, it is now taken as a matter of
course that certain defense mechanisms were employed, consciously or unconsciously, by
mass murderers which not only eased the killing process, but also enabled it to occur on
such an enormous, industrial scale. For instance, the party line (and official propaganda)

12

See Christopher Browning’s Ordinary Men, This view seems to contradict Daniel Jonah
Goldhagen’s inexplicably popular “eliminationist anti-Semitism” theory.
13
Hitler’s speeches, “table talk” and Mein Kampf are replete with references to “hardness” and the
importance of pitilessness. This talk worked its way into the speech of his mandarins like Himmler, Göring
et al.
14
See Michael Burleigh’s Death and Deliverance: ‘Euthanasia’ in Germany 1900-1945 (New
York: Cambridge University Press, 1994) and Ethics and Extermination: Reflections on Nazi Genocide
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997), as well as Henry Friedlander’s The Origins of Nazi
Genocide: From Euthanasia to the Final Solution (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1995).
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that continuously vilified Jews was used to rationalize genocidal behavior.15 Genocide
became permissible because it was condoned and sanctioned by what passed for legal
authority – absolving those performing it of responsibility for the act because the idea
was not theirs. There was also the Manichean tendency, prized in Nazi Germany, which
tended to view things in black and white or apocalyptical terms. Most simply, at
Auschwitz and among Einsatzgruppen units in the east, alcohol was used to numb or
repress the conscience.16
It is apparent that perpetrators and victims alike employed defense mechanisms
like transference, repression, or denial. They “numbed” themselves in order to maintain
some kind of psychological equilibrium. This raises the question of what it was exactly
that they were trying to distance themselves from. The answer may seem obvious at first,
but, counter-intuitively, it seems to me that it was not so much the act of genocide that
was bothering them, but the idea of it. For victims, this is borne out in the diaries by the
way writers are able to describe the “symptoms” of genocidal intent (“photographic” or
“journalistic” descriptions of conditions and atrocities), but cannot seem to come to terms
with the human will and motivation required to make genocide a reality.17 For the
perpetrators, the importance of this distinction is apparent in a series of speeches Heinrich
Himmler gave to SS leaders in Posen, Poland on the 4th and 6th of October, 1943. During
the course of a discussion about the necessity for eliminating the Jews of Europe,
Himmler expressed his belief that the SS, as an organization, had remained “decent” and

15

This is exemplified by the “Befehl ist Befehl” defense seen at Nuremberg during every trial,
including that of the Major War Criminals in 1945-46 and the “Doctors’ Trial” of 1947-1948.
16
See Peter Padfield’s Himmler: Reichsführer SS (New York: Holt, 1990) as well as Yahil.
17
An example of this might include Emmanuel Ringelblum’s frank recitation of atrocities in the
Warsaw ghetto combined with his tendency to dehumanize Germans by referring to them as “They” or “the
Others,” which serves to establish distance as well.
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navigated a “Scylla and Charybdis” between becoming too hard and being too soft in the
course of the “Final Solution.” He was cognizant of and sympathetic to the mental
difficulties his troops faced murdering the Jews of Europe (“Most of you know what it is
like seeing a hundred corpses lying together, five hundred, a thousand…”), but to him
there was a clear the distinction between conceptualizing and implementing genocide. He
states it explicitly - “I believe that it is better for us all to have endured this for our
people, and accepted the responsibility (the responsibility for deeds not the idea behind
them), and then take the secret with us to our graves.”18 For those perpetrators lower
down the chain of command, this separation of act or deed (Tat) and idea or word (Idee)
facilitated personal involvement in the genocidal process because it enabled them to
inwardly rationalize their personal actions during the Holocaust while outwardly
minimizing their participation in it afterward – as can be seen in an examination of legal
defenses employed at trials of war criminals from Nuremberg to Bergen-Belsen to
Auschwitz to Jerusalem.19 This polar separation of act and idea is a key, not just to
understanding how perpetrators killed, but also to discovering how victims dealt with the
ever-present possibility of death.
The research represented by this thesis indicates that victims often found the
genocidal picture too shocking to consciously accept as well, although my studies also
indicate that, at critical moments, they allowed themselves to see what they had only

18

Heinrich Himmler, “Moral Dilemmas” in Roger Griffin (ed.) Fascism (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1995). p. 161-162.
19
A deeply ingrained concept of the “Führerprinzip” was part of the cultural baggage of all Nazis
in the Third Reich. This “leadership principle” served to consolidate the power of those higher up the chain
of command and absolve those farther down of personal responsibility. In effect, however, it left a gap or
vacuum of responsibility, allowing elites cover for morally reprehensible acts.
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intuited and repressed before.20 While genocide was easier for perpetrators to commit
than to admit, their victims found it was essential to ignore (but not to deny) the
genocidal reality they were facing. By analyzing the way the two basic human
components of genocide – the perpetrator and the victim – interact with and think of each
other, a more complex understanding of genocide in its entirety emerges.
For perpetrators, regardless of which mechanisms were used, the aim was
ultimately, as Robert Jay Lifton put it, to increase the “psychic distance” between killer
and victim to the point where complete dehumanization of the “other” could take place.21
Whether the Nazis used ideology, alcohol, or physical measures like numbering, shaving,
or even what Terrence des Pres called an “excremental assault” to dehumanize their
victims, it did require effort on the part of perpetrators to come to think of their victims as
completely different.22 This dehumanization and distancing is apparent in perpetrator
diaries.23 Close examination of victim diaries written during the Holocaust, reveals its
presence on the other side of the genocidal equation as well.
VI: Language and Trauma
Scholars as different as Hayden White and Lawrence Langer have suggested that
Holocaust survivors employ certain narrative patterns to describe their experiences.24

20

See Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem and Gitta Sereny’s, Into that Darkness: An Examination of
Conscience (New York: Vintage Books, 1974).
21
See Robert Jay Lifton’s The Nazi Doctors: Medical Killing and the Psychology of Genocide
(New York: Basic Books, 1986).
22
See Terrence Des Pres’ The Survivor: Anatomy of Life in the Death Camps (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1976). Also see Paul Ricouer’s discussion of dread and defilement in The Symbolism of
Evil (translated from the French by Emerson Buchanan, Boston: Beacon Press, 1967).
23
See the diaries of Dr. Friedrich Mennecke in Aly, Chroust and Pross (eds.), Cleansing the
Fatherland: Nazi Medicine and Racial Hygiene (translated by Belinda Cooper, John Hopkins Press, 1994).
24
See Lawrence Langer’s The Holocaust and the Literary Imagination, (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1975) and Holocaust Testimonies: The Ruins of Memory (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1991). See also, Dominick LaCapra’s Representing the Holocaust: History, Theory, Trauma (Ithaca:
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Recent work on other sources confirms these arguments, and my own experience
conducting interviews with survivors suggests that certain patterns, narrative strategies,
and forms of speech continue to be employed by those who lived through the Holocaust.
While interviewing almost three dozen Holocaust survivors and their children, it was
possible to see these patterns in Holocaust discourse emerge clearly. They appeared in
the way stories were told, in the adoption of certain phrases, in the inclusion of certain
characters associated with precise meanings and in the exclusion of certain elements
central to understanding genocide. The most significant exclusion was the tendency of
survivors, speaking years after their experiences, to characterize perpetrators only in
cliché formulations revolving around anti-Semitism and hate. Attempts to come to terms
with the humanity beneath the barbarity were non-existent. My preliminary research on
diaries suggests that some of the same defense mechanisms thought to have shielded
perpetrators were at work among victims at the same time. These psychological
inhibitors provided a powerful bulwark against a frightful awareness of annihilation and
mortality – maintaining sanity in the case of perpetrators and facilitating the will to resist
among victims. These distancing mechanisms, still found among Holocaust survivors,
even sixty years after the events, are visible in the contemporary accounts as well.
It is not hard to discover transparent instances of psychological defense
mechanisms of denial and avoidance in the diaries. One famous example might include
the assertion by Anne Frank (1929-1945) “…I still believe, in spite of everything, that
people are truly good at heart.” At first only the heartbreakingly naïve wishful thinking of
a teenage girl, a closer reading suggests a protective denial of the exterminatory reality of
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Nazi-occupied Amsterdam in 1944.25 Etty Hillesum (1914-1943), another Dutch Jew,
reported people in the camp at Westerbork telling her “We don’t want to think, we don’t
want to feel, it’s best to shut your eyes to all this misery.”26 While Hillesum derides this
tendency to look the other way in others, a close examination of her diaries and letters
reveal that, over a long period and almost without exception, she engaged in the same
practice herself.
The type of language in which they chose to communicate is the only means left
by which we can understand writers of Holocaust diaries. There are as many styles as
there are diarists, but they share one common aspect. Holocaust diarists are all in some
way trying to come to terms with what Charlotte Delbo called “l’inconcevable.”27
Victims alternately described perpetrators in what I call “journalistic” or “photographic”
or “visual” terms – minimizing the analytic components of their entries – or they
transformed them, through the use of tropes and jokes, into metaphors symbolically
representing something other than mere individuals. In some cases, victims ignored
perpetrators completely – negating Germans textually even as their persecutors were
attempting to negate them physically. While the act of writing and documenting Nazi
actions is viewed by most scholars as an act of resistance, the diarists’ excision of
perpetrators is highly significant and suggests a more active and aggressive, though
unconscious, form of mental resistance to Nazi genocide.

25

Anne Frank, The Diary of a Young Girl: The Definitive Edition (edited by Otto H. Frank and
Mirjam Pressler, translated by Susan Massotty, New York: Anchor Books Doubleday, 1995), p 332.
26
Etty Hillesum, Etty: The Letters and Diaries of Etty Hillesum, 1941-1943 (Grand Rapids,
Michigan: Wm B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2002), p 587.
27
Charlotte Delbo, Auschwitz and After (translated by Rosette C. Lamont, New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1995), p. x.

15
In Holocaust diaries, we quickly discover the limitations of language. Everyday
language is used to transmit everyday ideas. But, in an exterminatory and extraordinary
environment, no language is able to convey the totality of meanings that one expects or
hopes to find.28 In a genocidal atmosphere, words and meanings do not remain static, but
fluctuate in an effort to express a traumatic reality. A wall exists in Holocaust diaries
between the act/idea of genocide and the capabilities of language and imagination to deal
with it. The full psychological import of the trauma can only be inferred. Quite simply
put, genocide is more real than language. In this sense, the Holocaust, as Primo Levi
maintained, is beyond comprehension.29 While extraordinary experiences cannot be
adequately conveyed through everyday language, nevertheless, it is only by “probing the
limits of representation” that we can hope to historicize the experiences and mentalities
forged in the moment of genocide. This thesis is committed to acknowledging those
linguistic limitations while analyzing them at the same time – increasing our knowledge
of genocide to the extent it is possible. Understanding in spite of language is possible
because trauma has left traces and intimations behind in the choice of words and in the
way they are employed, even if their full significance is not always apparent. To this
extent, the thesis is a work dedicated to finding meaning in Holocaust diaries.
VII: Periodization
Unfortunately, when examining these diaries, it is impossible to engage in that
favorite pastime of historians – periodization. It would be convenient to be able to say
that as the war went on and the “Final Solution” progressed, for various reasons,
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imaginations became more subdued and perpetrators receded out of focus. However, it is
not possible in 1939 to distinguish some kind of understanding of perpetrators that had
disappeared by 1945 (or the reverse). The reason this linear progression is not traceable
is because we are dealing with the individual histories of people enduring different kinds
of trauma at different times.
This is not the kind of history based upon overall public opinion or things as
prosaic as government documents, foreign newspapers, policy papers or radio broadcasts.
In other words, this is cultural, not diplomatic or military history, and there are no broad
generalizations to be made here about the effect of specific events or decrees on vast
numbers of people. The focus is on the individual. What I am examining is a series of
private moments in the lives of people as different as assimilated secular Dutch Jews in
Amsterdam and unassimilated orthodox Polish Jews in Warsaw. The similarities I am
seeking to identify in these Holocaust victims lie in only one thing – their understanding
of the people who wanted to kill them.
VIII: The Holocaust and Comparative Genocide
While Holocaust diaries are the specific lens through which victim responses to
perpetrators and their motivations are examined, the goals of this thesis are broader. One
might regard this paper as an attempt to develop a theory of what could be termed
“traumatized imagination” – in which I strive to discover the mental boundaries
associated with the average person’s understanding of the “other” during the course of
traumatic events. It may also be seen as an attempt to establish a paradigm or method
from which subsequent studies of genocide and imagination might profit.
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My research suggests that by constructing a rubric into which references to
perpetrators fall (whether they are present in the text, or absent, or in some in-between
state I term “dissolution”), it is possible to classify responses of Jewish victims to their
circumstances and their persecutors in order to see the emergence of patterns. This thesis
indicates that these patterns form a picture of a traumatized imagination that can
comprehend events “journalistically” or “photographically,” but which has great
difficulty conceiving “analytically” of a will dedicated to annihilation. The reality of the
perpetrator is altered in the imagination of the victim, just as the historiography indicates
that the victim was transformed in the mind of the perpetrator.
The point of this analysis not so much to recover lost voices as it is to recover lost
meanings buried in common texts. It should be noted, however, that it is not the intention
of this thesis, nor is it possible within the constraints of this format, for this to be a
comprehensive study of how victims in every Holocaust diary viewed perpetrators.
Instead, the more modest goal is to discover how some victims of the Holocaust saw their
oppressors and to offer some thoughts as to why there appear to be limits to their
understanding.
IX: Format and Representativeness of Diaries
The thesis is divided into five chapters. A short introduction and conclusion will
buttress three chapters of primary research. The title is explanatory of the work as a
whole. It centers on Jewish depictions of perpetrators in Holocaust diaries with special
emphasis on how they understood the possibilities of genocide and how aversions to
those possibilities constituted both actual and psychological resistance.
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While the methodological approach to this study reflects an interest in the broader
question of genocide, Holocaust diaries form the primary means of examining the
problem. This is for several reasons: first, because my own interests and research
experience lies in the field of Holocaust studies and secondly, because the thesis format
and length of this paper requires a narrower scope. However, this leaves open the
possibility for a larger and broader study to be undertaken in the same manner at a later
time. Because many instances of mass murder contain actors falling into these categories,
this method of analysis may also be used to analyze and historicize other genocides as
well.
I have not commented throughout on the question of how representative the diary
entries examined in this thesis may be. After all, those who actually wrote diaries only
represent a fraction of those who lived and died during the Holocaust – and that group
was, in many senses, self-selected. Rather than focusing on how typical a certain writing
strategy was, it seems more important to simply to demonstrate the existence of these
strategies of depicting perpetrators and to assess the possibilities that exist for using them
as a category of analysis.
X: “Normal Men” and What is Possible
In his 1947 book about Nazi concentration camps, The Other Kingdom, French
resister, activist and author David Rousset famously remarked that “normal men do not
know that everything is possible.”30 When I first stumbled across that phrase in an
undergraduate course on the Holocaust at Michigan State University in 1995, it caught
my attention – and, as an idea, it has remained in the forefront of my thought ever since.
30
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Since discovering that comment, I have found that every approach I have taken to the
study of genocide has been colored, for better or for worse, by the philosophy
encapsulated in that short sentence.
The comment contains several ideas that are important to this thesis. First,
Rousset was arguing that there are two different types of people (to say just “men” would
be sexist and would ignore many of those diarists I have looked at) – people who know
what is possible, and those who do not know what is possible. Rousset is not saying that
people are born differently, or that they are different because of their race or religion or
ethnicity. He is saying that they become different because of what they experience. In
this case, he is saying that trauma – living through the Holocaust – changed the way
victims understood the world. “Normal men” (that is everyone else who did not
experience Nazi genocide) cannot know it the way they do. This is much the same
argument that Jean Améry makes in his essay “Torture,” when he says that what is lost
forever is “trust in the world.”31 In addition, people who are sufficiently traumatized
cannot explain their experiences to other “normal” people with any degree of accuracy,
nor can they convey the meaning of what they have come to know. What they have
learned is that every possibility, every degradation, every pain and every fear
unimaginable to average people is always present, unmitigated and unaltered, in their
minds. This is to say that those who experienced genocide were forcibly set apart from
the rest of the world. Those who died experienced unimaginable horror. Those who
lived continue to experience pain and grief the likes of which those of us who mill around
them uncomprehendingly will never understand. These people have gained wisdom, but
many have lost faith in humankind. This is how I interpret Rousset’s short remark.
31
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One line of reasoning that I pursue in this thesis – that the diarists who wrote
about their experiences in the Holocaust could not make “normal men” understand what
happened to them – is only part of the argument. As many times as I read the diaries and
as much as I try to empathize with these writers, the more I realize it is impossible. I
could never “know” what these people knew. However, after engaging these diaries long
enough, I began to wonder if Rousset, and those who died, and those who lived, were
themselves able to recognize all the “possibilities” genocide entailed. Or if they were just
as lost and confounded by it as “normal” people.
The case I am trying to make in the following pages is that while Jewish diarists
and those who lived and died in the Holocaust may have experienced something the rest
of us have not experienced, they themselves did not necessarily “know” something we do
not. Due to their proximity to the event, they were only capable of understanding
portions, or small pieces, of the larger genocidal process as it moved along. One could
argue, strongly I believe, that we “know” more today – of the facts at least – than most
victims did at the time.32 In addition, even in those instances in which victims/diarists
attempted to analyze and define the events that transpired around them and identify and
explain the people who persecuted them, they were limited both by language and by their
own imaginations. In other words, the trauma of genocide is so great that even the most
astute observers and the most talented writers were only able to allow a portion of the
true reality into their consciousness – and consequently into the pages of their diaries.
Some might ask the question then “What is the importance of studying Holocaust
diaries if they do not really tell the whole story?” This is a fair question, and I offer now
32
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two preliminary answers. First, despite the fact that the numbers of victims is counted
into the millions, only a handful of diaries have survived for historians to examine. To
me, it seems important to engage these rare works with all the tools at our disposal, if
only to learn what people are capable of writing during times of genocide. It seems
important to know how these diarists used writing to resist, as well as to learn what they
considered important to pass to posterity. Second, and sadly, genocide did not disappear
with the Nazis. By asking questions about how much people can know and how much
they can tell us about genocide, we are plumbing the bottomless abyss wrought by cruelty
and hatred a bit further. By pushing these boundaries of knowledge, by “probing the
limits of representation,” it may possible to bring those who “know everything is
possible” and those who do not “know” closer together.
These diaries were not written in a vacuum. Historicizing and analyzing the
experiences related in them allow us to understand both the diaries and the history of the
period more clearly. The texts do not stand in isolation as purely literary artifacts. They
also represent specific and terrible historic moments in ways that would not otherwise be
possible. I make no pretense to have conducted a comprehensive survey. I would claim,
however, to have developed a rather unique rubric, or approach, for studying the
relationships between perpetrators and victims as they exist within the pages of Holocaust
diaries. Only future research will be able to answer questions beyond the scope of this
paper – questions regarding the overall prevalence of each of the three major discursive
strategies across a broad spectrum of diaries, or the distribution of these strategies across
different cultural, religious, generational and gender categories. Work in the future
should concentrate on these and other historical questions raised by the thesis. Only time
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will tell whether or not this line of inquiry will prove valuable for examining texts like
Holocaust diaries that were produced in a genocidal environment.
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Chapter 1: Presence

Descriptive Accounts of Perpetrators in Holocaust Diaries
“…words and events remain linked by the inscribing hand, a literal part
of the experience and the record of it.”
– James E. Young, 1987
I: Introduction
Noted Holocaust scholar James E. Young has written that
…for diarists…bearing witness was less a ‘literary act’ and more a
‘biological necessity’; for some it was even a ‘national obligation.’ So
acute was the fear that their experiences would remain, in Himmler’s
horrifying words, ‘a never-to-be-written page in history,’ that ‘literary
testimony’ became for many victims the sole reason to survive. When
survival and the need to bear witness become one and the same longing,
this desperate urge to testify in narrative cannot be underestimated.1
All of the diarists examined in this thesis are examples of the compulsion to
testify that Young is referring to. They all seemed to recognize the importance of
creating a historical document that captured the events they lived through for future
readers, and they all took the time to create those documents. Yet when historians ask the
question “how do these diarists depict perpetrators in their writing?” something
interesting occurs: in many diaries the perpetrators recede, change or even disappear.
The question being addressed then, is not just “how do perpetrators appear in diaries
written by Jewish victims during the Holocaust?” but also “Why, in documents
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manifestly written for the purpose of creating a record of atrocity and murder, are the
murderers strangely absent or held at arm’s length by the diarists?”
I believe the answer to these questions lies in the tensions surrounding the
production of these diaries. As Young maintains, diarists needed to write. However,
they needed to survive too. To survive frequently meant having to ignore the painful and
terrifying genocidal reality around them. I argue that obsessing, or even thinking, about
the most frightening aspects of their daily existence – the perpetrators of the Holocaust –
damaged the victims’ ability to cope with their situations. Because of this tension
between the need to write and the need to cope, the image of perpetrators was altered in
the diary entries we read today.
I have termed the conflict between the desire to testify and the psychological need
to avoid the harsh reality of the Shoah a “crisis of imagination,” and this concept will be
addressed and defined both here and (at greater length) in chapter two. However, it is
basically the concept that the tension between the need to communicate and the need to
avoid painful thoughts or emotions – especially those associated with perpetrators –
makes Holocaust diaries unique, and allows us to increase our understanding of different
levels, or forms, of resistance undertaken by victims.
The thesis is divided by the way perpetrators are depicted in seven particular
Holocaust diaries.2 This chapter will discuss two of these ways. First, all of these writers
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were individuals who brought their own perspective and focus to their diaries. Not every
diarist had a hard time discussing perpetrators. In fact, some presented detailed analyses
and descriptions of them. For instance, by examining the Bergen-Belsen diary of Abel
Herzberg (1893-1989), it is possible to establish something of a baseline against which
other accounts of perpetrators can be measured. To be clear however, Herzberg’s frank
and articulate discussion of Nazi cruelty and methods seems to be a less common
approach than other types of discursive strategies in which perpetrators are treated in
more abstract and distant ways.
The second type of depiction is one that is primarily a recitation of facts gleaned
from family, as in the case of Éva Heyman, or from news accounts (films and
newspapers) of Nazi actions, as is the case in the diary of Hannah Senesh. It might be
helpful to consider these types of entries primarily visual or descriptive discussions of
events and perpetrators in the broadest possible context, because there is seldom any
mention of how the author actually felt about them and even less seldom a discussion of
individual perpetrators. In these types of entries, the average, day-to-day perpetrators are
not really present at all. Unlike Hitler, the grand perpetrator, who is mentioned in every
one of them, run-of-the-mill perpetrators do not appear in these diaries – except perhaps
in the most superficial sense. This seems to be because the writer had not yet seen, or
directly experienced, the genocidal world in which these individuals existed and wielded
their power.

and Emmanuel Ringelblum of Warsaw, paying particular attention to ways they manipulate language to
depict perpetrators. In the final chapter, I look at the diary of Janusz Korczak of Warsaw, who avoided
perpetrators as much as possible until the very last entry in his diary. Overall, some diarists depicted
perpetrators, but did so in general terms, avoiding specifics and individuals for the most part. Others
confronted perpetrators, but did so by manipulating language to make the confrontation easier to manage
psychologically. Finally, some diarists ignored, or negated, perpetrators to the greatest extent possible.
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Eva Heyman was a thirteen year-old girl whose family did everything it could to
shield her from events. Hannah Senesh wrote from Palestine and had no personal
knowledge of events and could only repeat what she heard about it in the world press or
in rumors in her community. However, one final diary – that of Dawid Sierakowiak of
Łódź – begins to complicate the picture because he was there to experience Nazi
repression personally. And, while Sierakowiak frequently repeated headlines or relayed
simple descriptive accounts of events, he also expressed the anger and rage one would
expect to find under such circumstances. His diary soon becomes problematic however,
because he does not direct his fury at German perpetrators, but rather at his family and
other Jews. His diary provides an example of psychological avoidance and transference
and demonstrates how, at times, victims held the real culprits and legitimate sources of
their anger and misery – the Nazi perpetrators – at bay.
By thinking about these ways in which diarists expressed or avoided their own
feelings toward perpetrators, it is possible to see the active tension created by a “crisis of
imagination” in which the need to relate experiences bumps up against the need to put the
problems created by perpetrators out of their minds. As much as possible, these diarists
attempted to use “plain” language to describe what perpetrators were doing. As my
analysis progresses, this tension becomes greater. In chapter two, the perpetrators recede
into metaphors, tropes and jokes as diarists Etty Hillesum and Emmanuel Ringelblum
begin to realize that their world has become “so extreme as to outstrip language’s
capacity to represent it altogether.”3 Chapter three discusses only one diary, that of
Polish physician Janusz Korczak. It is a unique account in which perpetrators disappear,
almost entirely, before making reappearing in the very last entry Korczak wrote, perhaps
3
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only hours before his death. Taken all together, I believe it becomes clear that Holocaust
diaries contain extreme tensions – tensions which do not exist to the same degree in
memoirs written after the war – precisely because the physical threat represented by the
perpetrators was no longer present.
II: An Example of a Confrontational Diary
Not every Jewish diarist avoided descriptions of Nazi perpetrators. Abel
Herzberg wrote a very confrontational diary during the last year of the war while
imprisoned in the Bergen-Belsen concentration camp. I begin with his diary because it
allows us to establish a point from which other diaries depart. Herzberg’s frank and
angry discussions of Nazi character, practices and ideology provide an important place to
begin, not because other diaries were like his, but because they were so different. When I
began this investigation, I expected to find, across the spectrum of Holocaust diaries,
evidence of the rage, frustration, incomprehension and protest I found in Herzberg’s
diary. When I did not, I was surprised. Herzberg’s diary was in fact the outlier, a diary
that in the end did not conform to the patterns I saw emerging in other diaries. Because
Herzberg’s diary is so different from the other diaries examined in this thesis, I feel it is
important to include most of his pronouncements about Nazis and Nazism, leaving aside
only those that mention perpetrators in passing, or those that are redundant.
By way of background information, Herzberg was born in Amsterdam in 1893
and served in the Dutch Army during World War I. He studied law and was well-known
within Amsterdam’s Jewish community. Herzberg and his family were arrested by the
Nazis in March of 1943, but his wife managed to smuggle the children to safety. He and
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his wife spent several months in the Westerbork transit camp before being sent to
Bergen-Belsen at the beginning of 1944.
More than a year before the final defeat of the Third Reich, Bergen-Belsen
consisted of a number of sub-camps, and conditions had not deteriorated as they later
would. The sub-camp to which Herzberg was attached consisted of Jews being “saved”
on Himmler’s orders on the chance they could be exchanged for German prisoners. In
this camp Herzberg was one of the leaders, in charge of maintaining order and sitting in
judgment of offenses committed by Jews against one another. It was in this position – as
a comparatively privileged prisoner in a comparatively privileged camp that he was able
to write his extensive diary.4
Rather than divide the analysis of Herzberg’s diary into like-minded entries as I
do in later chapters, I believe it is more illustrative of this type of diary to allow it to
unfold chronologically. In this way it is possible to see swings in mood, theme or focus.
This approach also meaningfully displays a fact that should not be ignored – that as the
situation grew worse for Herzberg during the last months of the war, his direct
discussions of Nazis tapered off. This is not unexpected. In the early part of the diaries,
despite Herzberg’s belief that his conditions were comparatively worse than for other
Jews, he still had time and energy to carefully observe his surroundings and to write.
Toward the end, the perpetrators begin to disappear from his writings as he devotes his
energy toward staying alive and to documenting the starvation and death around him as it
was experienced by other Jews. This seems to support the argument that the more
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traumatic the environment in which a writer found him or herself, the less psychological
and physical energy he or she was able to devote to literary resistance to perpetrators.
Herzberg’s first really aggressive entry was directed at the barbarity of those who
imprisoned him. On 14 August 1944 he wrote
Roll-call is like a religious rite, or at least a sacred act for that
bunch of inferior anthropoids who, partly unfulfilled by the human ideals
that their teachers and priests taught them, and partly out of genuine
indignation at all manner of fine cant, have invoked with pounding hearts
a stark and lewd heathendom which taught them that the absolute binding
power of ethics and morals was nonsense, and that, in principle, whatever
was advantageous would always be permitted.5
At this early point in his imprisonment, Herzberg establishes what becomes a longstanding tradition – symbolically flipping the tables on the “master race” by calling into
question their supposed superiority. In fact, referring to them as “inferior anthropoids” is
one of the dehumanizing gestures which became a fundamental component of many
Holocaust diaries. As a lawyer, Herzberg is also highly critical of the “stark and lewd
heathendom” that abandons ethics and embraces a “might makes right” philosophy – an
opinion we would expect someone in a helpless position to subscribe to.
Herzberg frequently used sarcasm as a strategy to deal with his anger. On 17
August 1944 he wrote, “I have a nine-year old daughter. Have the Germans, those
guardians of European culture, locked her away, taken her to Poland?”6 Clearly Herzberg
does not believe Germans are “guardians of European culture.” The comment indicates
extreme anger but it also tells us something else that was common knowledge – for Jews,
moving east to Poland was something that was greatly feared. Though the details might
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not have been known, the prospect clearly angers and terrifies Herzberg and it is through
sarcasm that he is best able to express his emotions at this time.
On 17 August 1944 Herzberg made another observation common to many
Holocaust diaries. In it, he identifies, or conflates, Germans with products they create –
particularly metallic or machine-like products. In this case, he seems to indicate that
barbed-wire represents a kind of national character. He wrote,
…barbed wire seems to be a Germanic predilection. Wherever
you stand or go there is barbed wire. All high-grade stuff: good, quality,
rust-free. With long, thickly planted barbs. Horizontal and vertical barbed
wire. Perhaps the ancient Germans used to have barbed beards.7
The idea that peoples have common national or racial characteristics was, of course,
common at the time, and Herzberg’s use of this kind of analogy might indicate that he
subscribed to this point of view too. But it also seems to demonstrate a more general
point – namely that Jews were just as capable of essentializing their persecutors as the
Germans were of essentializing those they persecuted. On the other hand, the entry is
somewhat ambiguous because it could also indicate a more sarcastic tone in which
Herzberg adopts the faulty logic of his persecutors to make a broader point – that
explaining today’s phenomena in terms of fleeting cultural traits from the long past is
patently ridiculous.
Silence occupies an important place in the study of Holocaust diaries and
memoirs, but the subject has seldom been brought up as articulately as Herzberg does in
an entry dated 18 August 1944. He wrote
Last night I watched a new transport of Polish women arrive. It
was a strangely mild August evening whose infinite beauty penetrates
even to here. For although they have robbed us of the world, they have
not succeeded with the sky. The clouds and the moon remain our
7
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witnesses. Oh, if only they could speak! But they cannot speak. They
remain silent and embody the silence as it were. That silence which is
filled with mysteries, of whisperings of the past, filled with an endless
melancholy that evokes an almost intolerable longing. The depths of
sorrow become fathomless.
In this silence the Polish women file past. This too, takes place
without any sound. It is as if shadows are passing by, as if a film is being
projected with the sound turned off. Not a word is spoken. Not a sound is
heard. Their feet shuffle silently along the ground. If you look more
closely you will notice that a significant number of them are walking
barefoot. If ever a film is made of this period and the director wants to
capture the effect of the infinite wretchedness of evacuation, let him revert
to the silent film. Turn the music off too. Show only their eyes. Because
not only are there no words with which to convey the misery of the
dispossessed, no other sound is capable of it either – silence, silence, a
bewildering silence.8
Like James Young and Saul Friedländer would later, Herzberg recognizes the limitations
of language. Ironically, it is only through using language to discuss the paucity of
language (a very self-reflective and post-modern notion) that Herzberg is able to describe
it. More importantly, he is also aware – even before the war is over – of the important
place art holds in the process of conveying historical events to a future audience. This
seems to indicate Herzberg’s experience of another kind of “crisis” – not one of
imagination, but one of language. As many scholars would maintain after him, Herzberg
felt that the experience of the Holocaust could not be adequately related. In this case, it
was not that Herzberg believed it was too painful to describe, but because the idea of
others attempting to imagine what had happened, either through the use of language or of
art, seemed futile to him. For Herzberg to say “show only their eyes” is for him to resort
to the intangible – to imagination. At the same time, however, even as he wishes that he
could communicate his experiences to others, he acknowledges that it cannot be done and
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so, in the end, he (and the imaginary director of his film) must paradoxically resort to “a
bewildering silence” to convey the most accurate meaning.
Unlike some other diarists, Janusz Korczak for instance, Herzberg seemed to
grasp Nazi goals and ideology completely.9 In an aggressive and disdainful comment
written 19 August 1944, he again lays out his understanding of the Nazi raison d’etre.
“In every country that it marched into in its clumsy boots the Third Reich immediately
began to carry out the most sacred item of its manifesto: the extermination of the Jews.”10
This clear understanding of Nazi purpose is, perhaps, one of the strongest points of
Herzberg’s diary and one that gives him the fortitude to write what he does.
Another means of resistance common to many diaries was to dehumanize
perpetrators. By doing so, the diarists removed these people from what was familiar, or
from what was common between the two groups. This was not unique to victims, and
was in fact something done quite intentionally by the Nazis as they attempted to make
genocide more palatable to those who had to carry it out.11 This insistence on
dehumanization, on the part of both the Nazis and Jewish victims, seems to be an
example of the need to maintain a kind of simple binary division of peoples in an uneven
and hostile environment. On 28 August 1944, Herzberg penned the following entry
describing an SS man at Bergen-Belsen.
The group had not worked hard enough; ‘der Rote Müller’, a sort
of dressed up piglet, lazy as a pig on a hot day, fat and puffed up, with a
red mouth and greenish slits for eyes, a cigar stump permanently stuck
between a pair of clinging jellyfish lips, the Rote Müller felt that not
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enough work had been done. Four days’ Brotentzug [without bread
rations] for a group of forty men….12
This account of Nazi as animals or monsters is similar to descriptions by other diarists
(like Emmanuel Ringelblum’s portrayal of Nazi perpetrators as “Frankensteins” or
“bloody dogs,” which will be discussed at greater length in chapter two). This tendency
to dehumanize the hostile “other” continues in an entry from 30 August 1944, when
Herzberg wrote, “Those who had not gone to bed yet but were still sitting up had to jump
to attention, to listen to the roaring, the braying of the SS louts, learned through
propaganda and training.”13 These animal metaphors – Nazis as lions and jackasses – are
apt comparisons to Herzberg. In this entry, Nazi perpetrators – as cruel and powerful as
lions, as loud and ridiculous as jackasses – are nevertheless symbolically being stripping
of their power and placed under the control of some other force. To Herzberg, it seems
that these men are nothing more than trained circus animals, only doing as their masters
allow or as instinct dictates. At least that is the position his language puts them in.
Sometimes, Holocaust diarists referred to Germans as they may have tried to
portray themselves – but through the use of sarcasm, managed to convey the exact
opposite meaning. In the same entry of 30 August 1944, Herzberg refers to the SS as
“their lordships” on two separate instances. This is also very similar to a strategy
employed by Emmanuel Ringelblum in his Warsaw diary in which he refers to Germans
as “lords and masters” (see discussion in chapter two).
An important entry on 1 September 1944 is another example of the kind of
castigation and recrimination one would expect in many Holocaust diaries. Here
Herzberg wrote
12
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One day there will probably be peace again and then war again.
And people like us, people who are convicted of crimes they have not
committed, who are persecuted yet are innocent, who look at each other,
and whatever we may think of each other, know we are innocent, we who
with our wives and children are punished day after day by people to whom
we can reply only with silent contempt, we who know their crimes, their
immeasurable guilt, their lawlessness, and have discovered the extent to
which they have repudiated every human responsibility for us, we who
suffer for them, we who are made responsible for their responsibility, we
who are accused of everything that belongs to their criminal intent, who
are said to want everything that they bring about, who are said to aspire to
everything that they wish to achieve, we who are imputed with every
wickedness for the mischief-maker and who bleed for their misdeeds, we
who know this from our history, again from generation to generation, we
the eternal scapegoat, the brother of him who was beaten to death, who are
branded with the mark of Cain the fratricide, we are not even satisfied
with the illusion of the horizon – but we also want to know what lies
behind it, like a child that stands at the seaside and asks: Where do the
waves come from?14
This single long sentence is the most complete depiction, critique and repudiation of Nazi
perpetrators I found in any of the diaries I studied. Herzberg seems to pass through every
negative emotion, from “contempt” to scorn to anger, as all the blame for the Holocaust –
the complete culpability – is placed on Nazi shoulders. Here, Nazis are thoroughly evil.
The question is not asked why they are evil. Nor is the question asked why Jews are the
“eternal scapegoat.” It suffices for Herzberg that this is the way things are and
questioning it is a pointless exercise, like asking where waves come from. It also
bespeaks a kind of cultural resignation based upon countless years of dealing with the
same anti-Semitic phenomena. The sentence demonstrates something else important,
however. As Young has said, diarists felt compelled to not just to write, but to testify.
Testimony implies not just relaying information or narrative, but also calling for
judgment. It seems clear that by testifying in this way, Herzberg was looking forward to
the time when perpetrators and the idea of Nazism would be placed on trial. The passage
14
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almost reads like a prosecutor’s opening statement – something unsurprising since
Herzberg was a lawyer in civilian life as well as a jurist within the world of BergenBelsen. The passage is a declaration both of Jewish innocence and of German guilt and
as such seems a remarkable depiction of perpetrators (in general, though not specifically).
It is interesting to note the timing of this indictment as well – 1 September 1944 was the
fifth anniversary of the beginning of the war in Europe, something Herzberg
acknowledges earlier in the entry.
On 4 September 1944 Herzberg returned to a more general critique of individual
SS men. “The men who are required to work are being beaten terribly. Fritz, the Red
Müller, Count Turd (so named because he is responsible for the latrines) and Rau are
hounding men with a plank of wood.”15 Obviously Herzberg is indicating sympathy with
those at the mercy of these perpetrators and anger at those doing the beating, but he is
also demonstrating another strategy for dealing with a hostile “other.” By using humor –
in this case a scatological humor reference to one of the SS men – Herzberg (and indeed,
all the Jews who used the demeaning nickname), is attempting, through the use of
mockery to even out a disparity in power. The SS man, as “Count Turd” is not so
powerful, or so great a threat, as he would otherwise be.16
Herzberg is testifying again in an entry of 7 September 1944.
This morning, the commandant himself came to select the men. He sent everyone
to work. Men up to eighty years of age, sick people with thirty-nine and forty degree
temperature; he sent for the hospital soldier, generally known as the Herr Sanitäter,
abused the Jewish doctor, and gave himself away completely. ‘Ihr glaubt wohl wegen
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der kleinen Frontsverschiebung könnt Ihr alle sabotieren! Ich schneide euch den Hals
ab.17
Here he is providing evidence of murderous intent – witnessing in advance – against the
leadership of the Nazi camp.
On 8 September 1944 Herzberg plainly laid out the way prisoners at BergenBelsen physically resisted the demands of the Third Reich. He wrote,
The Germans say we are lazy, indolent slouches, slow and
incapable of work. Jews do not know how to work. They guess correctly.
We cannot work under these circumstances and will not do it. They can
drag us here, whip us and beat us, we will do it as slowly and as sluggishly
as we want and not a fraction more than the minimum. Of all the methods
of undermining the system, this is one of the best. To the Kraut it must
seem as if he is chewing on a sticky mass, or walking through thick
syrup.18
It should be noted again, that Herzberg was in a camp for relatively privileged Jews.
Because they were being saved for exchange with German prisoners (under the direct
orders of the Reichsführer SS no less), the amount of punishment that could be meted out
was somewhat limited. It is almost impossible to imagine this kind of resistance taking
place in Auschwitz, where, for example, the goal was either immediate Vernichtung in
the gas chambers, or the slower Vernichtung durch Arbeit of day-to-day life in the camps.
There are several important points that can be gleaned from Herzberg’s entry
dated 12 September 1944 in which he wrote “Whenever there is a westerly wind, all over
the camp one can smell the bones smouldering in the crematorium. The bones of the
Jews smell exactly like the bones of the Aryan Häftlinge when they are burned. What a
wonderful smell the bones of the Heroic Teuton Warriors will spread when they are

17

“You seem to think that because of the small shift of the front you can all start committing
sabotage! I’ll cut your throats.” Herzberg, p. 71.
18
Herzberg, p. 81-82.

37
placed on the fire.”19 The first point is that this is yet another frank acknowledgment of
Herzberg’s bitter anger and even hate of the Nazis who were murdering so many people
in the less-protected or privileged camps around him. The second is the clear expression
of his desire to switch places with the murderers. It is not enough now to stop the murder
of Jews – Nazis themselves must die and their bodies will smell wonderful burning. He
also makes a point about equality. Why are Jews being singled out, he implies, when the
bodies of Aryan Häftlinge smell the same as those of Jews? Finally, the sarcasm
continues – Herzberg believes the Nazi are anything but “Heroic Teuton Warriors.”
Calling them that is a mark of extreme scorn and contempt. The delight he feels in
German death continues in yet another sarcastic entry written later that week. On 17
September 1944 he wrote. “The transport from Westerbork brought us newspapers. I
read the Deutsche Zeitung für die Niederlande of 8 and 9 September. It is a pleasure to
read how courageously the Germans are falling in battle.”20
Something unique to Herzberg is his tendency to personify one specific – indeed
one essential symbol of Nazism. On 19 September 1944 he declares that “The
crematorium will have a good laugh today.” In the midst of the death-throes of the Third
Reich, Herzberg gloats at the prospect of the continued death and destruction of Germans
and Germany. He continues,
‘Der Herr Sanitäter’ has died. What is more, he died by his own
hand. He used to threaten it: ‘Wenn die Sache schief geht….’ Despite this
threat, die Sache ist nicht recht gegangen. Der Herr Sanitäter had drunk a
large bottle of rum, and with the courage of melancholy drunkenness, had
pressed his revolver to his head.
When he has arrived at the throne of eternal accountability, they
will call a number of witnesses. Material witnesses. Jews from Bergen19
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Belsen, who had stood before him trembling with fever, whom he had
refuses to make Dienstfrei. Jews who had been sent out to work last
winter when they had longed for a little warmth and rest.
In heaven they will stand before the throne of justice. All that the
Herr Sanitäter can do then is to hope for God’s mercy. Woe betide him
on his day of judgment.21
Again, Herzberg is providing evidence of Nazi atrocity – this time to an imaginary, but
higher court – not one presided over by man, but by God.
Early in the fall of the last year of the Third Reich, before things passed into total
chaos, Herzberg seemed confident in victory – not just of the Allies, but of the Jewish
people and Jewish culture. In an entry dated 28 September 1944, Yom Kippur, he writes
“And every enemy, including the SS, exists for us as if they were yesterday, as if they
were last year’s snow. They are worthless. They lead to emptiness and vanity and we
will survive. Next year in Jerusalem. With these words the Day of Atonement ends
too.”22 These ideas express a belief in the resilience of the Jewish people even in the
middle of the Holocaust. For Herzberg, the concept of the “eternal Jew” is something to
celebrate.
The crematorium is again an active, living participant in an entry dated 3 October
1944. “The ugly skeletal men were all starving with hunger…each of them could already
see the refuse cart waiting to take him to Hitler’s silent ally standing in the background:
the crematorium.” He continues later in the same entry, “…a couple of stray Canadians
arrived and began to fire at us. They were really angry and their machine-guns crackled
lustily. We had two casualties, the Schneebaumlager one, and the poor Häftlinge eight.
The crematorium had a feast.”23
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Herzberg reverts back to legal language in the entry of 5 October 1944. “…we
must do everything possible to avoid becoming accomplices of the Germans. We must
stand by our principles.”24 Here, Herzberg again explicitly recognizes the criminality of
the Nazi regime and implicitly expresses interest and satisfaction that when the day of
reckoning finally arrives the Nazis will be seen for what they are by all men, by history
and by God. This is why Jews must remain together – a coherent community – and not
sully themselves by colluding with their enemies in any way.
The entry of 9 October 1944 is long and remarkable. In it, Herzberg lays out what
almost amounts to a short version of Jewish history – one that clearly and unabashedly
posits the primacy of Jewish culture and thought, and one that savagely critiques
German/Christian culture. He wrote
Here we see this man, face to face, in his true light. We – and I
believe this to be our [Jewish] historical, our eternal, experience –
encounter him in his nakedness, far away from the path of civilization,
there where he feels no embarrassment. He gives reign to his passions. He
does what his heart desires, he pursues the lust of his soul, and we are his
spoils and his sacrifice. We Jews see man in the crevices and depths of his
true nature. We see him as the fly sees the spider, as the roe deer sees the
panther.
And we even managed not to hate him. Instead, out of a most
profound love for mankind and out of a vital urge and a philosophy of life,
that could not be surpassed or tempered, we gave him a rule of life. Out of
an all too great mercy for mankind we gave him the principle of
accountability and retribution so that he might control himself.
However, it was made into a kind of ‘love’ and ‘mercy’ which,
from a psychological point of view, meant the enfeebling of accountability
– and therefore became acceptable to him.
And when one sees here how men, big strong men, send women
and children on transport, shouting, cursing, raging, or when one has seen
just once how the SS man transports corpses with a cigarette in his snout,
unmoved as if he is transporting manure – no worse – as if he is
transporting bricks, then one knows: this is man. Ecce homo!
And even more than unmoved, the SS man is pleased with himself,
precisely because he is unmoved. That he has succeeded in attaining this
24
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state in the face of the most extreme human suffering, that and that alone
he calls victory and power. It is the victory over the principle, which he
senses to be a Jewish principle: the principle of the omnipresent Spirit, as
God is called by the Jew. Ha makom.25
According to Herzberg’s viewpoint, the Jews existed first. Others were encountered
later, almost as secondary beings, as they climbed up lower rungs on the ladder of
development. Nevertheless, he admits that, historically, the Jew has been subjected to the
lower creature/man. Even though he qualifies his initial statement, in making this
assertion, Herzberg flips the prevalent (at least in Nazi Germany) vision of Aryan and
Jewish relationships and assigns the power and the wisdom to see true nature to the Jew,
not to the Aryan. This could be considered the expression of a will to power and control
– one that is natural and almost necessary among powerless people in situations like the
one in which Herzberg found himself. He also asserts that while the Jews were
frequently the victim of those with more power, the true moral superiority lies with the
Jew, who is responsible for the Judeo/Monotheistic ethics and the law which gave the
“other” (the Gentile/Aryan) the opportunity to grow and mature as a culture. Throughout
this passage, Jews are tied in Herzberg’s mind to the moral, the correct, and the legal.
Continuing his history in a positively Nietzschean vein, he asserts that these Jewish laws
and morals were only acceptable to the Gentiles/Aryans in the watered-down form of
Christianity – the “love” and “mercy” which entailed an “enfeebling of accountability.”
This short “history lesson” which – quickly traces man’s progress over thousands of
years – out of some sort of Hobbesian state of nature, to Christian times, to 20th century
man, to the individual SS man, to the complete elimination of what is human in man – is
25
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meant by Herzberg to encapsulate the basic structure of history according to the Jew.
Regardless of whether other Jews felt this way or not, this is a fascinating insight into the
mind of an intelligent and well-educated Jewish man who, suddenly powerless and
surrounded by enemies, found it necessary to interpret history not just in a pro-Jewish
light, but in one that was actively hostile to Gentiles/Christians/Aryans/Nazis.
The entry dated 13 October 1944 is both a kind of elitist class critique as well as
one that continues Herzberg’s assault on any political philosophy based strictly on power.
He writes
Germany is governed – and this is Hitler’s secret – by the
Feldswebel [Sergeant]. He gives the soldier good fodder, and the officer a
leg up. He earns a good salary, pulls on his boots, and with his
unbelievable insolence and unsparing coarseness walks through the land:
the taskmaster, the slave driver, who will ‘niederschlagen,’ [and]
‘ausradieren’ everything, the servant as ‘Herr.’ The ruffian as the chosen
one, the depraved in the role of the man of noble blood. The unworthy,
who is fooled into thinking that because of his muscles, he has been called
upon to form the ruling race and will, therefore, ‘in die Fresse hauen’
[and] ‘im Arsch treten.’ The lazy good-for-nothing who finds everything
‘Scheisse’ except getting others to work for him. Others, he envies and
hates for their achievements and talent.
And as everyone has a rotten or worthless spot in his soul, there are
many, many National Socialists and many, many men in the SS. They
will be sorry enough, but regret is also one of the begetters of the
incurable disease that Germany suffers from: Deutschtum.26
Although this assessment of perpetrators starts out simply as a critique of the lower or
middling classes, by the end, it is German-ness itself that is the culprit to blame. Not
only is Deutschtum responsible for his problems, but it is also the object of Herzberg’s
derision. The critique continues on 21 October 1944. This time, the healthy German
bodies are envied – something that is again no surprise coming from someone reduced to
eating sporadic rations of stale bread and the occasional rancid mussels. In this case,
26
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however, he is also calling into question the very masculine virtues that the SS extol in an
attempt to shame those who harass the “wretched heap of wrecks” to be found in the KZs.
If they are truly Aryan warriors, or real German men (something he has already
expressed doubts about), Herzberg believes they would be fighting their more powerful
enemies. He writes
There is no news. There is only the endless bullying, provoking
and tormenting by the SS, and every day anew it amazes us that a body of
perfectly fit, well-fed men, at the peak of their lives, tall, muscled, strong
men, who in fact could be the flower of the nation, actually have no other
work and no other worry than daily to harass this wretched heap of wrecks
formed by us men, women and children. Daily, now that the German
fatherland is in great danger and the German nation finds itself in a
historic crisis, in which lasting decisions are made about its fate, its
happiness, indeed its life and death. One would like to shout at them:
gentlemen, have you nothing better to do now?27
It did not seem occur to Herzberg that he and the remaining Jews really were perceived
by the regime as Nazism’s most powerful enemies. The illogical nature of National
Socialism, and Hitler especially, who found it more important to win the war against the
Jews than the war itself, is something Herzberg does not even consider. As with many
other Holocaust diarists, the extent of Nazi irrationality is something Herzberg finds
difficult to comprehend.
Herzberg’s diary began on 11 August 1944. As we have seen, for about three
months he managed to pay close attention to perpetrators. However, by mid-November,
these depictions started to become fewer and farther between. The level of analysis began
to deteriorate as well, until by December 1944 Herzberg’s perspective, at first so different
than all the other diaries I have examined, was reduced to the straight journalistic type of
reportage of news that other diarists used as well. For instance, on Christmas Day he
27
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repeated rumors like the following: “Yesterday it was alleged: Brussels retaken. The
Germans again forty kilometers from the coast. 470,000 Americans taken prisoner.
Significant retreat in Holland. Probably it is all much exaggerated, but the fact of the
German initiative and offensive remains.”28
Up until 8 November, Herzberg wrote 51 entries, many (as we have seen) dealt
with perpetrators. He wrote 61 more entries afterward, and in these, perpetrators are
present only in passing, with a few exceptions like the following. 20 March 1945.
“Aber: kapitulieren werden wir nie. We, the SS, still have plenty to stuff ourselves on.
The rest does not matter.”29 This statement does not really seem to be a direct quote from
the SS. Rather, it is more likely Herzberg is putting words into their mouths – projecting
his own sentiments about their stubborn refusal to surrender and greed into their mouths.
Only one other statement regarding perpetrators is worth considering in this context. On
10 April 1945 he wrote a short entry. He wrote “The SS are allowing the ‘organizing.’
This afternoon they cut off the water because of an air raid alert.”30 This statement is of
some interest because is demonstrates that metaphors (“organizing” is a metaphor for
resistance through theft from the SS) which began in eastern camps like Majdanek and
Auschwitz had been appropriated and were being used by inmates in the interior. This is
unsurprising considering that as the Eastern Front collapsed, thousands of concentration
inmates (like those from Auschwitz Herzberg mentioned in his 18 August entry) were
transported to the interior of the Reich. The final sentence is just another example of
reportage.
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Through this brief analysis of Abel Herzberg’s statements on perpetrators it is
possible to accomplish several things. The first is to demonstrate potential literary or
discursive strategies for dealing with both a painful experience as well as the need to
communicate. Throughout his diary, Herzberg alternately writes in angry, sarcastic,
dehumanizing, metaphorical, philosophical, historical and journalistic styles. Not only
that, but although he early on recognizes the important role of silence in trying to convey
genocidal reality, it is only in the end that his diary manifests that silence with regard to
perpetrators. In other words, Herzberg’s diary represents a unique example of the genre
of Holocaust diaries by illustrating many of the possible ways a diarist could deal with
perpetrators. It also demonstrates the progression one individual worked through while
trying to come to terms with a brutal, genocidal world. In examining other diaries written
during the same six-year period, few of the writers laid out their vision and understanding
of Nazis as clearly or articulately as Herzberg did, but those who did discuss them used
many of the same literary styles that he employed. In order to make the point that these
other authors avoided perpetrators in their diaries, it was necessary to look at someone
who did not. For this reason Abel Herzberg’s diary has been examined first.
III: Depictions of Perpetrators at a Distance
Abel Herzberg was a grown man, well-educated and intelligent. Because of his
privileged position in a unique camp, he was able to observe perpetrators closely and pen
his entries in relative safety. Herzberg’s long pronouncements on the nature of Nazi
perpetrators stand in stark contrast to those of Éva Heyman (1931-1944) and Hannah
Senesh (1921-1944) – two young Hungarian women who tend to speak of Nazis only at a
distance. Their accounts are filtered through what they have been told by others, or what
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they may have seen in newsreels, or read in newspapers. There are a couple of good
reasons for this discrepancy. First, Heyman was only thirteen years-old when she wrote
her diary. Her family was well-educated, not to mention being committed socialists to
whom politics were second-nature. However, Heyman’s mother (whom she refers to
throughout the diary by her first name, Ági) and step-father tried to shield her from
events as much as possible. Of course, much of the worry, fear, and general
consternation the family felt as a whole comes through in Éva’s diary. It is not that
Heyman had no experience with Nazis at all. In fact, as her diary makes plain, her best
friend had already been taken away by the Nazis and sent to Poland before the diary
began. However, her direct experience was very limited, and the one close call she did
have before she was deported to her death in Auschwitz-Birkenau on 2 June 1944 did
manage find its way into a dream she wrote about.
The influence her family had on her is plain to see in an entry from 14 February
1944. In it Heyman wrote “…Ági thinks that the Russians don’t tell lies, and neither
does the Voice of America; only the German radio and the Hungarian radio tell lies.”31
Éva’s tone is not one that questions her mother’s judgment. As someone well-versed in
politics, Ági understood the idea of propaganda and misinformation very well. One
senses from this account that it is not that Ági is deluding herself, but that she is trying to
make things simpler for her daughter. This tendency to reduce things to the simplest
formulations is something common to many Holocaust diaries. It is as if there was not
the time or energy to qualify every statement. Or perhaps it was easier, in an
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environment of total war, to ignore the tendency of one’s own side to adopt the same
morally dubious tactics practiced by the other side (lies and propaganda).
In the same entry, Heyman continues “I heard Ági tell Grandma that at the
Journalists Club the night before they had said that the government was preparing to do
something terrible, and Jews who weren’t born in Hungary would be taken to Poland
where a horrible fate was in store for them.”32 Again, Heyman is relating something she
heard from her family. The comment is illustrative of the fact Hungarian Jews, (the last
European Jews to feel the full power of Hitler’s “Final Solution”) were aware of the
events taking place in Poland. From Heyman’s point of view, however, what this
“horrible fate” was could be was not yet questioned. Continuing with the same entry,
Heyman demonstrates her youth and naïveté. She knows that bad things are happening,
but the idea of an ideology or political philosophy is not yet clear to her. At this moment
in her life, people are defined by deeds, not ideas. Here she wrote, “I don’t know what
Fascism is, but one of the things it probably means is deporting Jews to Poland.”33 As in
Herzberg’s diary, while Jews might not grasp the full significance of the experience they
are living through, “Poland” has become a kind of shorthand for the worst kinds of fears
and a synonym for German depravity and evil.
Éva’s attempts to understand the ideas that gave structure to the events occurring
around her continued in an entry dated 26 February 1944.
I don’t know what ‘politics’ actually is, though everybody is
always talking about it: I really don’t understand it, or who does it, but
they do it very badly. I’ll just be a photo reporter, that’s all. But I promise
you one thing, dear diary; I won’t photograph a single Rightist because I
hate them with all of my might!34
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This quick entry gives us a clue to Éva’s view of the world: politics – however it is
defined – is done badly (and who could disagree with her analysis?). She believes it is
simpler to dream a little dream of being a photographer. Finally, her statement indicates
that, even though the causes of the war were unclear to her, hate in response to hate was
still possible, even for one so young.
Éva‘s nebulous and ill-defined ideas of Nazis and Nazism end on 19 March 1944.
In an entry that resonates with fear and trepidation, she wrote “Dear diary, you’re the
luckiest one in the world, because you cannot feel, you cannot know what a terrible thing
has happened to us. The Germans have come!”35 Here, Heyman gives us a clue as to
how it is possible to deal with trauma. It is better not to be able to feel at all than to
suffer. The Nazis come like the end of the world, making Heyman wish she could not
feel, but at the same time, she believes it is necessary to live and to feel this trauma
through the act of writing the entry. This entry is important because it underscores the
idea of a “crisis of imagination” in which Holocaust diarists had to come to terms with
the need to speak about what was happening, and at the same time numb themselves with
regard to its full meaning.
Heyman divulged her dream to become a photographer in an earlier entry. On 25
March 1944 she made another statement that gives an idea of how the war made the most
sense to her in photographic or cinematic terms. She wrote “I was on my way home
when the German soldiers came marching in, with cannons and tanks, the kind I’ve seen
in the newsreels.”36 A cinematic version of the war is just that – images and maybe some
short journalistic descriptors that relay what is happening, but contain no real analysis of
35
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why it happens. This is Heyman’s first real experience of Nazis, yet she finds it
impossible to discuss it in any other way than to say it similar to films she has seen. It is
clear that she is avoiding – or perhaps has not yet really probed the idea of the Nazi
perpetrator, as she herself admits in the next day’s entry. On 26 March 1944, she wrote
“Dear diary, until now I didn’t want to write about this in you because I tried to put it out
of my mind, but ever since the Germans are here, all I think about is Márta. She was also
just a girl, and still the Germans killed her. But I don’t want them to kill me!”37 The fear
in this short entry is palpable. Heyman is terrified. She knows her friend has been
murdered and this realization allows her to understand her own mortality as well. But the
idea of death is something she must not think about and she tries “to put it out of [her]
mind.” But again, she is compelled to write about the fear, to write about the Nazis and
to write about the murder of her friend. Again, we see the tensions of a “crisis of
imagination.”
Things quickly became worse for Éva and her family, as she related in brief and
factual entry dated 28 March 1944. “Early this morning the German and Hungarian
Police took Uncle Sándor and everyone they knew who is a Socialist or a Communist.”38
Clearly the genocidal pressure was increasing and the little girl’s world was becoming
more and more dangerous. This short entry again relays information. It is almost a
journalistic account. Something happened, that is all. Éva makes no effort to discuss
why this happens. She merely records the event. It seems plain that she is still trying to
keep certain things out of her immediate consciousness.
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Shortly after this entry, Éva and her family were moved into the ghetto in
Nagyvarad. The next month’s entries are devoted almost exclusively to life in the ghetto
with all its horrors and deprivations. However, as much as she may have wished to keep
a conscious awareness of Nazi perpetrators at bay, subconsciously she was still trying to
cope. In a fascinating entry of 5 May 1944 she wrote “I dreamt that Pista Vadas was the
driver of the truck [taking the family to the ghetto], and I was awfully angry that Pista
Vadas had become an S.S. man.”39 Pista Vadas was the young Jewish man Heyman was
in love with (a youthful crush, at a distance). It is interesting that in order for Éva’s mind
to let perpetrators through – even in a dream – they had to be disguised in the form of
someone Heyman loved and could trust. What the dream reveals then, is not a
perpetrator at all but a Jew in an SS uniform. The actual German human being is
nowhere to be found. This type of imaginative alteration dealing with the uniform
continues in other diaries and will be examined later in the thesis.
As things moved from bad to worse, Heyman, like Herzberg, began to ignore
perpetrators even more. In fact, in the last month of her life, they disappear entirely. One
final entry on 18 May 1944, written only about two weeks before Heyman was deported
to Auschwitz, again conveys a young child’s fear of death and the unknown.
Although she quotes her grandmother, one senses that she is appropriating the words for
herself too. She wrote “Even Grandma said: I really don’t want to die, because maybe I
will yet live to see a better world, and all those people who are now so inhuman and
wicked will be punished.”40 This entry expresses two important things. First, it displays
dread and horror in the face of imminent death. Secondly, and more importantly, the

39
40

Heyman, p. 89.
Heyman, p. 97.

50
comment, like many of Herzberg’s, testifies to the desire to see justice served and
perpetrators punished for the pain and misery they have caused.
We now turn to the diary of one of the great heroes of the Holocaust, Hannah
Senesh. Interestingly, although Senesh clearly felt the need to resist Nazi aggression very
strongly, her diary is almost devoid of comments on perpetrators. Categorically, her
diary could almost fall under the heading of “Absence” or “Silence,” were it not for the
fact that she repeats some of the visual or cinematic elements Heyman expressed and
periodically makes short personal comments on their significance. Although both young
women were Hungarian, Senesh was considerably older than Éva Heyman (born in 1921
rather than 1931) and could therefore express a more mature opinion about the war.
Unlike Heyman, she was also not present in Europe during the period in which she wrote
her diary. Writing from a kibbutz in Palestine, Senesh’s diary clearly conveys the mental
as well as physical distance from the perpetrators of the Holocaust. Although she
sympathizes with her family back in Hungary, and she editorializes somewhat, it seems
that, for someone who would eventually give her life to fight the Nazis, she thinks far less
about them than one would expect.41
Her entry of 8 September 1939 lays out, in few words, the immediate cause of the
war.
The war we feared has begun. It broke out over the matter of Danzig and
the Polish Corridor…If they had really wanted to they could have preserved the
peace. But they didn’t want to – so there is now war between Germany and
Poland. The Germans have already captured a large part of Poland, and France,
and England, Poland’s allies have entered the war.42
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This comment is completely neutral in terms of perpetrators. The war is to be feared, but
the “they” who could have avoided it could include any or all of the Great Powers.
Her tone is more personal on 14 May 1940 when she says
I was struck by the realization of how cut off I am from the world.
How can I have the patience to study and prepare for an exam while the
greatest war in history is raging in Europe? We are witnessing, in general,
times that will determine the fate of man. The European war is engulfing
vast areas, and fear that it will spread to our land is understandable. The
entire world is gripped by tension. Germany grows mightier daily.43
In this entry, Senesh begins to express what she is compelled to do – namely to act.
Writing is not necessarily something her psychology requires. Senesh wants to act, not
just react – this is why she questions her patience. The enemy is no one in particular –
she has not seen perpetrators or experienced the war – it is only that “Germany” grows
mightier and hence must be fought.
Senesh’s comments of 4 June 1940 are worth mentioning because they indicate
that she was attempting to identify with those who were suffering under Nazi oppression.
“I can’t feel a thousandth of what Mother must no be living through. She is suffering for
our plans, dreams, which perhaps in this world holocaust will turn to ashes.”44 This is of
interest for several reasons. First, it acknowledges the idea that imagination is limited –
she cannot understand what is happening to her mother in Hungary. She expresses
anxiety because all of the hopeful Zionist dreams she has invested so much hope in could
go up in flames. Finally, “this world holocaust” is an important phrase. In it, Senesh
seems to indicate her realization that the flames of war could exceed the bounds of
Europe and completely engulf the world if something is not done. Her use of the word
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“holocaust” is the only example I have found in which the word that would come to
resonate around the world as a synonym for Nazi atrocity is used during the war by a
diarist.
Senesh again repeats simple news in her entry of 17 June 1940. “The Germans
are on the threshold of Paris. Perhaps today the city will fall. Paris and France and the
entire world. What is going to become of us? All I ask is, how long? Because that Hitler
must fall, I don’t doubt. But how long has he been given? Fifteen years, like Napoleon?
How history repeats itself.”45 Clearly, Senesh understood the stakes at play in this war,
particularly the extent to which those stakes affected Jews. At this point, before she goes
back to Europe to fight, she is concerned with only one major villain, rather than the
innumerable soldiers and functionaries who competed to fulfill Hitler’s anti-Semitic
wishes across the continent.46
The only time Senesh truly expresses fear, it not in relation to what is happening
in Europe, but what might happen in Palestine. On 23 April 1941, she wrote
But no one dares ask, what will happen if the Germans come here?
The words are meaningless – on paper. But if we close our eyes and listen
only to our hearts, we hear the pounding of fear…Whether I want to or
not, I must imagine what the fate of the Land will be if it has to confront
Germany. I’m afraid to look into the depth of the abyss, but I’m
convinced that despite our lack of weapons and preparedness, we won’t
surrender without resisting strongly. Half a million people can face up to
a force, no matter how greatly it is armed.47
This entry is very revealing and recapitulates some of Herzberg’s themes. First and
foremost it expresses the resolution to resist and fight back – even if the wish itself is
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naïve and fanciful. It also acknowledges the inability of words to convey or to help cope
with the trauma a German invasion of Palestine would create. Finally, like Herzberg,
who repeated some Nietzschean philosophy in his diary (in relation to the “weakness” of
Christianity), Senesh paraphrases Nietzsche from Beyond Good and Evil – admitting her
aversion to looking into the “abyss” of German aggression – an admission which also
reinforces the idea of a “crisis of imagination” in that she is saying she does not want to
think about certain possibilities that might befall her or her comrades.
The last two entries in which Senesh substantively address perpetrators goes back
to the model of the simply descriptive account of what is happening in the broadest geopolitical sense. On 9 July 1941 she wrote.
Germany attacked Russia about two weeks ago [it was 16 days]
and swiftly captured Russian Poland, as well as a good part of Finland,
and has begun advancing toward the interior of Russia. According to
radio reports, the Nazis are now encountering strong Russian opposition.
Everyone knows that the results of this struggle will be decisive to the
future of the world. The suspense is enormous.48
Cleary, despite expressing her opinion about the importance of Operation Barbarossa,
Senesh is clearly dependent on news reports and the radio to let her know what is going
on. The final entry pertaining to Nazis or Nazi Germany was written on 6 July 1942. It
simply states, “The Germans are at the gates of Alexandria.” 49 Although she wrote
sixteen more diary entries after this one before she left for Europe at the beginning of
1943, there seems to be no more for her to say about perpetrators. As with Herzberg, the
more traumatic the environment was in which Senesh found herself, the less there was to
talk about. It seems plain that there is some link between the intensity of the atmosphere

48
49

Senesh, p. 121.
Senesh, p. 152-153.

54
surrounding the writer and the ability or desire to deal with those who are responsible for
that intensity.
IV: Distance in Proximity – The Diary of Dawid Sierakowiak
We have seen how some Jewish writers, like Abel Herzberg, took direct aim at
Nazi perpetrators in the pages of their diaries. Others, like Éva Heyman and Hannah
Senesh found it necessary to describe perpetrators in “photographic” or “visual” terms,
due to their limited knowledge of events and their distance from the situation. The diary
of Dawid Sierakowiak (1924-1943) is different from Herzberg’s in that he does not
undertake much analysis of individual perpetrators, though he did have the opportunity to
observe them. It is also different from the diaries of Heyman and Senesh because it was
written by a keen observer from the very center of the Holocaust – the Łódź ghetto. The
diary is far longer and more complicated than that of either Heyman or Senesh, but even
though he was almost as close to the Germans as Herzberg was, he finds it difficult to
sustain any consistent analysis of their character or nature. In fact, as the diary
progresses, Sierakowiak becomes angrier with the Jews of the ghetto than he is with the
Nazis. This diary, then, occupies a kind of middle ground in which perpetrators appear,
and appear as perpetrators – not as metaphors or tropes as we will see in the next chapter,
yet remain analytically undefined. Much like Heyman and Senesh do in their visual, or
media-driven depictions, Sierakowiak’s preferred method of reporting is to relay what the
Germans do. There are too many instances to mention in which he reports a new order
that has been posted, or mentions the visit of a prominent Nazi personage. A short
description of the most salient perpetrator depictions will have to suffice to indicate some
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his experiences as well as how those experiences bear similarities to other themes
introduced in this chapter.
On 4 September 1939, only three day after the war began, Sierakowiak, only
fifteen years-old at the time, penned this optimistic entry. He wrote
…optimistic but outrageous news reached us about the Germans
having torpedoed an English passenger ship carrying several hundred
exceptionally rich and influential American citizens. Eight hundred
people died! And even before receiving this information, Roosevelt had
announced that the United States would not stay neutral! What will he say
now?50
Clearly, through this almost rote repetition of the incident with the RMS Lusitania in
1915, Sierakowiak and the other distressed Jews of Łódź hoped to invoke some of the
hope that had been kindled when that passenger ship went down and the United States
began to move toward hostilities against Germany in the First World War.51 Sierakowiak
and the other Jews of Łódź would of course have to wait until the end of 1941 for the
United States to enter the war against the Axis – and by then it was much too late to make
any real difference for many of them, including Sierakowiak, who died of tuberculosis
and starvation in August of 1943.
On 9 September 1939 Sierakowiak got his first personal look at the Nazis. He
wrote
I go to the Pabianicka highway to watch the arriving troops. A lot
of cars. The soldiers are not so extraordinary; only their uniforms make
them different from Polish soldiers – steel green. Their faces tough,
boisterous. They are the conquerors after all! A car full of high-ranking

50

Dawid Sierakowiak, The Diary of Dawid Sierakowiak: Five Notebooks from the Łódź Ghetto
(Translated by Kamil Turowski, New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 33.
51
1,198 people died aboard the Lusitania, including 128 Americans, one of whom was Alfred G.
Vanderbilt. The rumor in the ghetto seems to be clearly based on this incident, with President Roosevelt
simply taking the place of President Wilson. See Melvin Maddocks (ed.), The Great Liners (New York:
Time-Life Books, 1978), p. 136-137.

56
officers with grim faces passes at lightning speed. People on the street are
quiet and look at the passing troops indifferently. Hush, hush!52
This entry is ambiguous. First the soldiers are “not so extraordinary,” but by the end they
are “conquerors after all.” This early in the war (nine days in), the people of Łódź,
including Sierakowiak, did not yet know what to make of the occupying forces – this is
the reason for the indifference he mentions – though there is clearly some dread and
trepidation present as well. As time when on, however, it became clearer to the Jews of
Łódź what their German conquerors had in store for them.
Only three days later, the first real violence enters Sierakowiak’s diary. In his
Dziennik, or diary, on 12 September 1939 he wrote about the beginning of the new and
miserable life that awaited the people of his city for the next few years. “People are
being seized again for forced labor; beatings and robbings. The store where my father
works has also been robbed. The local Germans do whatever they wish. There are
numerous stories of how they treat Jews at work; some Germans treat them well, while
others bully them sadistically.”53 The treatment of Polish Jews becomes more intense
within just a few weeks and by 4 October 1939, after a particularly shameful incident in
which he was put to work in front of gaping and laughing non-Jewish citizens of Łódź,
Sierakowiak has this to write. “It’s our oppressors who should be ashamed, not us.
Humiliation inflicted by force does not humiliate. But anger and helpless rage tear a man
apart when he is forced to do such stupid, shameful, abusive work. Only one response
remains: revenge!”54 This passage is interesting because it attempts to rationalize – and
thus mitigate – the feelings of shame he feels at undergoing this experience. At the same
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time, his rage and intensity are still great enough for him to desire revenge. Over time,
however, the hope of avenging himself on Nazis seemed to fade away for Sierakowiak.
As lack of food and constant pressure from the Nazis and from the Jewish ghetto
authorities mounted, much of his energy was diverted into keeping himself alive and
much of his remaining anger turned elsewhere.
Unlike the diaries of Heyman and Senesh, the fact that Sierakowiak does not
attempt much of an analysis of Nazi perpetrators cannot be explained away by saying he
had no contact with them. In an extended entry written 28 October 1939, he relates a
long story in which the Sierakowiak’s home was entered by a German officer searching
for radios and other contraband. During this intrusion, Sierakowiak and a friend were
assigned a few hours of heavy labor under the supervision of a Nazi soldier. Rather than
make them walk their heavy load all the way to the police station, the officer supervising
the young men, a man who “sympathizes” with them, allows them to take their burdens
there aboard a streetcar. Although, in itself, the story this event is fairly innocuous, it is
one of several close confrontations between the diarist and individual Nazis. The event
terrified Sierakowiak and his family, leading him to write at the end of the day “Don’t let
this kind of day happen again,” but it did not cause him to rethink or begin to analyze the
perpetrators in any new or different way.55
In the first of the five surviving notebooks comprising Sierakowiak’s diary, there
always seems to be some surprise when confronted with violence. He wrote in an entry
dated 12 December 1939
A horrible day…On my way home I suddenly saw a horrible scene near
Kilińskiego Street. A German dressed like a wagon driver was following a Jew,
hitting him on his back with a huge stick so hard that the Jew (who was trying not
55
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to turn around, not to be hit in the face) kept bending lower and lower, while the
German reeled in his effort.56
The next diary, detailing life in the ghetto from 1 January 1940 – 5 April 1941 is missing.
By the time the reader catches back up with him, Sierakowiak has endured much more
suffering and is much more experienced in ghetto life. The tone of the later diaries is
more stark and resigned. It is clearly important for him to write, but the possibility that
he might not survive is not lost on him.
12 April 1941 sees Sierakowiak turning to straight reportage. He writes, “Just as I
expected, the Germans have broken through the front line in the Balkans, and gained
enormous victories in Yugoslavia, Greece and Africa. In the near future they will
become the overlords of all of Europe, excluding, of course, the Soviets.”57
Sierakowiak’s faith in the Soviets is, of course, premature, as entries over the next few
months attest. In fact, on 23 June 1941 he incredulously writes “It’s all true! Today’s
newspaper brings an official declaration of war against the Soviets by Finland, Italy,
Germany, Romania and Yugoslavia” – another demonstration of reportage.58 It is at the
point where the war expands into the Soviet Union that the first real hints of despair
become evident in the diary. The very next month, Sierakowiak expresses the opinion
that the Germans must be in league with Satan. On 20 July 1941 he wrote. “If only those
Krauts did not lumber any farther, you could say it would not be so bad. But so far the
bloody beasts keep moving on. All of the Devil’s power must be helping them.”59 These
dehumanizing and demonizing images are the first real emotional characterizations of
Nazis since Sierakowiak’s initial and ambiguous impression of German soldiers in the
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opening days of the war. His opinion is obviously much stronger at this point – but still
he neglects to ask himself (or his readers) why Nazis are doing this and why they are the
way they are. Like Herzberg, he seems to take it as a given.
As conditions deteriorated further in the ghetto, Sierakowiak turned the anger he
was still capable of against more visible forms of authority. His first target was his
father, whom he accused multiple times throughout the diary of stealing food from
himself, his sister and especially his mother, whom he held dear. The second target was
the Jewish ghetto leadership, symbolized by Chaim Rumkowski. There is no doubt that
in the entire history of the Holocaust, no Jewish figure is as problematic as Rumkowski,
or “King Chaim” as he was sarcastically known to his “subjects.” In the most positive of
analyses, he comes off tyrannical and authoritarian. In the worst, he is depicted as a
traitor, perhaps even as vile as the Nazis themselves. There is no doubt where
Sierakowiak stood. On 30 August 1941 he wrote. “Rumkowski gave a truly ‘Führerlike’ speech in the afternoon” – a speech which cut payments for food rations.60 Likening
Rumkowski to Hitler was not an idle comparison. To Sierakowiak, both men were trying
to accomplish the same thing – the death of all the Jews of Łódź.61 The complaints
against the corrupt ghetto government continued. On 17 April 1942 Sierakowiak wrote
that “A meat ration of 10 dkg per person has been issued. In addition, 3 kilos of
vegetables and 10 kilos of slaggy coal per family. Systematically we are being pushed
closer to death.”62 Although he does not say who is pushing the ghetto population toward
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death, the ambiguity of the statement and the context in which it is delivered indicate that
the hostility could be directed at both the Nazis and the Jews who Sierakowiak feels are
abetting them.
By 24 April 1942, Sierakowiak’s understanding of perpetrators was considerably
different than it was during the first days of the war when Nazis were “not so
extraordinary.” “Today,” he writes, “the German medical commission visited our
workshop. They are people from another world; our rulers, masters of life and death.”63
Starvation and exhaustion are beginning to take their toll on the young man. The
historian must be sensitive to instances of sarcasm in works they analyze, but in this case,
I can find none. Sierakowiak is not like Herzberg or Ringelblum – mocking the Germans
by using their own words or perceptions against them. Rather, at this point, less than a
year before his death, Sierakowiak seems genuinely mystified by these people, these
aliens “from another world.” As mentioned above, Nazis made it a point to draw stark
contrasts between themselves as overlords, and other peoples (especially Jews) whom
they conquered. It seems that in this moment of weakness, Sierakowiak is adopting the
Nazi frame of reference, placing the “rulers” above him, and above the other starving
inhabitants of the Łódź ghetto.
Like Herzberg, Sierakowiak seems to have no trouble divining the Germans’
goals vis-à-vis the Jews. Even though the entry of 17 August 1942 discusses optimistic
developments, Sierakowiak is still suspicious – still counting on Nazi brutality and antiSemitism to do their worst. He writes. “There’s been an incredible uplifting of spirits in
the ghetto [in response to Soviet military initiatives]. The Jews are raising their heads
again, but they’re very frightened by the rumors circulating about the Germans’ intention
63
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to finish off the Jews in Europe before they lose the war.”64 Indeed, as historians have
been fond of pointing out for many years, Hitler was more concerned with winning the
war against the Jews than the one against the Allies. Starvation and disease may have
wracked his body, but Sierakowiak’s diagnosis of the situation was absolutely correct.
Finally, on 5 September 1942 an event took place that shattered Sierakowiak to
the core. That day, he wrote “My most Sacred, beloved, worn-out, blessed, cherished
Mother has fallen victim to the bloodthirsty German Nazi beast!!!”65 Obviously, in this
instance, Sierakowiak is blaming the perpetrators, not other Jews, for his mother’s death.
This well-placed castigation changes very quickly, however, perhaps because it gives him
no relief. Later the same day he felt compelled to write “Dear Mother, my tiny, emaciated
mother who has gone through so many misfortunes in her life, whose entire life was one
of sacrifice for others, relatives and strangers, who might not have been taken away
because of her exhaustion had it not been for Father and Nadzia [Sierakowiak’s sister]
robbing her of her food here in the ghetto.”66 Blaming starving family members for his
mother’s death, rather than those who made the ghetto possible, is another sign that
Sierakowiak had begun to internalize the script written for him by the perpetrators of the
Holocaust.
The death of his mother marked the beginning of the end for Sierakowiak. The
remainder of the diary, while filled with valuable information about the events in the
ghetto, tells us precious little about how he thought of Nazi perpetrators. He himself
summed it up best the evening his mother died, writing “Nadzia screamed, cried, suffered
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spasms, but these days it doesn’t move anyone. I am speechless and close to madness.”67
In this short sentence, Sierakowiak tells us what he can about reactions to trauma. Like
so many other diarists, from Herzberg to Hillesum, he pronounces the unspeakability of
the events he is bearing witness to, and recognizes that genocidal reality is another kind
of reality – one in which madness reigns supreme.
Madness and murder are the subjects of the last entry I will examine in this
chapter. On 11 March 1943, six months after the death of his beloved mother,
Sierakowiak again strikes out at the Jews who have come to stand in for Nazis in his
world.
Lunatics, perverts, and criminals like Rumkowski rule over us and
determine our food allocations, work, and health. No wonder the Germans
don’t want to interfere in ghetto matters: the Jews will kill one another
perfectly well, and, in the meantime, they will also squeeze maximum
production out of one another.
This conflation of Jewish victims with their oppressors is not something unique to
Sierakowiak. In many diaries, like that of Emmanuel Ringelblum, this is a common
quality, and it points to several things. First, it tells us that the Nazi perpetrators, at the
point this effect occurs, have become so completely part of the world of the victim that
they are no longer looked to as the first cause of the horrible conditions afflicting them.
Secondly, it tells us that, at least to some degree, the Nazis were succeeding in breaking
down the solidarity of the Jewish community. If diarists like Sierakowiak, who felt
compelled to tell the story of the ghetto in their writings, also felt compelled to blame
other Jews for their misfortunes, the work of subjection was almost complete. Finally,
this entry is another example of a “crisis of imagination” in which the pain of dealing
with perpetrators themselves has become too much to bear – and so secondary sources
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are found upon which to pour scorn, derision and hatred. The transference of emotions
from one painful object to another that is less painful or threatening is a common
psychological reaction to trauma and one that can be seen in many instances in other
diaries. Dawid Sierakowiak’s diary simply lays out the dynamics of this effect most
clearly.
V: Conclusion
When they attempted to deal with them at all, Dawid Sierakowiak, Hannah
Senesh and Éva Heyman tried to deal with perpetrators in plain, descriptive language.
These writers either did not have the maturity (as in the case of Heyman), or they did not
have the proximity to perpetrators (as in the case of Senesh), or they lost the strength to
criticize perpetrators as time went on (as in the case of Sierakowiak). In this sense they
stand apart from the way Abel Herzberg was able to criticize perpetrators, at least in the
early part of his diary. However, all three of the diarists examined in the second part of
this chapter did manage to make some kind of statement about perpetrators, even if it was
simply to express fear of them. In the diaries I will discuss in the next chapter, the idea
of the perpetrator itself changes as the language of reality is altered in genocidal
circumstances. It is to the ways diarist’s employed metaphors, tropes and jokes to deal
with perpetrators throughout some Holocaust diaries that I now turn.
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Chapter 2: Dissolution

Jewish Diarists, Perpetrators, and Depictions of the Inconceivable
Metaphor is probably the most fertile of man’s resources,
its effectiveness verging on the miraculous. All other
faculties keep us enclosed within the real, within what
already is… Only metaphor aids our escape and creates
among real things imaginary reefs, islands pregnant with
allusion.
– Jose Ortega y Gasset,1925
I: Introduction

In a short entry dated 5 October 1940, Emmanuel Ringelblum, a Jewish historian
and resident of the Warsaw ghetto, recorded a joke. “There’s a Jew riding in a streetcar.
When he comes to the Hitler Platz, he cries ‘Amen!’”1 The noun Platz refers to a city
square in both German and Yiddish, but the verb platzen also means “to burst” or “to
explode.”2 Ringelblum was playing with words – quite literally swerving from one
meaning to the other. Surrounded on every side by enemies, Ringelblum and everyone
else who repeated the joke were symbolically doing what no one had been able to do
physically – killing Adolf Hitler.
The ways language was used to define and resist perpetrators is addressed in this
chapter. In some instances, the lines between perpetrators, collaborators and even other
Jews began to blur or collapse. In other cases, like Ringelblum’s joke, victims used
1
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language to indicate aggression, hostility and the will to fight. In every situation
however, the kind of language these victims used was indicative of the presence of
defense mechanisms that protected the solidarity of the Jewish community and the
identity of the individual writer. If diarists did not depict aggressors as distant or abstract
actors responsible for the misery they saw everywhere around them, they used linguistic
swerves to transform aggressors into something “other”— something more capable of
being resisted than the merely human.3 Resistance was frequently contingent upon the
ability to repress, deny, or avoid unpleasant realities. The Jewish writers examined here
demonstrated psychological defense mechanisms even as they attempted to define the
perpetrators, explain their actions and convey a sense of hostility toward them.
The introduction examined the historiography of psychological defense
mechanisms during the Holocaust. Chapter two demonstrated how, with some
exceptions, diarists had no trouble depicting the physical dimensions of persecution – the
blood, the beatings and the barbarity – but did have problems comprehending the agents
of persecution and the motivations that drove them. What is clear from this analysis is
that victims experienced difficulty imagining and recording accounts of individual or

3

To avoid confusion, “linguistic swerves,” or “turns” will be used in place of the word “tropic.”
The word “tropic” derives from the Greek tropikos and the Latin tropus – meaning “a turning.” In
conventional usage, the word connotes a certain style or discourse. Here, the “swerve” discussed represents
“a turning” from one possible meaning toward another in an effort to relate two or more ideas, but without
the literary and historiographical baggage “tropic” entails. See Hayden White, Tropics of Discourse:
Essays in Cultural Criticism (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978), p. 2. In this chapter, these
swerves are considered in their metaphorical and comedic manifestations. Paul Ricoeur’s study of
metaphors also supports this interpretation. He argued that “The metaphor [swerve] was correctly
described in terms of deviance.” To him, a metaphor was a “transfer” and the goal of this transfer was to
fill a “lexical lacuna” of meaning between writer and reader. Paul Ricoeur, “The Metaphorical Process as
Cognition, Imagination and Feeling,” Critical Inquiry, vol. 5, no. 1. Special Issue on Metaphor, (Autumn
1978), p. 145.
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collective wills dedicated to personal or Jewish annihilation.4 Diarists not only resisted
death, but they resisted the idea of death as well.
The difficulty writers had coming to terms with an “incomprehensible” will to
genocide indicates two things: first, the presence of psychological mechanisms of
defense; and secondly, the near impossibility of manipulating ordinary language to
convey the experience of trauma.5 The evidence suggests that keeping an awareness of
murderous Nazi intent at bay enabled some Jewish diarists to maintain the mental
equilibrium needed to get through the day. Although Jewish diarists moved physically
and temporally toward a moment of confrontation and negation with Nazi perpetrators,
they ultimately recoiled from the possibilities of that meeting in their writings. This was
the Jewish diarist’s “crisis of imagination.” The closer victims came to the moment when
the idea and act of genocide become one, the more necessary it was to psychologically
avoid that moment. This tension is apparent in a range of sources penned during and
after the war by Jewish victims, but it is particularly evident in Jewish diaries written
during the Holocaust. While diarists felt compelled to commit their experiences to
posterity in writing, these writers could not fully acknowledge the scope of the
experiences they were living through. They desperately tried to convey some sense of
the reality to the reader, as well as any potential meaning they felt it might contain, but at
4

There is a great difference between contemporaneous Jewish accounts of genocide and post-war
testimonies. In the latter, perpetrators appear in a distinctly different and more obvious manner than in the
former. It is my contention that for those caught in the maelstrom of the Holocaust, engaging in
speculation about the nature of persecutors and their motivations was problematic because it broke down
mental boundaries separating perpetrator from victim.
5
In 1937, Anna Freud enumerated ten defense mechanisms: regression, repression, reactionformation, isolation, undoing, projection, introjection, turning against the self, reversal and sublimation. In
the case of the writings examined here, the focus is mainly on avoidance/denial – the repression of painful
external stimuli. Anna Freud, The Ego and Mechanisms of Defense (translated from the German by Cecil
Baines, New York: International Universities Press, 1946), p. 47 and 190. Also see Cathy Caruth’s
Trauma: Explorations in Memory (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1995) and Unclaimed Experience:
Trauma, Narrative and History (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996).
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the same time pulled away from a horrifying new actuality that faced them. These
opposing tendencies make Holocaust diaries singular, and it is by examining the way
perpetrators are depicted by the victims of the Holocaust that historians are offered a
unique perspective on the way Jews experienced trauma and facilitated psychological
resistance during the Shoah.
One method of reading these diaries and of seeking out the broader meanings and
contexts included in them is through an application of the techniques developed by
historically-informed literary critics. Hayden White argued that “…to write a history
mean[s] to place an event within a context by relating it as a part to some conceivable
whole.” 6 By this he suggests that no historical event can have meaning if it stands alone
and that history is the attempt to create a context able to bridge the difference between
two discrete events. One way this could be done, he contended, was through the use of
linguistic mechanisms like metonymy, synecdoche, metaphor or irony, which link
disparate elements together. In Holocaust diaries, noticeable departures in style, syntax,
tone, tense, imagery, or the use of irony or jokes pointed toward similarities and alternate
meanings when used to describe perpetrators. They indicated a victim’s attempt to come
to terms imaginatively with an “unimaginable” situation which represented a “rupture” in
the “cultural continuum.”7 When examining these diaries, it is possible to detect a
writer’s need to avoid the implications this kind of imagination might have led to. In
many instances, creative use of language was the only permissible way diarists had of
venting their anger and aggression toward those who persecuted them.

6

White, p. 94.
James Young in “Interpreting Literary Testimony: A Preface to Rereading Holocaust Diaries and
Memoirs,” New Literary History, vol. 18, no. 2 (Winter 1987), p. 404.
7
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Linguistic swerves often indicate the presence of forms of psychological defense.
In fact it is a long-recognized observation that certain linguistic devices serve this
function. In The Tropics of Discourse, Hayden White paraphrased noted literary critic
Harold Bloom, and argued that,
…a trope can be seen as the linguistic equivalent of a psychological
mechanism of defense (a defense against literal meaning in discourse, in
the way that repression, regression, projection and so forth are defenses
against the apprehension of death in the psyche), it is always not only a
deviation from one possible, proper meaning, but also a deviation towards
another meaning, conception or ideal of what is right and proper and true
“in reality.”8
Writers of Holocaust diaries were trying to represent a new and “incomprehensible”
reality to their readers. However, the language they used – that of our mundane,
“everyday” world – was unable to convey the new and extraordinary circumstances the
writer was attempting to describe. To the diarists, perpetrators were anything but
“ordinary men.” 9 The evidence suggests that perpetrators were understood as an evil, or
a malignancy representing the exact opposite of the true “human.” To acknowledge the
perpetrators’ humanity would have broken down the boundaries between “us” and
“them” necessary for resistance. The need to maintain this separation was a central
component in the diaries of Holocaust victims. This is why David Rousset’s comment
that “normal men do not know that everything is possible” is so important. In this case,
the reader or historian (Rousset’s ostensible “normal man”) is left with the difficult task
of attempting to reconstruct a historical event using an “inconceivable” text.

8

White, p. 2.
This is not to assert that Christopher R. Browning’s description of German killers as “ordinary
men” is incorrect. It is to say that to Jewish victims writing diaries at the time, it was less important what
Nazis were in “reality” than what they were imagined to be. See Ordinary Men: Reserve Police Battalion
101 and the Final Solution in Poland, (New York: HarperPerennial, 1993).
9
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II: Sources
With few exceptions, Jews were the only group singled out for complete
extermination during the Second World War.10 By submitting to Nazi control, most other
groups could reasonably expect to survive – if they did as they were told, kept their heads
down and remained inconspicuous. However, from 1941 on, Jews could not acquiesce to
the full range of Nazi demands in any way other than through their deaths. Therefore,
any action they took which kept the individual alive longer or which perpetuated the
community was an act of resistance.11 The sources presented in this chapter are explicitly
acknowledged as examples of opposition and resistance, whether they are classified as
preemptively aggressive, or reactively protective.12 In either case, the point is not to
lionize these forms of psychological resistance, but show that they were an inevitable
10

Soviet Kommisars were explicitly singled out for death by Hitler’s Kommisarbefehl. But, as
historians like Arno Mayer point out, Jews were conflated with bolshevism in the Nazi mind. Sinti and
Roma (“Gypsies”) were also singled out for annihilation. See Christopher Browning’s The Origins of the
Final Solution: The Evolution of Nazi Jewish Policy, September 1939-March 1942 (Lincoln: University of
Nebraska Press, 2004), pp. 220-221 and Arno Mayer’s Why Did the Heavens Not Darken?: The Final
Solution in History (New York: Pantheon Books, 1990).
11
Martin Gilbert ended his history of the Holocaust with the assertion that “To die with dignity
was a form of resistance. To resist the dehumanizing, brutalizing force of evil, to refuse to be abased to the
level of animals, to live through the torment, to outlive the perpetrators, these too were resistance. Merely
to give witness by one’s own testimony was, in the end, to contribute to a moral victory. Simply to survive
was a victory of the human spirit.” The Holocaust: A History of the Jews of Europe during the Second
World War (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1985), p. 828. Lawrence Langer took Gilbert to task
for the final two sentences, saying it was “like strewing violets in Dante’s and Virgil’s path as they toil
downward through the noxious atmosphere of the Inferno….” Holocaust Testimonies: The Ruins of
Memory (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991), p. 165. The analysis in this chapter supports Gilbert’s
implication that resistance was not only a common, but an intrinsic component of human psychology
during the Holocaust. However, it also concurs with Langer’s contention that to portray resistance as a
triumph of the human spirit is like “building a monument to hope on the rubble of decay.” Langer, p. 165.
To find any redemptive value in the Holocaust would be an attempt to find meaning in most meaningless of
events.
12
In other words, the level to which behaviors or modes of thinking had to rise in order to be
classified “resistance” was qualitatively higher for groups not singled out for complete extermination. For
Jews, resistance was tantamount to survival, and any action, thought, or state of mind that maintained the
individual ego or built communal bonds can be defined as resistance. Resistance for Jews and non-Jews
were ontologically distinct categories. Kalí Tal said that “Bearing witness is an aggressive act. It is born
out of a refusal to bow to outside pressure or to repress experience, a decision to embrace conflict rather
than conformity…” In this instance, Tal is discussing witnessing after traumatic events, but her comments
are applicable to contemporaneous Holocaust writing as well. Worlds of Hurt: Reading the Literatures of
Trauma (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 7.
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reaction to the trauma produced by genocide. The linguistic swerves considered here are
neither sacred, heroic, nor mystical. Rather, they represent struggles to reclaim agency
amid Nazi attempts to shut off every avenue of opposition.13 They are written examples
of diarists’ desire to bolster their own psychological well-being. If psychological and
physical well-being were interconnected, the act of writing diaries was meaningful
resistance because it helped the victim to stay alive. The linguistic resistance recounted
here represents an important conflict over the dregs of autonomy and power. Therefore,
concepts of “resistance,” first as a psychological phenomenon and second as opposition
to Nazi domination and authority are inextricably linked.
Two sets of primary documents are scrutinized here: the “chronicles” of
Emmanuel Ringelblum of Warsaw, and the letters of Etty Hillesum of Amsterdam. These
have been selected because they represent works by individuals with opposite
personalities and styles who nevertheless employed many of the same kinds of linguistic
devices to relate their experiences to readers. Both writers were ultimately victims of
Nazi genocide, but as individuals and as Jews, they were very dissimilar. They were of
two different generations – one raised before the Great War, the other after. One was
from a largely Jewish milieu in Eastern Europe and the other from the largely non-Jewish
cultural milieu of Western Europe. Ringelblum penned his account from a ghetto while
Hillesum wrote from occupied Amsterdam and later from the interment camp at
Westerbork. Despite these drastic differences, both writers retained similar linguistic
constructions that suggest the presence of psychological defense mechanisms and

13

Resistance and mechanisms of defense were present on both sides. The deadly thing in the Nazi
case was that the intentional creation of structural mechanisms of resistance (euphemistic speech and
formal strategies of physical and psychic distancing, for instance) weakened the need for mental and moral
resistance – perpetuating and intensifying the genocidal outcome.
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underscore the difficulty they faced conveying traumatic experience. In the examples
that follow, the presence of tropic or linguistic swerves indicates the coding of different
levels or categories of experience which, taken individually or combined, form the basis
for a new language of genocide and atrocity.
Emmanuel Ringelblum (1900-1944) was a professional historian who received
his doctorate from the University of Warsaw for a dissertation on the Jews of that city
during the Middle Ages. When the war began, he coordinated social aid in the ghetto and
was a member of the political underground. Yet he is most famous for founding the
Oneg Shabbat Archive documenting Nazi atrocities and for keeping a running chronicle
of life and death in the ghetto. These entries were translated into English in abridged
form as Notes from the Warsaw Ghetto.14 Following the “liquidation” of the ghetto,
Ringelblum and his family were taken prisoner by the Nazis. They were executed amid
the ruins of Warsaw on 7 March 1944.15
The Notes are an account of events in the Warsaw ghetto from slightly before its
formation in October of 1940 until the end of 1942, when it was dismantled and the vast
majority of its residents deported “to the East.”16 Ringelblum’s writings have been
referred to as a “chronicle” rather than a “diary” by Jacob Sloan, who translated
Ringelblum’s oeuvre from Yiddish to English. Yet Sloan argued that the entries were

14

Currently, the only English version of Ringelblum’s works is in the form of Notes from the
Warsaw Ghetto: The Journal of Emmanuel Ringelblum. This version, translated and edited by Jacob Sloan,
is somewhat problematic for reasons to be discussed below.
15
Israel Gutman, ed., Encyclopedia of the Holocaust, vol. 3, (New York: Macmillan Publishing
Company, 1990), p. 1283-1285.
16
Warsaw Jews made up approximately 300,000 of the 800,000 victims murdered at the Treblinka
death camp. See Konnilyn G. Feig’s Hitler’s Death Camps: The Sanity of Madness (New York: Holmes &
Meier, 1979) p 293-312 and Yitzhak Arad’s Belzec, Sobibor, Treblinka: The Operation Reinhard Death
Camps (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1987) p. 60-62.
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merely “notes toward a history of the times, and nothing else.”17 He explained his
comment thus:
Diaries usually restrict themselves to the lived experience of the diarist;
they reflect his feelings and thinking; they are personal outpourings,
confessions of a sort. Notes from the Warsaw Ghetto is nothing like that.
Much of the material Ringelblum recorded he heard or saw himself; but he
rarely describes how he felt about it.18
This dismissive categorization of Ringelblum’s writing as a mere chronicle is
inaccurate. The Notes are unlike most Holocaust diaries for two reasons. First, as a
trained historian, Ringelblum was more attuned to the broader context in which events
transpired than most diarists. Second, the goal of the chronicle was to represent a history
of the ghetto which future historians could draw upon, as Sloan mentioned.
These Notes are not simply a dispassionate account, sterile and shorn of all
personal sentiment. Even choosing which events to include in them revealed
Ringelblum’s point of view and made writing it a personal, autobiographical act in the
most general sense. But even more, his choice of language showed that he inserted
himself into the text — opining and editorializing while providing a professional account
of the facts of Nazi aggression at the same time.19 Ringelblum’s entire “chronicle” was

17

Sloan seems to believe that the importance of the Notes lies in the fact that they establish certain
facts about life in the Warsaw ghetto. Here, the concern is to discover how Ringelblum felt about those
who put him there. Ringelblum, p. xxii.
18
Ringelblum, p. xxii.
19
An example of this would include a entry written on 13 April 1941 in which Ringelblum
includes a quote from a ghetto newspaper Against the Stream, forcefully laying out the general rationale for
Jewish resistance. Ringelblum called it a “fine lead article,” and seemed to appropriate the sentiment for
himself. “It’s the thing to say that the war is turning people into beasts. But we did not wish the war, and
we do not wish it now, and we will not be turned into beasts. We were, and we will remain, human
beings.” Ringelblum, p. 151. In another entry written on 17 June 1942, Ringelblum discusses a
problematic way in which Jews were being reduced to “beasts.” He wrote, “…we are left to be led as
sheep to a slaughterhouse.” He attempts to explain why this is so later in the same letter. He argues,
“…every Jew knew that lifting a hand against a German would endanger his brothers…Not to act, not to
lift a hand against the Germans, has since then become the quiet, passive heroism of the common Jew.”
Joseph Kermish, “Emmanuel Ringelblum’s Notes hitherto Unpublished,” Yad Vashem Studies, vol. VII
(Jerusalem, 1968), p. 179-180. This assertion of “heroism” is problematic – taken by historians like Martin
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suffused with telling linguistic remarks and signs which indicated that he had developed a
code he was inviting the reader to decipher. For instance, he used the words “They”
“Them” or “Their” in a specific context on no less than 145 separate occasions.20 He also
described Nazis as “the Others,” (also capitalized) some 70 times.21 Sloan commented on
this in his introduction,
We know from the very first page of the notes who the cryptic “They”
refers to. “They” are the Germans. It is not a good idea to mention Their
real name too often; the notes may be confiscated by Them. For the same
reason, the notes have many phrases and passages in pidgin Hebrew.
“They” can easily understand Yiddish, the language of the notes, Yiddish
being basically a medieval variant of German. But “They” would have
more trouble decoding the Hebrew.22
Sloan was wrong here for several reasons. First, the Notes contain multiple references to
Nazis, Hitler, the SS and so on.23 If Ringelblum were attempting to hide the presence of
Nazis in the text, he did so very poorly, and in a manner inconsistent with the rest of the
work as a whole. Second, Yiddish may derive from German, but it is written in Hebrew
characters the average Nazi would not be able to read. Third, if the Notes did fall into the
wrong hands and if any effort at all were made to translate them, there was enough

Gilbert to indicate some sort of moral victory, while others like Lawrence Langer consider it “an obviously
desperate struggle on Ringelblum’s part to rescue some shred of meaning from a hopeless situation.”
Langer, p. 165. Langer seems more correct. Ringelblum was explaining why Jews seemed like sheep
(another linguistic swerve), but actually remained human beings – a mechanism of defense in that it is an
attempt to maintain the integrity of the Jew as human being.
20
These Sloan capitalized regardless of their position in the sentence – thereby defining them as
proper nouns rather than as pronouns.
21
Because Sloan’s edition is abridged, the value of these numbers is to demonstrate that these
words appear regularly in Ringelblum’s work, not to establish some empirical truth or meaning in them.
22
Ringelblum, p. xxv. It is important to note that there are no capital letters in the Hebrew
alphabet. By capitalizing them in the English translation, Sloan is drawing attention to their peculiar
context or placement in a sentence.
23
For example, on 8 May 1942 Ringelblum discussed communiqués that gave hope to ghetto
inhabitants by depicting the Führer as weak. He wrote “Another communiqué disembarked the whole army
in Murmansk, borne by 160 ships, not one of which was sunk en route. Of course, when Hitler heard this
news…he collapsed.” Ringelblum, p. 260.
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information to doom the writer or the bearer of the documents, whether certain names
were thinly disguised or not.24
Sloan was on the right track when he wrote “It is not a good idea to mention
Their real names to often…,” but not for the reasons he thought. When examining
linguistic turns in Ringelblum’s discourse, it is possible to see that several things were
happening at once. First, he interjected himself into the text, but in a subtle way different
from the very personal tone used in most diaries. Second, his style revealed a keen
understanding of the power of language. A belief, well-established in Jewish mysticism
and theology long before the arrival of post-structuralist discourse, posits that the very act
of naming confers power. It was not a good idea to mention “Them” too often because
these utterances made “Them” more real, more powerful and less easy to ignore.
The other subject of this chapter’s analysis, Etty Hillesum (1914–1943), was the
daughter of Dutch and Russian Jewish parents. As a young woman, she studied law,
Slavic languages and psychology in Amsterdam. In March of 1941, about a year after the
Nazis occupied the Netherlands, Hillesum began a diary. After she was imprisoned in the
Westerbork transit camp, she wrote letters to friends describing the treatment of Jews
there.25 In 1943, she was deported with her family and about 900 other Jewish victims to
Auschwitz, where she was murdered later that year on 30 November. Salvaged and
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The pages that form the Notes were buried in metal boxes and three milk cans in cellars across
the Warsaw ghetto in 1943. One milk can was recovered in 1946. Another milk can and several containers
were found in 1950. The third milk can has never been recovered.
25
The majority of Hillesum’s diary entries were written before her imprisonment in Westerbork
and many of the letters she wrote while there were smuggled out of the camp, thereby evading Nazi
censors. Her final letter was thrown from the inside of a cattle car bound for Auschwitz.
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published after the war, her writings reveal an intimate portrait of a highly intelligent,
spiritual individual.26
In some ways, Hillesum’s letters and diaries were more personal and less
problematic than Ringelblum’s. Though she employed tropes on many occasions which
swerved away from obvious meanings, her style was more reflective, relaxed and
demonstrated less need to commit every fact to paper than Ringelblum’s.27 Her concerns
were more inwardly directed and point to a personality more devoted to maintaining
everyday relationships than with the social, political and military matters discussed by
Ringelblum.
At the same time, Hillesum’s writings were similar to Ringelblum’s because they
demonstrated ways in which writing was used as an act of resistance. This resistance was
not only outwardly directed – helping to create communal bonds among Jews – but
inwardly directed as well because the act of writing itself reinforced individuality amid
Nazi attempts to eradicate difference amongst Jewish victims.28 Yet in both sets of
sources there remains an intrinsic tension between the goal of leaving behind a record of
Nazi crimes on the one hand and maintaining the will to resist on the other. In an effort
to relieve these tensions, these diarists resorted to the use of linguistic devices like
26

Originally published in Dutch, the diaries earned a wide readership and were translated into
multiple editions in many languages, including French and English. The edition used here is the most
recent English translation entitled The Letters and Diaries of Etty Hillesum, 1941-1943 translated by
Arnold J. Pomerans (Grand Rapids, Michigan: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 2002). All
biographical information comes from the introduction to this book.
27
It might be supposed that Hillesum’s diaries are less complicated than Ringelblum’s
“chronicles” because she was younger and had less riding on the details of her writing than Ringelblum
had. This is not the case. Throughout, she demonstrates sophisticated insights and a keen intelligence.
She was simply more interested in the good than the bad – for reasons to be discussed below.
28
Nazis were extraordinarily concerned with categories – this is why concentration camp inmates
were made to wear different colored triangles on their uniforms: pink for homosexuals, purple for religious
objectors like Jehovah’s Witnesses, red for political prisoners, two yellow triangles forming the Star of
David for Jews etc. For all groups, the color of the triangle signified a violation of some aspect of the Nazi
“moral” code, but for Jews, the fact that they wore the yellow star at all meant there could be no
rehabilitation for them. They were expressly marked for death.
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metaphors, jokes and sarcasm to explain something that was inconceivable – both to
themselves and to those who would read their work. This manipulation of language was a
method of relieving the contradictions inherent in an extremely traumatic and deadly
environment.
III: The Limitations of Language and the Need for Meaning
The study of Holocaust diaries is the study of language and the limitations of
language. In ordinary circumstances, everyday language is used to transmit everyday
ideas. However, in the murderous environment in which Jewish diarists found
themselves during the Second World War, no language was able to convey the totality of
meanings the historian expects or hopes to find. As mentioned in the introduction, within
the genocidal atmosphere of the Holocaust, words and their meanings did not remain
static but fluctuated in an effort to express a traumatic reality. A wall existed in Holocaust
diaries between the act-idea of genocide and the capabilities of the victim’s language and
imagination to deal with it. When reading diaries, the full psychological magnitude of the
trauma can only be inferred and thus comprehension can be incomplete at best. Simply
put, genocide was more real than language – and so the experience was inexplicable at
the most basic level. In this sense, the Holocaust remains, as Primo Levi and other
memoirists contended, beyond comprehension.29
The diarists writing at the time understood that the incomprehensibility of the
circumstances interfered with their ability to communicate to readers. Etty Hillesum
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See Primo Levi’s discussion of language and comprehensibility in The Drowned and the Saved,
(translated from the Italian by Raymond Rosenthal, New York: Vintage International, 1989), and in Jean
Améry’s At the Mind’s Limits: Contemplations by a Survivor on Auschwitz and its Realities translated by
Sidney Rosenfeld and Stella P. Rosenfeld (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1980), p. 21-40.
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addressed this issue explicitly. In a letter written from Amsterdam in December of 1942,
she wrote
To simply record the bare facts of families torn apart, of possessions
plundered and liberties forfeited, would soon become monotonous. Nor is
it possible to pen picturesque accounts of barbed wire and vegetable swill
to show outsiders what it’s like.30
The reader who was not there, Hillesum seemed to argue, must of necessity experience
difficulty grasping the truth accounts of the Holocaust represent. This is because
extraordinary or traumatic realities cannot be dealt with adequately using everyday
language. At the same time, Hillesum recognized that the quotidian was the only idiom
readers would possess – hence the conundrum. Historians are as aware of this problem of
language as Hillesum was. Nevertheless, it is only by rising to Saul Friedländer’s
challenge to “probe the limits of representation” that we can hope to historicize the
experiences and mentalities forged in the moment of genocide or to increase our
understanding of the experience of victims as they lived it.31 This analysis represents an
attempt not to recover lost voices, but to recover lost meanings – to translate the language
of atrocity into something more comprehensible. This idea of “translating” is supported
by William Reddy’s recent argument that
the concept of translation allows one to speak of the relations between
language and the world in a way that is neither Cartesian (distinguishing
sharply between subjective and objective conditions, as most
psychologists continue to do) nor poststructuralist. It allows one to say
meaningfully that there are kinds of thought that lie ‘outside’ of language,
yet are intimately involved in the formulation of utterances.32
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(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992).
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William M. Reddy, The Navigation of Feeling: A Framework for the History of Emotions
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), p. 64.
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Through the creative use of language, Holocaust diarists offered readers their nearest
rendition of an extreme reality. It is the task of the historian to break down and examine
potential meanings these offerings might convey.
Emmanuel Ringelblum also commented on the paucity of language when trying
to relate the events of the Warsaw ghetto. In an entry written sometime in late June
1942, he observed that “The German soldiers’ willful treatment of the Jews is beyond
description.”33 This comment is interesting because “willful treatment” is such an
understated phrase. By “willful treatment,” he meant rapine, sadism and murder. But
by expressly leaving those incommunicable words out, he underscored his point –
nothing he said or wrote could make the reader any more aware of the true reality of the
ghetto than a simple phrase like “willful treatment.” The way these words are used
indicates Ringelblum’s belief that the imagination cannot follow where the victims
were forced to go.
Hillesum repeatedly stressed the difficulty transmitting the true nature of what was
happening to her, but also indicated the need to do so. In the same letter quoted above,
she displays her concern with finding meaning. She wrote,
True, things happen here that in the past our reason would not have judged
possible. But perhaps we have faculties other than reason in us, faculties
that in the past we didn’t know we had but that possess the ability to
grapple with the incomprehensible [my emphasis]. I believe that for every
event, man has a faculty that helps him deal with it.34
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Hillesum was expressing the desire or need to make sense of her experiences, as well as
the hope that she could explain their meaning to others.35 More importantly however, it
was clear to her that she needed “faculties other than reason” to do so. Language is a
function of reason, and it is worth noting that Hillesum used a verb of metaphoric force
(“grapple”) to indicate the problem she was confronting.36
In fact, Hillesum seemed to believe suffering conferred meaning, something later
Holocaust memoirists like Primo Levi would dispute.37 In the same letter, she
illuminated the paradoxes of language in an argument which initially promoted and then
dissolved the idea of Jewish specificity or proprietary monopoly of the tragedy presented
by the Holocaust
It is not easy – no doubt less easy for us Jews than for anyone else – yet if
we have nothing to offer a desolate postwar world but our bodies saved at
any cost, if we fail to draw new meaning from the deep wells of our
distress and despair, than it will not be enough. New thoughts will have to
radiate outward from the camps themselves, new insights, spreading
lucidity, will have to cross the barbed wire enclosing us and join with the
insights that people will have to earn just as bloodily, in circumstances
that are slowly becoming almost as difficult. And perhaps, on the
common basis of an honest search for some way to understand these dark
events, wrecked lives may yet take a tentative step forward.
That’s why it seemed such a great danger to me when all around
one could hear, ‘we don’t want to think, we don’t want to feel, it’s best to
shut your eyes to all this misery.’”38
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In this passage, it seems clear that Hillesum needed to believe there was meaning in
suffering. If there were not – if suffering were only just that – she would have been bereft
of any reason to stay strong or continue resisting. Throughout the text of her letters and
diary entries she frequently stated, often very explicitly, that the mind required events to
have meaning – this despite the fact that she also said it was impossible to write a
description capable of conveying that meaning. This need to use communication to resist
was the primary, though implicit, argument for witnessing and recording the events she
lived through. At the same time, she seemed to have been under no delusions about the
difficulties this posed. The fascinating, and very human thing about Hillesum was that
even though she claimed it was “dangerous” for others not to want to “think” or “feel,”
an examination of her diaries and letters indicates that, over a long period of time, she
avoided certain types of confrontation herself – particularly in the diaries, but also in the
letters she wrote during the process of deportation.
In the sense that the need for meaning was of extreme importance, especially to
young writers, Hillesum’s comments are reminiscent of the assertion made by Anne
Frank (1929–1945) another Dutch Jew. Frank wrote, “…I still believe, in spite of
everything, that people are truly good at heart.” At first, this passage simply seems to be
the heartbreakingly naïve wishful thinking of a teenage girl. Closer scrutiny, however,
suggests a protective denial of the exterminatory reality of Nazi-occupied Amsterdam in
1944.39
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In an undated letter written sometime after 26 June 1943, Hillesum made another
comment similar both to her previous statements and to Anne Frank’s. She wrote
And in spite of everything you always end up with the same connection:
life is good after all, it’s not God’s fault that things go awry sometimes,
the cause lies in ourselves. And that’s what stays with me, even now,
even when I’m about to be packed off to Poland with my whole family.40
By shifting the blame for events from the divine to the human, Hillesum seemed to be
saying the events she was living through were not God’s fault – humans were to blame.
If God were at fault, the suffering Hillesum witnessed at Westerbork would have been
pointless. She could not bear for this to be the case. Though there is a veneer of
hopefulness, this statement seems to be a symptom of denial and avoidance rather than
one of true optimism. As in the case of Anne Frank, the denial functioned to insulate the
self from what the senses said was going on around it. The world these two saw around
them was not good. Neither were many of the people. Nevertheless, they both began
optimistically, saying “in spite of everything,” or “even now.” This suggests a need or
even a compulsion to paint things in bright terms. People are “truly good at heart.” “Life
is good after all.”
One reading of Frank’s passage focuses on her suggestion that people were
inwardly good “at heart,” although they may not have outwardly demonstrated that
goodness. This implies the belief in a sort of Cartesian dualism between subjective and
objective realities. Frank seemed to indicate that the cause for the discrepancy between a
good nature and a bad deed was that people were alienated from themselves. Hillesum’s
approach was the opposite. She believed the reason things went “awry” was “in
ourselves” – though it is not entirely clear if she thought the answer to the problem was
40

Etty Hillesum, Etty, p. 608.

82
inside as well, or if it needed to come from an outside source like God. Her emphasis on
faith would suggest it is the latter. In either case, both writers seem to demand an
ultimately positive meaning. If that meaning could not be found it was either because it
was hidden or because there were those who chose not to find it. This point of view is
indicative of a deep-seated need for a positive world-view. Events which did not fit this
perspective (they both said “in spite of everything”) were anomalous in the bigger
picture. These young women not only needed to believe that “goodness” existed, but that
the “good” in the heart would triumph in the end. This optimism itself can be read as a
mechanism of defense and perhaps even as one of hostility. Not only did it enable the
holder of the belief to maintain a needed distinction between those who were only good
“at heart” and those who were good both outwardly and inwardly, but it also implied the
superiority of those whose outward and inward natures were reconciled.
IV: Linguistic Mechanisms of Defense – Metaphors
A problem that arose for the authors of Holocaust diaries was that the events they
wrote about were completely disconnected from any other type of previous reality. It
was impossible to make a comparison to their experiences because nothing had ever been
like them. This did not mean writers could not describe their experiences in language at
all, but it did mean that language had to be modified and meaning encoded in a different
way to even partially convey its significance. The remainder of this chapter will deal
specifically with ways diarists encoded perpetrators, their motivations, and their attitudes
toward oppressors symbolically in their diaries.41
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The evidence indicates that the extreme conditions of the Holocaust gave rise to a
different, perhaps inassimilable, form of historical writing based on trauma and atrocity –
a new epistemology and language of genocide.42 No period in history so demonstrated
the fact that everything was indeed possible. When Nazi Germany willed or imagined a
hellish new reality into existence, perpetrators and victims were both forced to create a
new language to describe it.43 These new types of understanding and language were not
incidental, but inseparable components of a deadly new world, one where genocide was
possible.44 In other words, that new world was as much about how it was imagined or
felt to be as it was about how it was purported to be in some “objective” reality.45
The meanings created in the discourse of genocide were purposeful, even if they
were sometimes unconscious. As Berel Lang contended, “the writer is responsible for
what the imagination does, and this is true even if the directions in which it moves are not
the results of deliberation in its usual sense.” 46 In Holocaust discourse, meaning shifted
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and alternate definitions filled the spaces between the quotidian and the grotesque.
Holocaust diarists built tenuous bridges between what had been possible and what was
now possible – and in doing so translated between alternate realms of experience. Lang
continued, arguing that
…linguistic developments which occurred at the time of the Nazi
genocide would disclose features resembling those of the process
of genocide itself; it would be difficult to understand how that
process might occur without corresponding changes in the
language. 47
Here, Lang was discussing the way perpetrators manipulated and changed language in
order to find better ways to kill through the use of euphemisms. Words like
Sonderbehandlung (“special treatment”) come to mind when one thinks of ways Nazis
sought to disguise their intentions, perhaps even from themselves, by conferring new
meaning on normal language.48 The ways Nazis twisted language reflected their attempt
to create a new morality in which genocidal mass-murder was not only permissible, but
an imperative. In order to do this, they sanitized genocide by investing old words with
new meanings – hence the sinister connotations we now have for words like Säuberung
(“cleansing”).49

47

Lang, p. 83.
The creation of euphemisms and languages of separation and degradation were one way of
depersonalizing victims. See the Jew as “gangrenous appendix” in Robert Jay Lifton, The Nazi Doctors
Medical Killing and the Psychology of Genocide (New York: Basic Books, 1986), p. 16; Jews and
psychiatric patients as “portions,” Götz Aly, Peter Chroust, Christian Pross, Cleansing the Fatherland: Nazi
Medicine and Racial Hygiene (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994), p. 250; Jewish bodies as
Scheißstücke – “pieces of shit,” Olga Lengyel, Five Chimneys (New York: Ziff and Davis, 1947), p. 83;
Jewish corpses as Figuren – puppets or dolls or Schmattes – rags, Claude Lanzmann, Shoah (New York:
Pantheon Books, 1985), p. 9; Jews and mentally ill as “animals in human form,” Michael Burleigh, Death
and Deliverance: Euthanasia in Germany 1900-1945 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), p.
119; Jews and mentally ill as Ballastexistenzen – human flotsam and jetsam, Henry Friedlander, The
Origins of the Nazi Genocide: From Euthanasia to the Final Solution, (Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina Press, 1995) p. 15 and targeted victims as unnütze Esser – “useless eaters,” Lifton, The Nazi
Doctors, p. 22.
49
This process of redefinition was incomplete, however. Nazis changed language to mock,
degrade and dehumanize their victims in order to make it easier to kill, but it was only partially successful.
48

85
The development of strategies of differentiation and dehumanization was
necessary for Jewish diarists as well, though for reasons very different from that of the
Nazis. It is my contention that Jewish diarists during the Holocaust also avoided the full
reality of the situation by altering language. But for them, the goal was to stay alive. An
example of this alteration includes the way the word “organizing” was understood in
completely different ways by victims in Auschwitz and other camps than it was by the
outside world. In some instances in Holocaust diaries, victims used language figuratively
or metaphorically to depict their persecutors. Writers were forced into this linguistic
detour because of the contradictory necessity of keeping perpetrators mentally at bay
while at the same time expressing the subconscious urge to confront them.
One example comes from the work of Emmanuel Ringelblum, who relayed an
account not only of fascist and anti-Semitic violence, but also provided evidence for how
perpetrators were viewed by members of the Jewish community. In a passage written in
January of 1940, he told of the arrival of three German soldiers into the ghetto. He wrote,
“Three ‘Skulls’ from the Totenkopf company came to an apartment on Wloclaweka
Street, with spitters, sawed-off shotguns, in their hands, [and] took all the money there
was.”50
“Skulls” obviously referred to the insignia worn by the SS, especially the
Totenkopfverbände, who not only wore the sign of the death’s head on their headgear, but
For example, the SS extermination contingent at Treblinka not only referred to the narrow barbed-wire
“tube” through which victims were flogged on their way to the gas chambers as the Himmelfahrtsstraße
(“the Road to Heaven”),but they also put up a sign, surmounted by a Star of David, in Hebrew reading
“This is the gateway to God. Righteous men will pass through.” Besides being cynical, the notice points to
Nazi use of the tropic. In one sense it is saying the gas chamber is a portal to another, better place. In
another, it is a prima facie admission of Nazi guilt – “Righteous men” by definition should not be put to
death. See, Arad, p. 120 and Gitta Sereny, Into that Darkness: An Examination of Conscience (New York:
Vintage Books, 1983), p148.
50
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not in Yiddish, but in Hebrew, a significant point that will be discussed below.
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also upon their collars. The repetition of the skull motif in both Yiddish and German is
significant. The sentence is almost redundant unless one reads “Skulls” and “Totenkopf”
in different ways because Totenkopf already connotes skulls. Rendered in quotation
marks by Sloan, this suggests the term was commonly used by other ghetto inhabitants,
not just Ringelblum. This indicates that a new language specifically related to Nazis and
atrocities was formed in the traumatic conditions of the ghetto. The short definition of
spitters, written in Hebrew, performs the same function - making the reader aware of the
development of slang particular to the Jewish denizens of Warsaw. However, “Skulls”
seemed to be a more common term than spitters, as shown by Ringelblum’s decision to
define the latter.
By transforming the Germans wearing the uniforms of the death’s head into
“Skulls” themselves, Ringelblum pointed to another meaning. By using “Skulls” as a
synecdoche (allowing a part – the skull – to stand in for the whole – the Nazi perpetrator)
he was not only identifying those was responsible for the theft, but he was also
underscoring their menacing connection with death in the minds of the ghetto’s
inhabitants. Like classical European depictions of Death coming with his scythe to
harvest souls, so the Nazis came like Death with their spitters, gathering money in lieu of
lives – for the moment.51
This reading of the Ringelblum’s passage suggests that Death was personified in
the form of these perpetrators. Like Death, these men were no longer human. Though
they had recognizably human features, they had no feeling or remorse – no human
qualities. To Ringelblum, the Nazis were death. They were the antithesis of what was
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human and alive – their existence as well as their insignia a grinning example of life’s
negation.52 Ringelblum distinguished between what was human and what was inhuman
in order to separate himself and his people from this deadly “other.”
There is another synecdoche in the Notes that parallels this use of “Skulls.” It
concerns Ringelblum’s discussion of the way Nazis drove Jewish police to ever more
stringent measures against their own people. In an undated entry, written sometime in
late 1942, he wrote of witnessing a scene “one day when every policeman had to meet a
quota of four ‘heads.’”53 Again, the synecdoche, rendered in quotes by Ringelblum’s
translator Sloan, indicates that this was common slang used in the ghetto, not just a
creation of Ringelblum’s. The fact that Nazis entering the ghetto were “Skulls,” while the
victims were “heads” suggests a kind of equivalence.54 Ringelblum could have simply
reported the event (as Sloan wrongly implies he did), but he does otherwise. Instead of
laying out the simple facts, he moved to a more poetic and illustrative way of narrating
experience. At least if Hayden White is to be believed, such tropic devices correspond to
the use of mechanisms of defense.55 Just as the Nazis represented death, so too the Jewish
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victims were outside the bounds of the living. Even to other Jews, they were the walking
doomed – written off and hopeless. Perhaps this attitude seems cold coming from people
in a situation very similar to that of the poor victims, but even earlier in the Notes
Ringelblum took pains to mention that the Jewish ghetto dwellers were developing a
“marked, remarkable indifference to death, which no longer impresses.”56 By turning
their own doomed people into simple ‘heads” who existed now only to be counted and
murdered, ghetto inhabitants resisted by preserving and consolidating the strength of
those who remained among the living.
The diaries and letters of Etty Hillesum provide examples of both swerves and
types of repressed aggression. In a letter written in December 1942, she described the
two Commandants of Westerbork, the transit camp from which Jews were sent to their
deaths in Auschwitz. She wrote,
We have a Dutch Commandant and a German one. The first is taller, but
the second has more of a say. We are told, moreover, that he likes music
and that he is a gentleman. I’m no judge, although I must say that for a
gentleman he certainly has a somewhat peculiar job.57
It is interesting to note that the Dutch Commandant, who starts out being the
subject of the sentence, seems to dissolve or disappear into the German Commandant by
the end of the paragraph. Either the two became indistinguishable to Hillesum, or she
was shielding her fellow countryman from the repressed furor of her subsequent remarks.
It seems more likely that the distinction between perpetrator and collaborator was
beginning to dissolve. Hillesum implies that the Dutch Commandant was like the
German one. While he may have retained the characteristics of the Dutch people, he was
56
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nevertheless lumped together with the Nazi in Hillesum’s mind.58 A relationship
between the two is expressed – the Dutch Commandant is taller but the German has more
power. Significantly, power is expressed in terms of language – the Nazi has more “say.”
The Dutchman is subordinate to, but of a piece with the German. That the German has
“more say” implies that the Dutch Commandant also has some “say.” The way lines of
logic, causality and identity begin to fragment in these passages indicates something akin
to what Derrida meant by writing “sous rature” (translated by G.C. Spivak as “under
erasure.”)59 By writing and physically crossing out a word as Heidegger did in Derrida’s
example in Of Grammatology, or by figuratively “crossing out” words or identities that
seemed as if they should be there, the author draws the reader toward a concept or idea
without forcing her to use words that do not convey the totality of meanings she knows
she cannot express. In the end, to Hillesum, the specific identities of the Dutch
Commandant and the German merge together and they become indistinguishable.
The Commandant (presumably the German one, although it is not specified) likes
music – his tastes are refined as befits a “gentleman.” However, Hillesum’s tone indicates
that she believes there is more to a “gentleman” than just the outward expression of
intellectual and cultural taste. To her, gentlemanliness is a state of being, not a veneer or
superficial mask of culture that can be donned and removed at will. To Hillesum, this
58
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“gentleman” Commandant was a poseur, and even though the he had the ability to
manipulate her body, she believed she could defeat him on the transcendent plane of
culture.
The final understated sentence is the most fascinating. Hillesum begins by
saying “I’m no judge.” In doing so, she renounces the power judgment implies, but then
proceeds to do exactly what she said she would not. She wants to remain detached from
the perpetrator – even from the distant contact with him judgment presupposes, yet she is
compelled to make a statement. She claims not to want to be the one to decide what
made someone a “gentleman” (or a human) – this was something “They” do. But clearly,
Hillesum is judging the man. By denying that this is the case, however, she distances
herself from the perpetrator in an attempt to stand outside the event she describes.
Finally, her tone is disdainful, indicating hostility toward the Commandant
because he has a “peculiar job” for a gentleman. Hillesum knew where the trains were
going and was under no illusion about the fate of those who were shipped away. Here,
she implies that a gentleman would never do what this man did daily: issue orders to pack
people into cattle cars for deportation and death. The conclusion is obvious – far from
being a “gentleman” (in Dutch the word Heer), the man is a criminal, a thug, and a
murderer. This quick and bitter remark helps to differentiate the Jewish prisoner
(Hillesum herself) from the perpetrator-collaborator and establishes a moral separation
between one side and the other. It is significant that Hillesum places the Dutch
Commandant next to the German one. As mentioned above, this indicates a breakdown
in the author’s mind between perpetrator and collaborator. The blurring of lines between
Nazis and others persecuting the Jews supports the contention that it was mentally
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necessary, and simplest, to reduce relationships between victims and “others” to binary
categories.
Ringelblum’s “chronicle” not only displays the tendency to blur the lines between
collaborators and Nazis, but also between perpetrators, collaborators and victims as well.
In an entry on 25 May 1942, Ringelblum referred to the Nazi roundup of their own
Jewish agents – informers and policemen – for death or deportation. As events in the
ghetto moved towards their climax, he wrote, “The Gestapo beast devours its progeny.”60
On its face this comment references the myth of Saturn consuming his children.61 Not
only that, but by the time Ringelblum uses the phrase, it had been co-opted for many
purposes, but especially modified by intellectuals in the 19th and 20th century as “the
Revolution devours its children,” in reference to the excesses of the French and Russian
Revolutions. More to the point, however, Ringelblum suggests that there is a patriarchal
role being filled here.62 The Jewish police and informers are now children of the
“Gestapo beast,” not children of the Covenant. Here Ringelblum not only explicitly
labels the Gestapo “beasts” (a dehumanizing term), but also implicitly disowns those
individuals who sold their brothers and sisters out to these “beasts.” As far as
Ringelblum is concerned, these informers and policemen are no longer Jews.
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What is important here is the degree to which Ringelblum collapses the definition
of perpetrators. Not only is the wall between perpetrators and non-Jewish collaborators
broken – as in Hillesum’s description of the Dutch Commandant – but between
perpetrators and Jews as well. The two become indistinguishable – one is just a weaker
version of the other. It seems that, for Ringelblum, the blackmailers, informers and
Jewish policemen who herded thousands to their deaths are “progeny” of “beasts” –
something definitely an insult and almost a curse. By giving up the “progeny” to the
“beasts,” the binary distinction between “us” and “them” is re-established in
Ringelblum’s mind and the world can continue to make sense.
If one tendency of these writers was to collapse collaborator-perpetrator
distinctions, another was to reify perpetrator-victim boundaries. The text at hand is part
of a letter written by Hillesum dated Tuesday 8 June 1943. She wrote, “Right across from
me only a few meters away, a blue uniform with a helmet stands in the watchtower.”63
An incongruity is apparent here – this is not a perpetrator, a collaborator or even a person.
It is only a “blue uniform.” This remark is significant because throughout hundreds of
pages of diary entries and letters to friends, this is one of the only discussions of
perpetrators at all.
Hillesum and the “uniform” occupy the same space – they are in dangerously
close proximity to each other. The “blue uniform” is only “a few meters away.”
However, there is a world of separation between them because they occupy different
categories. Hillesum is a human being – she lives and she can communicate. The
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“uniform” however, has neither ears that can hear nor a heart that can feel compassion or
mercy – and so it stands in metaphorically for everything Hillesum feels about Nazism
and the atrocities it commits daily.
The “uniform” is in a watch tower above – an artificial perch, indicating
usurpation of authority, not authority itself. Meanwhile, Hillesum herself is in a
subordinate position on the ground below. A close reading of this letter indicates that
Hillesum is not implying surrender by placing the “uniform” above her, but is
maintaining the separation between “I” and “They” needed to continue to survive.
Nothing in the sentence indicates that she is recoiling from or was awestruck by the “blue
uniform.” She is merely observing it there in the watchtower.
The removal of what is human in the perpetrator was an essential component of
many Holocaust diaries. Perhaps this is because Hillesum and other writers could not
allow themselves to admit that a real human would willingly participate in such horrible
events. The purpose of dehumanizing a hostile “other” in favor of signs and symbols of
fascist violence and panoptic authority is to establish the separation needed for survival.
Interestingly, in some ways it also parallels the Nazi need to make killing easier by
dehumanizing those they murdered. In this reading of Hillesum’s letter, to remove the
human element was to remove the tension resulting from the subconscious awareness that
her incomprehensible position is the result of human agency. It was necessary for her to
take this stance considering the importance she attached to meaning.
There are many instances in the Notes when Ringelblum removed or altered the
human component in perpetrators and detoured around certain words or names associated
with Nazi Germany. These swerves took several forms. The Germans themselves were
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called “the Occupying Power” on no less than seven different occasions in Sloan’s
abridged edition. Propaganda Minister Josef Goebbels was never mentioned by name,
but simply referred to as an “important publicity man.”64 Although Hitler was mentioned
by name in multiple instances, he was also referred to at various points in the text as
“That One” (twice), “A.H.,” “a famous villain,” “Someone,” a “modern Haman,” and
even as “Horowitz” on multiple occasions. This last reference to Hitler is interesting
because it serves several functions. First, it hides the immediate subject of the entry, as
Sloan noted. More importantly, it mocks and insults Hitler. Perhaps by giving him a
Jewish name, Ringelblum was exhibiting aggression. He did this by calling attention to
Hitler’s long-rumored Jewish heritage – something known to infuriate the Führer.
Finally, calling him “Horowitz” functioned as an equalizer. Ringelblum was a Jew.
Hitler as “Horowitz” was a Jew too. By using a Jewish name, Ringelblum brought Hitler
down to his level and linguistically evened out a disparity in power.
Another fascinating linguistic swerve taken by Ringelblum was his tendency to
take a phrase Germans used to characterize themselves and write it in Hebrew, not
Yiddish. As mentioned above, Yiddish is derived from German. Although it is written in
Hebrew characters, it still owes its sound and structure to the German language. By
rendering a phrase in Hebrew, Ringelblum removed it from the German language entirely
– and took something that represented German identity (a German phrase) and inverted it
by writing it backwards in the tongue of a “slave” creature “unworthy of life” in Nazi
eyes.65 This literal inversion was a clever way of mocking the Germans, exhibiting
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The phrase “life unworthy of life” was another Nazi euphemism. Initially it was part of the title
of the influential 1920 essay Die Freigabe der Vernichtung lebensunwerten Lebens (Authorization for the
extermination of life unworthy of life) by legal scholar Karl Binding and psychiatrist Alfred Hoche. It was
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hostility and exercising power.66 There are several examples of this technique. In four
separate entries in the Sloan edition Ringelblum translated “lords and masters” into
Hebrew. He also changed “men (or captains) of valor” into Hebrew on six occasions.
Another time, Nazis were called “fine fellows” in Hebrew, as Ringelblum blended
sarcasm and linguistic inversion into a doubly loaded attack.67
These swerves point in exactly the opposite direction from the literal meaning of
the words. In another instance, a Nazi slogan was ridiculed and the KdF organization
(Kraft durch Freude – “Strength through Joy”) referred to as “Strength through Malicious
Joy.”68
It is not just well-known Nazi slogans or personalities that are singled out for this
treatment. One Nazi soldier in the ghetto is referred to in two separate entries as
“Frankenstein.”69 He is given this nickname because “he looks and acts like the monster
in the film of that name. He’s a bloodthirsty dog who kills one or two smugglers each
day. He just can’t eat his breakfast until he has spilled the blood of a Jew.”70 That this
Nazi is compared to Frankenstein’s monster is significant. Like the Golem of Jewish
tradition, the monster was called into life by mysterious, occult means – an affront to

used to describe those members of society whose utility was deemed minimal (the terminally ill and asylum
patients for example) and whose deaths, according to the authors, would be economically beneficial to
Germany. The phrase remained in circulation throughout the Nazi period and was eventually applied to
Jews as well. See Friedlander, The Origins of Nazi Genocide, p. 14.
66
Hebrew is written right to left, whereas German, like English is written left to right.
67
Ringelblum, p. 53.
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see Shelley Baranowski, Strength through Joy: Consumerism and Mass Tourism in the Third Reich
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).
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nature.71 This abomination was cobbled together from pieces of dead bodies. The ghetto
Frankenstein is similarly dead. Like the “blue uniform” and the “Skulls,” there is no
humanity to be found, only the outward resemblance of a man. Even this meager
resemblance is immediately called into question by yet another linguistic turn. The man
became a “bloodthirsty dog” – indicating the descent of the Nazi to the level of the bestial
and re-establishing the distinction between the living, human Jew and the dead, inhuman
German. This verbal flip indicates a mechanism of defense that attempts to alter reality.
At the time this entry was written, the ghetto was in its last stages of collapse. From
Ringelblum’s vantage point, nothing was more common in Warsaw than dead Jews and
living Germans. He turned this dynamic on its head. Through the hostility of the
sentence and the separate spheres it created, he indicated that the will to resist remained
in spite of the carnage around him.
Etty Hillesum also used this kind of “horror show” imagery to indicate hostility
and to reinforce the polar “us-them” opposition. In a letter dated Sunday, 8 August 1943,
she described a visit from a Dutch collaborationist general and labeled him a “fat toad in
a green uniform.”72 This depiction is interesting for several reasons. First, Hillesum,
who was conversant in several languages, including English, would most likely have
known that “toad” or “toady” was an expression for a sycophant.73 It seems possible that
she intended to imply that the Dutch General was not his own man, nor even any longer
Dutch. He was one of “them” – an extension of the Nazis and a tool used to implement
71
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terror and atrocity. In the traumatic environment of Westerbork, multiple categories were
not permissible. For Hillesum, writing this letter shortly before her deportation, a person
was either with the Jews or against them – there was no middle ground. Second, a long
European tradition exists linking the toad with evil – it was one of a witch’s familiars, in
service to the Devil. By casting the Dutch General in this light, she indicates her belief
that the General was metaphorically in league with Hitler in the same way a “toad” was
in league with Satan.74 Finally, the toad is a cold-blooded creature, almost as far from
human as anything with a heartbeat. Hillesum distances herself from the Commandant
by removing him as far as she possibly can from the living without metaphorically killing
him the way Ringelblum killed Hitler with a joke at the beginning of this chapter.75
As these passages show, writers during the Holocaust used unique linguistic
methods to say a great deal more than the actual text indicates. However, metaphors
were not the only way language was manipulated to convey an altered reality. On the
surface, Holocaust diaries and chronicles would seem to be the last place to find jokes,
especially jokes told by victims. This is not the case. It was precisely because the
situation was so dire that some authors resorted to the use of jokes to fend off feelings of
helplessness and to convey their anger and will to resist.
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The images of witches and Satan are Christian to be sure, but are also something Hillesum
would have been very familiar with simply by having been immersed in Western Christian culture and
folklore in the Netherlands her whole life. In fact, her entire diary reveals that she was profoundly
influenced by Christian thought.
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on the German word Tod or “death.” The arrival of the Dutch General is as much a harbinger of doom as is
Ringelblum’s narration of the arrival of the “Skulls” with their spitters.
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V: Linguistic Mechanisms of Defense – Jokes
The use of jokes has long been understood to indicate hostility or aggression and
to establish distance. Humor is also considered by many psychoanalysts and behavior
theorists to be a coping mechanism.76 Martin Grotjahn, author of a psychological study
of humor, wrote that “The Jewish joke constitutes victory by defeat.” He also observed
that there is a traditional form of Jewish joke that “contains devastating aggression,
disguised by restrained, almost humble modesty.”77
In Jokes and Their Relation to the Unconscious, written in 1905, Sigmund Freud
also discussed ways jokes were employed to demonstrate aggression and to distinguish
between one group and another. He argued that
…all moral rules for the restriction of active hatred give the clearest
evidence to this day that they were originally framed for a small society of
fellow clansmen. In so far as we are all able to feel that we are members
of one people [my emphasis], we allow ourselves to disregard most of
these restrictions in relation to a foreign people.78
He seems to say here that laughter traditionally brought groups together by placing them
in opposition to other groups. Freud’s comment refers to the long-term social uses of
laughter. Culturally, however, laughter changed considerably throughout the course of
European history. According to Mikhail Bakhtin, at the time Rabelais was writing
Gargantua and Pantagruel in France in the mid–16th century, laughter was considered to
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be a truth in itself – an open, expansive, life-affirming gesture. Over time, however
laughter became an aggressive, cynical tool for ostracism.79 Patricia Keith-Spiegel
reinforced Bakhtin’s assessment, arguing that “Gradually laughter and humor became a
substitute for actual assault…Laughter has also been viewed as the means of maintaining
group standards in primitive times.”80 The sources demonstrate that this was the case for
Jews victims during the Holocaust. Jokes made about Nazis served to consolidate their
sense of community with other Jews and to further increase the psychic distance between
“us” and “them.” When humor was used in this manner to disparage others, it served two
functions. The first was “to increase morale and solidify the in-group [in this case the
Jewish inhabitants of the ghetto].” The second was “to introduce and foster a hostile
disposition toward the out-group [the Nazi perpetrators].”81 Not only did it intensify
social distinctions, but as Freud continued, “By making the enemy small, inferior,
despicable or comic, we achieve in a roundabout way the enjoyment of overcoming
him.…”82 He appeared to mean by this that in certain situations, the making of
“tendentious” jokes is not only a hostile and aggressive impulse (an act of resistance
against a threatening “other”), but also an act relished and enjoyed by the one telling the
joke – a reaffirmation of individual power.
During the Holocaust, it was most frequently the case that physical resistance was
impossible – either because it was perceived as a futile waste of one’s life, or because of
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the threat of reprisals against family or community. In Holocaust diaries, direct
confrontation with the perpetrator was avoided in one way through the unconscious
method of making jokes at the expense of the Nazi perpetrator. However, simply because
the aggression in this process was sometimes muffled or even unconscious did not make
it any less a form of resistance.83 Indeed, Freud argued that these kinds of jokes were
especially favored in order to make aggressiveness or criticism possible
against persons in exalted positions who claim to exercise authority. The
joke then represents rebellion against that authority, a liberation from its
pressure.”84
Martin Grotjahn reinforced Freud’s concept of the joke as a subconscious attempt to
come to terms with an inadmissible hostility when he remarked
Increasing demands for repression through the ages have changed
aggression from assault into wit. Where we would have struck a person in
earlier times, we restrict our hostility now and often repress it entirely.
Aggressive wit gives us a new way of admitting dangerous aggression…85
Jokes in Holocaust diaries are significant because they indicated a linguistic “turn” away
from one meaning and pointed toward another, more subtle, but also more aggressive
understanding of the perpetrator. Although it initially seems as though the act of writing
and the telling of jokes was passive, in the case of Holocaust diaries these forms
represented a more hostile attitude towards perpetrators than at first might be expected.
Some of the best instances of this type of joke appear in the chronicles of
Emmanuel Ringelblum. In fact, at least two dozen jokes can be found in the edition
translated by Sloan. Two will be examined here. One joke, written 9 May 1940,
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indicates repressed hostility and aggression. Ringelblum wrote, “Horowitz [Hitler]
comes to the Other World. Sees Jesus in Paradise. ‘Hey, what’s a Jew doing without an
armband?’ ‘Let him be,’ answers Saint Peter, ‘He’s the boss’s son.’”86 Ringelblum was
imaginatively killing Hitler, who must be dead in order to be in Heaven. Second, he was
pointing out Hitler’s arrogance and hubris. Even in Paradise, the Führer believes he can
still call the shots. Third, Hitler is put in his place by Saint Peter. Here a space is created
where Hitler’s word is not law. By putting the words “let him be” in Saint Peter’s mouth,
Ringelblum was effectively de-fanging the viper. Fourth, Ringelblum was joking in the
idiom of the “Christian” perpetrator himself, displaying his mastery of the “other’s”
culture. Finally, this is all in the context of a joke that can either be read as modest and
self-deprecating (obviously if Jesus is the boss’s son, Jews have been wrong all along and
Christians correct), or a sort of comedy of the absurd (because it is not logical in any kind
of moral universe for Hitler to be in Paradise). This is an excellent example of a joke
being what William Martineau called a “social mechanism…for resolving hostility
emerging from structural relationships….”87
Jokes took many forms, but most indicated aggression. Sometimes this hostility
was expressed scatologically. In another entry from mid-September, 1941, Ringelblum
wrote, “They say at the beginning of the Russian campaign Napoleon put on a red shirt to
hide the blood if he should be wounded. H. put on a pair of brown drawers.”88 Not only
is this funny but it indicates several sets of beliefs. First, it demonstrates the hope in the
ghetto that “H,” like Napoleon, had picked a fight with a Russian colossus that he could
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not win. Second, it implies that Napoleon (who emancipated the Jews) was a brave, if
foolhardy man. By contrast, “H.” is a coward who will not venture out to fight with his
men and whose bowels give out on him when things go wrong.89 Third, the very notion
of defilement also has a specific context in relation to the Holocaust. Terrence Des Pres
wrote of a Nazi “excremental assault” on the Jews. This assault took place in the ghettos
and concentration camps. The argument asserts that by debasing the victims through
filth, feces and urine, the Germans created greater distance between the Herrenmenschen
and the Untermenschen. This enabled them to minimize pangs of conscience because the
victims, smeared in mud and excrement, seemed less human than their impeccably
dressed “masters.”90 In fact, French philosopher Paul Ricoeur noted that from time
immemorial, the three primary symbols of evil have been defilement, sin and guilt.91 By
making Hitler defile himself, Ringelblum sets up a situation in which that which is rotten
or evil on the inside is now able to be seen on the outside. Although this is delivered as a
joke, it nevertheless contains devastating aggression and linguistically points toward an
alternate meaning. It was clear to the Jews of Warsaw that Hitler was evil. Creating this
joke and wording it in this manner was a way of directing the attention of others toward
the obvious – Hitler (and all he represented: Nazism, anti-Semitism and malignant
aggression) are not only metaphorically, but physically evil for all to see.
Jokes served many functions in Holocaust diaries. They indicated aggression and
hostility, they established distance between perpetrators and victims and they revealed a
89
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turn toward alternate meanings that could not be conveyed by ordinary language. In
other words, the use of humor in these diaries encompasses the entire spectrum of
laughter’s cultural history by being both life-affirming and aggressive. These humorous
linguistic turns represent a line of psychological defense that helped victims maintain the
will to resist. As they resisted, they withdrew both into the community and into
themselves. These two places represented havens from the brutal reality victims faced
and worked together to provide a basis for continued struggle.
VI: Community, Individuality, and Defense Mechanisms
Michael Geyer argued in an essay on Jewish resistance during the
Holocaust that:
For Jews there were no rules of the game, no spaces of autonomy, no
voices that mattered, no partial community with the persecutor. Hence,
for Jews, every act of establishing ties among themselves was
resistance…For it is the effort of constituting in transcripts, hidden from
the persecutors, what is denied to them: community.92
In the diaries, notes, chronicles and transcripts that comprise Jewish writing during the
Holocaust, creating community was indeed extraordinarily important. However, exactly
because there “were no rules of the game,” it would perhaps more correct to say that the
acts which established ties as well as those which maintained individuality constituted
resistance.
Maintaining community was an important form of resistance because it ensured
the perpetuation of Jewish culture into a future which could mourn those who were lost
and try to understand what had happened in the past. Holocaust diaries served this
function. The passages above indicate that it was also important for diarists to maintain a
92
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sense of individuality when, everywhere they turned, they were being lumped together by
the Nazis – physically in ghettos and camps as well as categorically as “non-humans.”
The Jewish writer faced the dual problem of remaining an individual amid German
attempts to eradicate differences amongst Jews and at the same time draw strength from
the bonds of community.
To the individual writer of a Holocaust diary, finding a way to stay alive in hostile
and unforgiving environment was of paramount importance. For this reason, the full
murderous reality of the situation was often avoided. Because resistance required
something other than the self to struggle against, to think of the Nazis as people like
themselves – or to focus on the humanity beneath the barbarity – would have blurred the
lines which established the separation between perpetrator and victim required to
continue the struggle. Community and individuality were both important. Bolstering a
sense of Jewish community created a sense both of belonging and one of differentiation.
The greater the contrast between “us” and “them” (which could also be perceived as one
of “good” against “evil”), the greater the motivation to continue the battle. The more
thoroughly the diarist understood his/her own individuality, the more importance was
attached to preserving that identity. In other words, because composing diaries and
writing in general was a profoundly personal act, this expression of individuality and
autonomy reinforced the existence of a separate entity capable of resisting. To linger too
long over perpetrators and their motivations for committing what so many diarists refer to
as “incomprehensible” deeds would have had a detrimental effect in that the very
inconceivability of the situation tended to reduce the capacity for resistance. Just as
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staring at the sun for too long leads to blindness, so focusing excessively on the human
element in the Nazi criminal would have detracted from the victim’s ability to fight back.
The two goals of preservation of the community through the creation of a record
and the preservation of the self by avoiding traumatic reality reinforced each other. The
tension indicated in the passages cited above is between two things: the diarist’s
determination to leave a work behind documenting Nazi outrages and describing Jewish
suffering that would form another chapter in their people’s history, and their individual
need to evade the implications any commonalities they might share with the perpetrators
might have implied.
VII: Conclusion
Any effort to find a reason or meaning in the persecution, or to discover humanity
in the perpetrators, detracted from the Jewish victim’s ability to maintain the mental
strength necessary to continue resistance. Nevertheless, Emmanuel Ringelblum and Etty
Hillesum each attempted some kind of critique of the perpetrator, even if it came in the
form of linguistic turnings and swerves. However, for some victims the trauma of daily
life during the Holocaust was overwhelming. For these individuals the thought of
perpetrators and their motivations was too painful to acknowledge, and their diaries
reveal a lacuna where the historian senses a perpetrator should be found. The next
chapter posits that the conspicuous absence of perpetrators in some diaries indicates a
more profound withdrawal than Hillesum or Ringelblum present – a sort of mental
“hunkering down.” The absence of perpetrators can nevertheless be detected by careful
examination of hints and intimations in the writer’s use of language. By looking for these
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clues, it is possible to see the disappearance of perpetrators from Holocaust diaries as a
form of resistance as well.
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Chapter 3: Absence

Negation, Identification, and Suicide as Resistance
“Out of a mad soul we forge a sane deed.”
– Janusz Korczak, 30 March1937
I: Introduction

On 5 or 6 August 1942, an event took place in Poland that has since become the
stuff of legend.1 That morning, Nazi authorities ordered the deportation of all of the
children residing in the Warsaw Ghetto’s home for Jewish orphans. All accounts agree
that it was with quiet dignity and resignation that the director of the orphanage, Dr.
Janusz Korczak, organized his 192 charges into rows and, holding one child by the hand
and clutching another to his breast, walked with the children two miles to the
Umschlagplatz, from whence cattle cars departed daily.2 Crowds of tearful people
poured out onto the sidewalks as the children, carrying the green flag of “King Matt,”
Korczak’s fictional monarch, and the blue flag with the Star of David went by. Once at
the Umschlagplatz, an SS officer, aware of Dr. Korczak’s prominence, offered him the
option of staying behind, but Korczak brusquely waved the officer away.3 And so, after
clipping the yellow Stars of David from their sleeves and leaving them strewn about the
1
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Umschlagplatz, the “Old Doctor,” as he was known, and his children silently boarded the
train bound for Treblinka to the strains of Mendelssohn’s Requiem.4

The transport

departed on schedule at 12:55pm. Korczak and the children were never seen by Ghetto
residents again. They most likely perished in the gas chambers within hours of their
arrival at the camp.5
Korczak’s legend has grown over the years to near mythic proportions. He is
considered one of the greatest heroes of the Holocaust and in many quarters is practically
regarded as a saint. The “hagiography” on Korczak is large, particularly in Europe, and
the “last march of the children” has been depicted by many playwrights and authors. 6
What concerns us here is not the worshipful post-war literature that has developed in the
years since that “last march,” but what Korczak himself may have thought about what
was going on around him during the final weeks and months of his life. By looking at
Korczak’s own writings and the way he treated perpetrators in his diary, it is possible
both to clarify the historical and psychological portrait of a complicated man and to
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recognize that the “theatrical” nature of his last march tells us something about him and
the means he chose to resist Nazi genocide.
As we have seen, resistance did not always mean an armed uprising. However,
for some it could (and did) mean an internal struggle to preserve one’s dignity, integrity
and culture. Some resisted in and through their efforts to leave a record of atrocities
behind. By closely examining Korczak’s own writings it is possible to see inward
defense mechanisms morph and become outward, actual resistance to Nazi atrocity.7
Korczak’s biographers explain his internal defenses used early in life, but his Ghetto
diaries reveal how Korczak used suicide and drama as a final form of defiance. At
different times, Korczak used every means at his disposal to protect himself and his
children, and thereby defied the Nazis, even though, paradoxically, the final act of
defiance did not actually save any lives.
Although, in the end, Korczak could not save any lives, he was able to salvage
many things he valued. It is true that his propensity toward narcissism and selfaggrandizement (which we will see below) meant that he focused much of his energy on
preserving his own personal dignity and reputation. However, it would be a mistake to
assume that the spectacle he arranged was purely for his own benefit. In the long term,
though he could not save the children’s lives, Korczak was able to maintain the children’s
7
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Religious Faith as Causes of Suicide among New Slaves,” in The Journal of Negro History, vol. 62, no. 2
(April 1977), p. 147-159.
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memory and individuality as well as the idea of childhood innocence itself. By drawing
attention to this innocence, he starkly accentuated the injustice of the Nazi’s genocidal
actions. It could be argued that these things Korczak salvaged were of no practical use to
the children in their last hours, and that they might be incidental to Korczak’s own goals
of preserving his sense of importance. I do not believe this, however. In the short term,
by staying with the children, Korczak (who manifestly did not care about his own life)
was able to give the children something concrete to cling to – his own comfortable and
familiar presence in their lives, right up to the very end.
II: The Use of Language to Describe Genocide
I argued in chapters I and II that writers used different techniques when
attempting to communicate the reality of the Holocaust to their readers. Some felt no
qualms about describing the actions of perpetrators in writing. Others tried to find a
middle path between ignoring perpetrators and confronting them head on. Some of the
diarists I have discussed resorted to using linguistic mechanisms like metaphor,
synecdoche, and jokes to partially conceal their persecutors – and to express meanings
that might not be readily apparent upon a cursory reading of the sources. Others, like
Janusz Korczak, however, could not bear to allow the perpetrator into their writings – at
least any more than was possible given the events transpiring around them.
It has been suggested that one reason Nazis might not appear in diaries is that, in
everyday, practical terms, the victims did not have much actual contact with perpetrators
and so might not have thought about them that much.8 As discussed in the introduction,
however, this argument seems unlikely. It is important to recognize that perpetrators,
8

I would like to thank Professor Bernard Wasserstein of the University of Chicago for bringing
this possibility to my attention again in a personal interview on 31 March 2006.
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whether in full-view or as part of the background, were a part of diarists’ lives at the
time. Indeed, they were the one unavoidable fact of the victim’s existence, and it seems
inexplicable for them not to show up at least as a kind of antagonistic imaginary. In fact,
for perpetrators not to appear (or to appear minimally) should give readers pause and
make them wonder at this apparent aporia or paradox in Holocaust diaries: namely that
the people who represented the most concrete fact in these writer’s world fail to appear in
writings which were created for the purpose of leaving a record of Nazi cruelty and
atrocity behind. In Korczak’s case, the record clearly establishes that he dealt with
Germans personally and directly on at least several occasions. The relative absence of
perpetrators in his diary is therefore not the result of his ignorance of perpetrators
individually or as a group9. It must mean something else. Another reason for this
omission might be that the diary was one final place of control and autonomy – a haven
in which the elimination of the perpetrator represented a last stand against an implacable
enemy. If this is the case, the exclusion of perpetrators in Holocaust diaries is another
form of resistance, much like the use of metaphors and tropes seen in the previous
chapter, and should be analyzed as such.
The type of language with which they chose to communicate is the only means by
which we can understand writers of Holocaust diaries today. There were as many styles
as there were diarists, but they shared one common aspect. They were all in some way
trying to come to terms with what Charlotte Delbo called “l’inconcevable.”10 As we have
seen so far, victims alternately described perpetrators in what I call “journalistic” or
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Charlotte Delbo, Auschwitz and After (translated by Rosette C. Lamont, New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1995), p. x.
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“photographic” terms – eliminating an analytic component – or they transformed them
through the use of tropic devices into metaphors symbolically representing something
more than mere individuals. In some diaries, victims ignored perpetrators almost
completely – negating them textually even as perpetrators were attempting to negate
these authors physically. While the act of writing and documenting Nazi actions is
viewed by most scholars as an act of resistance, the diarist’s excision of perpetrators is
highly significant and suggests an active and aggressive but not necessarily conscious
form of mental resistance to Nazi genocide. Janusz Korczak’s writings seem to be a case
in which the victim struggled to shut the perpetrator out of his mind, only to have him
reappear one last time, but only when the need for defense mechanisms was obviated.
In cases like Korczak’s, it seems likely that the negation of the Nazi perpetrator
was a form of psychological resistance to the trauma the victim endured. It is considered
a truism among Holocaust historians that a multiplicity of psychological mechanisms
existed whereby Nazis were able to dehumanize their victims, and therefore distance
themselves from them. It does not seem far-fetched then, to look within gaps or absences
in the diaries (where one would expect to find accusation, recrimination, hate, fear or
other emotions directed at the perpetrator), for psychological mechanisms used by
victims to dehumanize and negate perpetrators. In fact, it is possible to speculate that this
dehumanization or negation of the hostile “Other” was helpful, if not necessary, to the
continued functioning and mental health of those diarists as they struggled to survive.
For example, in every diary examined in this thesis, the authors try to establish some kind
of distance – whether through direct aggression, resort to dehumanizing metaphors, or by
holding the perpetrators at arms length by sticking to a strictly factual style. The only
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exception to this is Janusz Korczak’s final entry, which will be discussed in greater detail
below.
In Korczak’s case, the collapse of these interior defense mechanisms, as
indicated by his final diary entry, seems to have led to a final symbolic volley directed at
the perpetrators once the possibility of survival was all but extinguished. When Korczak
became aware that he had no way out, or that there were no choices left that were
acceptable to him, interior defense mechanisms became obsolete, and freed him to act in
a way that performed several important functions. First, his actions preserved his dignity,
and that of his children, by interfering with the Nazi goal of transforming them from
people into objects. Second, these actions prevented his children from becoming just
another mass of anonymous victims, thereby preserving some of the individuality the
Nazis were trying to take from them. It is precisely because of the decisions Korczak
made during those last frantic hours that the obliteration, or negation, the Nazis
envisioned for their victims was not entirely successful in the case of the orphans in his
care.11
Korczak’s diary is a valuable tool because it helps historians establish the logic of
his actions that final morning – actions which followed, at least to some degree, from the
thoughts he expressed in writing. For the Nazis, genocide meant more than just murder.
It meant that victims were objectified and stripped of their individuality before they were
subjected to the cold disgrace of an anonymous death. The “final march” of Korczak’s
11
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children, while it did not prevent death, prevented the complete success of Nazi intent –
something Korczak foresaw - and this is why it was such a profound act of resistance.
III: Silence
What was left unwritten in Holocaust diaries can be as important as what was
committed to the page. There are several reasons why diarists might have left
perpetrators out of their writings: perhaps they wanted to create a record of Jewish life,
not Jewish death. Or maybe the perpetrators’ actions, presence, or even existence
constituted a threat so dire that the writer found it necessary to avoid mentioning them at
all costs. While historians can envision a broad spectrum of possibilities, the evidence
indicates that on many occasions these reactions were protective and represented a type
of psychological resistance to Nazi genocide.
Historians, theologians, philosophers, and others who study the destruction of the
European Jews, have been divided about the nature of Holocaust testimony. It is
generally contended that victims of the Holocaust experienced a reality so far outside the
bounds of normal human experience that it exceeds the capacity for imagination or
comprehension for those David Rousset called “normal men.” In other words, some
assert that language cannot convey the meaning of extreme situations like torture, atrocity
and genocide. In this sense, Holocaust diaries are problematic because they are
attempting to tell us something we cannot, and could never, understand. Some have even
suggested that silence is the best response to the caesura represented by the reality of
Auschwitz.12 Lawrence Langer clearly recognized the paucity of language when he
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For example in Irving Greenberg’s assertion, quoted in the essay “Where is God Now?”, that
“no statement, theological or otherwise, should be made that would not be credible in the presence of the
burning children,” in John K. Roth and Michael Berenbaum (eds.), Holocaust: Religious & Philosophical

115
asserted that “the human need…to see the Holocaust as some kind of continuum in the
spiritual history of man repeatedly stumbles over the limits of language, to say nothing of
the limits of traditional moral theory.”13
This approach has been critiqued for clouding what is essentially an historical
occurrence which should be subject to the same rules and methodologies as other events.
For instance, scholars like Christian Maier have pointed out that while the Holocaust may
not be completely comprehensible, it is explainable.14 This analysis of Janusz Korczak’s
diary acknowledges the problem of comprehension yet still attempts to interrogate, or
probe, those boundaries of representation – or in the case of the absence of perpetrators,
the boundaries and meanings of a strategy of representation through un-representation. In
this way, it is possible to respond to Giorgio Agamben’s assertion that philosophers and
historians need to find a way out of the impasse in which the urge to understand meets
the “incomprehensible” nature of genocidal reality.15
The events Korczak bore witness to were to some degree beyond comprehension,
even to him. But looking carefully at his writings allows us to see that it is precisely in
the gaps in the narrative, especially those gaps that seem as if they should contain
perpetrators, that he is telling us something – both about incomprehensibility and about
genocidal reality.
Implications (New York: Paragon House, 1989), p. 262. Theodor Adorno also famously remarked “after
Auschwitz, to write a poem is barbaric,” although he recognized later that he may have phrased the
sentiment incorrectly. Theodor W. Adorno, Negative Dialectics (translated by E.B. Ashton, New York:
Seabury Press, 1973).
13
Lawrence Langer in “The Dilemma of Choice in the Deathcamps,” in John K. Roth and Michael
Berenbaum (eds.), Holocaust: Religious & Philosophical Implications (New York: Paragon House, 1989),
p. 228.
14
Christian Meier, From Athens to Auschwitz: The Uses of History, translated by Deborah Lucas
Schneider (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005), p. 137-169.
15
Giorgio Agamben comments in Remnants of Auschwitz: The Witness and the Archive (translated
by Daniel Heller-Roazen, New York: Zone Books, 2002) that “some want to understand too much and too
quickly; they have explanations for everything. Others refuse to understand; they offer only cheap
mystifications. The only way forward lies in investigating the space between these two options.” p. 13.
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Although Lawrence Langer is skeptical about how much truth can be understood
about the Holocaust through any medium, he has also remarked that
When fantasies become literally true, the artist, the writer, must record a
reality that has become the expression of the impossible, at the same time
convincing his audience that whatever distortions he employs do not
negate, but clarify [Langer’s emphasis] reality and subject it to an
illuminating metamorphosis.16
Korczak’s negation of perpetrators only seems to be a distortion when in fact this strategy
most accurately reflects the experience he was living. It is not that perpetrators were not
on his mind, it is that their existence was being mediated or repressed in a way that
allowed Korczak to function more easily.
Giorgio Agamben recognized that absence is a prominent, indeed unavoidable,
element of the unthinkable nature of the Nazi genocide when he wrote,
at a certain point, it became clear [to me] that testimony contained at its
core an essential lacuna; in other words, the survivors bore witness to
something it is impossible to bear witness to. As a consequence,
commenting on survivors’ testimony necessarily meant interrogating this
lacuna or, more precisely, attempting to listen to it.17
Interrogating these lacunae can prove a very difficult task for the historian, who must try
to reconstruct an event or a mentality based upon hints and clues obtained through the
study of the context in which the lacuna appears. The essence of Holocaust diaries is that
they narrate portions of journeys (which were never identical) from life to death, and tell
us something about the stages people pass through on the way.18 It is therefore possible to
see the relative absence of perpetrators in Korczak’s diary in two distinct ways.19 First,
16

Lawrence Langer, The Holocaust and the Literary Imagination (New Haven: Yale University
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complete control by having the power to “make live and let die.” Agamben, Remnants of Auschwitz, p. 82-
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the lacuna itself – the absence of perpetrators in these diaries – displays the victim’s
comprehension of the genocidal dynamic and even suggests a kind of reversal of roles.
In Korczak’s diary, the “Old Doctor” and his orphans are not nameless or numberless
“non-humans.” Rather, it is the Nazi perpetrator who is now subject to this effacement.
This reversal represents a form of resistance in which the victim exercises a form of
imaginary control, not only over his or her own life, but over that of his persecutors as
well. Second, if it is correct to surmise that victims passed through stages on the path to
becoming the nameless “drowned,” then it is possible to see Holocaust diaries in general
as the articulation of resistance to being placed in a position in which death or
“drowning’ was the pre-ordained outcome. Moreover, one would expect that as
individuals passed through the various stages toward the silence the Nazis intended for
them, there would be corresponding changes in the form their testimony takes. Clearly
Korczak’s testimony changes over time.
We can see, in the development of Korczak’s treatment of perpetrators, a growing
awareness of what we might call the “dynamics of genocide.” When these suspicions
became certainties, Korczak’s inward mechanisms of defense were no longer necessary,
and he took direct action against the Nazis in the form of a highly theatrical suicide. This
“suicide” was clearly a kind of outward resistance to genocide – one which assured that
Korczak (and the children) would not submit silently or anonymously to the fate their
persecutors had decreed for them. In other words, Korczak was exercising his will, or
volition, to halt the progression or downward spiral that Agamben discusses – though the
price remained his life and the lives of those he loved.

83. See also “Right of Death and Power of Life” in The History of Sexuality: An Introduction, vol. I by
Michel Foucault (translated by Robert Hurley, New York: Vintage Books, 1990), p. 135-159.
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This is not to say that there is a direct correlation between the stage of
dehumanization in which all victims found themselves and the kind of diary they wrote.
While those on the verge of “drowning” may have been alike in their emptiness and
degradation, the authors of diaries were not (yet); and they responded to their
environment in different ways. However, I believe that the relative absence of
perpetrators in Holocaust diaries like Korczak’s is significant and that it is only by
“listening to” this lacuna that the historian is better able to understand the context in
which these documents of atrocity were written. The choices Korczak made about how
to respond to the Nazi goal of reducing him to something less than human tells us a great
deal about the limits of control and about the dynamics of genocide.
Primo Levi spoke of levels of understanding, and he knew that those who
survived to write about Nazi genocide and what took place in the concentration camps
had not “fathomed them to the bottom.”20 The diaries we have examined thus far are
different, however. In almost every case except for that of Abel Herzberg – from that of
Éva Heyman, Hannah Senesh and Dawid Sierakowiak who wrote explicitly of
perpetrators, to that of Emmanuel Ringelblum and Etty Hillesum, who wrote of them
both realistically and metaphorically – the authors ultimately did fathom Nazi genocide to
the bottom, and were murdered in by starvation, firing squads or in the gas chambers.
These diaries are all the writings of the “drowned,” not the “saved.” They were written in
transit, as it were. The case of Janusz Korczak is no exception. And, although a message
from the “bottom” is naturally impossible (dead men and women tell no tales), it seems
important to get as close as we can to that moment-of-no-return if we are to move
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Primo Levi, The Drowned and the Saved, (translated by Raymond Rosenthal, New York:
Summit Books, 1986), p. 17.
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forward in our understanding of the structure and effects of genocide, and comprehend
more of what these diaries tell us about resistance.
IV: Sources and Biographical Information
Scholarly sources of information about Korczak are somewhat scarce in English
language translations. The primary source of our information about Korczak’s thoughts
and feelings during the period in question is his Ghetto Diary, which was begun briefly in
January of 1940, but then set aside and taken up again from May to August, 1942.21 This
diary represents our closest glimpse into the mind of a man who was clearly aware of the
dangers besetting him and the children he cared for. And, it is worth noting pursuant to
our discussion of absence and silence that although Korczak had contact with Nazis and
was even imprisoned at one point (at the end of November, 1941) by the Gestapo for not
wearing his armband, he seemed to go out of his way to ignore those perpetrators who
accounted for so much of the misery he saw around him during the period in which he
was writing.
In addition to the Ghetto Diary, Korczak’s beloved children’s book, King Matt the
First, published in Poland in 1923, is a kind of primary source as well. The title
character, King Matt, is clearly a stand-in for Korczak in the same way Peter Pan is a
stand-in for the writer J.M. Barrie. Korczak admits this much himself in the introduction
to the book when he discusses the use of his own photograph as a young boy of about ten
on the frontispiece of the novel. He directs his remarks to the children he hopes will read
the book and says to them,

21
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When I was the little boy you see in the photograph, I wanted to do all the
things that are in this book. But I forgot to, and now I’m old. I no longer
have the time or the strength to go to war or travel to the land of the
cannibals. I have included this photograph because it’s important what I
looked like when I truly wanted to be a king, and not when I was writing
about King Matt.22
Although the novel was written long before the events of the Holocaust, it still contains
many of the same images and sentiments apparent in Korczak’s wartime diary. This
means that through a comparison of these two very disparate sources we can to trace
some of the themes of Korczak’s life that were independent of the trauma caused by Nazi
genocide and aggression – particularly Korczak’s emphasis on a “good death.”
Two final sources of information, Joseph Hyams 1968 biography, A Field of
Buttercups, which focuses on those last few months in the ghetto, and Betty Jean Lifton’s
1988 full-length biography, The King of Children, though not primary, supplement King
Matt, and allow us to understand some of the basic threads and common themes of
Korczak’s life. They therefore help us make some critical conclusions about the more
enigmatic points in the Ghetto Diary, especially about how Korczak could, at the very
end, set aside internal defense mechanisms and seize upon a much more direct, though
suicidal, assault upon his Nazi persecutors in the form of his final, dramatic “march”
through the streets of the ghetto and his insistence upon dying with his children.
Korczak was born Henryk Goldszmit in 1878 or 1879 – he did not know which
year – to an assimilated Jewish family in Warsaw. The first concrete fact of young
Henryk’s existence was his father’s wild, unpredictable, and sometimes violent behavior.
Over time it became increasingly clear that the elder Goldszmit suffered from serious
mental illness which was perhaps related to syphilis. Henryk’s mother was actually
22

Janusz Korczak, King Matt the First (translated by Richard Lourie, Chapel Hill: Algonquin
Books of Chapel Hill, 2004), p. 1.

121
afraid to leave her son alone with his father.23 As a result, Henryk was raised by his
overprotective mother and grandmother – that “stern regiment of women,” as he would
later call it.24
Henryk studied medicine in Warsaw and became a pediatrician. During his years
in school, he wrote for several Polish language newspapers.25 It was at this time that he
adopted the sobriquet “Janusz Korczak’ – the name he continued to use throughout the
remainder of his life. During the Russo-Japanese War he served as a military doctor – a
role he was to reprise in 1914 during the Great War. From 1911 onward, he also served
as the director of an orphanage for Jewish children on Krochmalna Street in Warsaw. It
was during this time that Korczak became well known in his home country and even
throughout Eastern Europe for his creative work as a pedagogue and his books of
humorous and humane advice for raising children. He even had his own talk radio
program called “Ask the Old Doctor” in Warsaw. His fame was not limited, however, to
his homeland and his works on education made him something of a celebrity during his
visits to Palestine in the mid-30s.
Korczak’s father’s erratic behavior and propensity toward violence instilled a
lifelong fear of both madness and sex in his son. Korczak never married and never had a
sexual relationship to the best of anyone’s knowledge, because he regarded sex as
“dangerous, unhealthy and undignified.”26 In addition to his fear of madness and
sexuality, he was also obsessed with death and suicide throughout his life. This too may
have been rooted in his relationship with his father, who died, most likely by his own
23
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hand, in 1896.27 When Korczak’s mother passed away in late 1919 or early 1920 during
a typhus epidemic, he was even prompted to suggest a suicide pact to his sister. His early
writings contain poems like “Ah, let me die / Ah, don’t let me live / Ah, let me descend
into my dark grave!” Lifton suggests that the frequency of writings of this type indicates
that he may have suffered from severe depression throughout his life.28 Following his
mother’s death, Korczak also began keeping mercuric chloride and morphine in his
drawer at all times. He is known to have visited her grave with these pills and may have
even attempted suicide at one point around 1920.29 Although it is not certain that he
attempted suicide, the possibility is suggested by the experiential tone of comments in his
diary that “nothing is more loathsome than an unsuccessful attempt at suicide…this sort
of plan should be worked out so as to insure certainty of success.”30 Korczak seems to
have been repeatedly tempted to end his life over a period of many years, although he
protested later that “having once tried the delights and joys of committing suicide, a man
lives to an advanced old age without the temptation to try again.”31
An obsession not just with death, but with a “good death” also seems to have
preoccupied Korczak. At a funeral for his good friend and mentor, Waclaw Nalkoski,
Korczak delivered the eulogy. In a speech that seems to have echoed his own hopes for
the type of “good death” for which he longed, he said
A happy man died – a man who lived the way he wanted, and died the way
he wanted, in a hospital bed. He was not killed by those who today, like
cowards sing his praise. He was not killed by those who lived and got fat
27
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eating the crumbs of his thought. He was not killed by those who could not
see his greatness. He did not fight any of them. He merely dismissed them
with a toss of his head.32
This passage is even echoed in his books for children and points to some of the things
Korczak valued or wished for: happiness, freedom, acclaim and recognition, and
greatness.33 All accounts of Korczak’s last march demonstrate that he followed this
formula very closely. In the end, that final, quixotic act seems very much to be the
symbolic equivalent of the “dismissal” with the “toss of his head.” In a diary entry dated
21 July 1942, as life rapidly disintegrated around him, he wrote again about his wish for a
good, or beautiful death, though he clearly does not envision his death (or his children’s)
as a collective experience at this time. He wrote:
It is a difficult thing to be born and to learn to live. Ahead of me is a
much easier task: to die. After death, it may be difficult again, but I am
not bothered about that. The last year, month or hour. I should like to die
consciously, in possession of my faculties. I don’t know what I should say
to the children by way of farewell. I should want to make clear to them
only this – that the road is theirs to choose, freely.34
A final important trait of Korczak’s is his apparent sense of mission or selfimportance. As with the other aspects of his psychology, this too seems as if it can be
traced back partially to his father, who, though he often treated his son very poorly, was
extremely proud of a letter of blessing he received from the Chief Rabbi of Paris on the
occasion of Henryk’s birth. This letter told the elder Goldszmit “your son will be a great
man of Israel.”35 This may have just been a kindly sentiment on the part of the Rabbi, but
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the fact that the younger Goldszmit/Korczak kept the letter his entire life suggests that he
attached considerable importance to it. This tendency to view himself as important,
combined with his lifelong role not only as a physician, but as a public personality and a
symbol of “children’s rights” throughout Poland, Palestine and Eastern Europe, point to
his embrace of and identification with a style of living that was at least as much
performative as it was genuine.36
As we will see, the life-long importance he attached to fame (he acknowledges
wishing to be a king in King Matt) was exacerbated by the genocidal situation in which
he wrote the Ghetto Diary. There is also no doubt that Korczak relied heavily on his
authoritative public persona to mitigate the myriad disasters that befell the orphaned
children of the Warsaw Ghetto on a nearly daily basis. But he did so at a cost. When his
prestige and prominence were no longer enough to earn him the respect he felt was his
due, the old depression and suicidal thoughts came flooding back in.37 It is certain, then,
that Korczak brought a considerable amount of psychological baggage, as well as
personal history with him into the traumatic environment of the ghetto – where traumatic
conditions no doubt accentuated both good and bad characteristics. Korczak was an
individual devoted to children (often to the exclusion of adults). He was also someone
who fought for children’s rights and for their safety. However, at the same time, he was
chronically depressed, perhaps frequently suicidal, not to mention someone whose
personality contained narcissistic and self-important elements.
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When the Nazis invaded Poland and formed the Warsaw Ghetto in 1940,
Korczak’s orphanage was moved inside the ghetto walls. As a prominent personality, he
was well-known to other diarists and chroniclers of life in the ghetto like Michael
Zylberberg, Chaim Kaplan, Emmanuel Ringelblum, and Adam Czerniakow, head of the
Warsaw Judenrat.38 Korczak maintained a high profile throughout the duration of the
ghetto’s existence, and he lobbied ceaselessly on behalf of his orphans. As mentioned
above, he and the children were sent to Treblinka on 5 or 6 August 1942.
Fortunately for historians, the doctor left his diary lying next to his bed that
morning. Interestingly enough, he left his cracked glasses behind as well. Perhaps it is
reading too much into the historical record, but one wonders if Korczak perhaps left them
behind because he wanted to indicate he had finally seen the way before him clearly, or
conversely, that he felt there was nothing more to see.39 The diary was salvaged and
taken to safety by Korczak’s friend Igor Newerly, and was first published in Polish in
1956. Over the years, Korczak’s legacy grew and he came to be regarded as one of the
great heroes of the Holocaust – especially in Europe and Israel. Today, his memory is
revered by people all around the world.
V: Suicide and Daydreams
By analyzing Korczak’s depictions of perpetrators, we are able to get an
impression of the way he felt about the Germans who invaded his country and threatened
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to take away his beloved children. We are also able to surmise what kind of defense
mechanisms he used to cope with life in the Ghetto and how they helped him cope with
the everyday terror that threatened to break down his carefully composed public persona.
Most importantly, we can see how his depictions of perpetrators changed over time as his
situation became increasingly impossible.
Korczak only spoke of Germans directly or indirectly on four occasions in his
diary, and never before May 1942, a year and a half after the establishment of the
Warsaw Ghetto.40 The first entry, dated 15 May 1942, does not discuss perpetrators
explicitly but alludes to them in the description of a “daydream.” Analysis of this
passage requires the historian to follow Agamben’s advice to “listen” to the lacuna where
the perpetrator should appear. This passage is the most concrete example of an
“absence” that indicates a kind of “representation through non-representation.” It also
reinforces the idea that Korczak was obsessed with suicide yet avoided the prospect of his
own negation or absence by resorting to fantasy. Therefore, Korczak’s first entry in his
diary pertaining to perpetrators stands apart from all the others and goes directly to our
discussion of absence and silence. Not only does the passage recapitulate the themes of
Korczak’s life in many ways (fear of madness, narcissism, and preoccupation with
suicide), but it also demonstrates a way in which he was able to confront his enemies in a
grand manner in keeping with his sense of self-importance.
We know that in real life Korczak was unafraid of standing up for himself or
those he loved. 41 In King Matt, the protagonist (Korczak’s stand-in) repeatedly takes on
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the world in an attempt to realize positive changes. This fictional stance as well as l
actions we know he took in real life seems to indicate that Korczak wished to confront his
enemies and did so both physically and through his writing. At the same time, he had
learned from the incident with the potatoes (see fn. 43) that an outright physical or verbal
assault against the Nazis would most likely leave his children alone in a hostile world
with very bleak prospects. This passage provides an outlet for his hostility, while it also
masks the extent of his rage. Although I have quoted part of this passage before, I am
repeating it in its entirety for the sake of clarity. In this entry, written 15 May 1942, the
doctor wrote
There were years when I kept mercuric chloride and morphine pills
hidden in the far corner of a drawer. I would take them out only when I
went to my mother’s grave at the cemetery. But since the start of the war,
I have kept them in my pocket, and it’s interesting that they were not
confiscated when I was searched in jail..
There can be nothing (no experience) more loathsome than an
unsuccessful attempt at suicide. This sort of plan should be fully matured
so as to ensure absolute certainty of success.
If I kept on postponing my otherwise fully thought-out plan, it was
because always at the very last moment some new daydream would sweep
me away and could not be abandoned before I worked it out in detail.
These were something like themes for short stories. I put them under a
common heading of: “Oddities.”
Thus:
I have invented a machine (I made a detailed design of the whole
mechanism). Something in the nature of a microscope. The scale – one
hundred. If I should turn the micrometer screw to ninety-nine, everything
would die that did not contain at least one percent of humanity. The
amount of work was unbelievable. I had to determine how many people
(living beings) would go out of circulation each time, who would take
their place, and what would be the outcome of such a purged tentative new
life. After a year’s deliberations (at night, of course) I came half way with
the distillation. Now the only people left were half-beasts, all others have
perished. How minutely, to the last detail I planned everything – the best
proof that my own person was completely excluded from this peculiar

personally went to Gestapo headquarters to protest – an action which luckily only cost him a month in
prison.
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system. By a mere turn of the micrometer screw of my ‘microscope’ I
could have taken my own life. What then?
I confess with some embarrassment that I return to this theme
today, too, on the more difficult nights. Nights in prison have produced
the most interesting chapters of my tale.
There were about a dozen of these daydreams in the workshop to
choose from.
Thus…I have found the magic word. I am the ruler of the light.42
The first paragraph of this passage reconfirms Korczak’s long-term obsession
with suicide. It also gives us some additional information about his state of mind.
Initially, the doctor kept the pills in a separate location apart from his person, except
during visits to his mother’s grave. Before the war, the suicide tablets seem symbolic – a
sign of his loss and grief indeed, but a loss and grief that was manageable. This state of
affairs changed once the war began, and Korczak prepared to end his life at any moment.
In his diary, he expressed surprise that the pills were not taken from him in jail,
but he did not immediately address the more perplexing question of why he did not take
him then. Perhaps this is because, as he stated in the second paragraph, he found
unsuccessful suicide attempts “loathsome” – and one made in jail would allow for too
many factors beyond his control. For Korczak, at this point in his life, suicide was no
longer about emotion, as it was when he proposed the suicide pact to his sister; it was
about rationality – a sane response to the insane world he saw around him. This is why in
the third paragraph he explicitly stated that his suicide plan was fully worked-out. Why
then did he not go through with it? The answer was contained in the power of
“daydreams” that occupied Korczak’s troubled mind.
As a physician and an intellectual familiar with the writing of Sigmund Freud,
Korczak recognized and acknowledged that “daydreams” represented repressed wishes.
42
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In fact, Lifton quotes the doctor as saying “Feelings that have no other outlet become
daydreams. And daydreams become the internal script of life. If we knew how to
interpret them, we would find they come true, but not always in the way we expect.”43 It
appears that Korczak’s daydreams performed several functions with respect to his mental
condition. First, they expressed a wish. Secondly, and more importantly, they performed
the function of keeping him alive precisely because the daydream “sweeps [him] away”
from imminent thoughts of suicide.44
What then is the nature of this particular daydream and what does it tell us about
Korczak’s feelings about perpetrators? The daydream itself is somewhat ambiguous.
Korczak obviously did not really invent a machine, and it is doubtful that he actually
drew designs. This is our first clue that he is narrating the episode as it occurred over and
over only in his mind. The killing machine he “invents” is based upon a microscope. It
is not surprising that a doctor would envision a scientific instrument, but it is illustrative
to point out that rationalization of mass-murder through an appeal to and use of science is
exactly the approach taken by Nazis in the development of the “Final Solution”45 How
does Korczak determine who he is going to kill? It is again through a “rational” resort to
43
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numbers and percentages. He begins by making the sweeping, though egalitarian,
assumption that everyone is made up of certain parts “human” and certain parts “beast” –
and more importantly that these differences can be differentiated and measured. This
enables him to construct a “machine” that can be set to kill anyone composed of more
than a certain percentage “beast.” Korczak is the one who gets to determine this
percentage – something which confers upon him all the power in the world, and which
indicates profound narcissism. In his daydream he proceeds about this task rationally, as
a scientist and a physician. Just like a scientist, he clearly has to take into consideration
many factors – such as what human life will look like with so much “beast” expunged
from it and how much “beast” he should allow to remain.
Even as Korczak proceeds scientifically about his experiment, he is also
profoundly aware of the irrationality at the heart of his project. It is obvious that he
originally comes up with this “daydream” in jail (“Nights in prison have produced the
most interesting chapters of my tale”). The dream also causes him “embarrassment.” If
it made sense, then it would not shame him. This passage clearly expresses rage, but the
target of this anger is carefully concealed. This is an obvious example of one of the
lacunae Agamben discussed. By listening carefully to it, we can infer that the rage that
drove him to these wishful daydreams was directed at the people who put him in a
powerless position – the Nazis. This “daydream,” which Korczak himself understood as
a repressed wish, clearly indicates aggression and hostility toward perpetrators (without
whom there would be no need for his “machine”). The doctor is clearly aware of the
faulty logic of his proposition. He knows that if he takes it upon himself to decide who is
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human and who is “beast,” he is no better than those he murders, and hence he is as much
“beast” as they are (and so it is important that he remain outside of the system).
What we have here then, in at least some sense, is Korczak appropriating Nazi
methods (the scientific rationalization of mass-murder), their “logic” (minus the racial
overtones), their language (“out of circulation” is as much a euphemism as “special
treatment”), and their goals (the elimination of those who are not “human”). Korczak’s
fantasy is one of domination and control and an attempt psychologically to make up for
his feelings of powerlessness. This can also be ascertained from the enigmatic last
paragraph (“I have found the magic word. I am the ruler of the light”). What exactly he
meant by this is uncertain, but Korczak himself had claimed in the past to have looked to
Germany “for light and knowledge.”46 If we read the passage this way (“I am the ruler of
Germany/Germans”) it makes perfect sense. Locked in a jail cell in Warsaw on the
orders of the Gestapo, Korczak fantasizes about turning the tables and reorienting the
positions of victim and perpetrator.
The ironic thing about this passage, however, is that it is only by adopting the sort
of logic of murder and genocide employed by perpetrators that Korczak is able to refrain
from committing suicide. It was with catastrophic results that Nazi fantasies about Jews
came true. Korczak’s fantasy is remarkably similar to Nazi fantasies, yet it served the
positive purpose of keeping him alive.47 Without daydreams of this sort, he readily
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admitted that he would have committed suicide. Paradoxically then, murderous fantasy
itself becomes a form of resistance to Nazi genocide.
Fantasies of this type are apparently not rare. In a chapter on necrophilia in his
book, The Anatomy of Human Destructiveness, psychologist Erich Fromm recorded the
dream of one of his patients – one that is extraordinarily similar to Korczak’s. Fromm’s
patient says:
I have made a great invention, the ‘superdestroyer.’ It is a machine
which, if one secret button is pushed that I alone know, can destroy all life
in North America within the first hour, and within the next hour all life on
earth. I alone, knowing the formula of the chemical substance, can protect
myself.” (Next scene) “I have pushed the button; I notice no more life, I
am alone, I feel exuberant.48
Fromm’s analysis of this case is short, almost curt. He says
This dream is an expression of pure destructiveness in an extremely
narcissistic person, unrelated to others and with no need of anyone. This
was a recurrent dream with this person, together with other necrophilous
dreams. He was suffering from severe mental sickness.49
Ostensibly, this patient was not under duress when he described this dream, nor
was he subject to any genocidal pressures. It is interesting and illustrative, however, to
compare this “extremely narcissistic” person’s dream with a daydream that Korczak
described. Was Korczak “suffering from severe mental illness?” This does not seem to
be the case. As he mentioned himself, the daydream was protective and it was precisely
by resorting to fantasies – “necrophilous” or otherwise – that he was able to cope with the
traumatic environment of the Warsaw Ghetto. It seems in Korczak’s case that an
“expression of pure destructiveness” enabled him to continue to live and resist. In this
May entry, Korczak’s attitude toward perpetrators is hostile and aggressive, although
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suppressed (no individuals or nations are named). His approach changes considerably by
the next time he mentions them.
VI: Identification and Denial
The second passage, written 27 July 1942, only eleven days before the doctor and
his children were sent to their deaths, represents Korczak’s only discussion of
perpetrators specifically as Germans or Nazis. It is striking because, in it, he adopts the
voice and persona of a perpetrator. It is also notable because both its (seemingly
defensive) naïveté, as well as the way it laid out the possibilities Korczak saw before him,
including suicide and heroism.
The doctor was obviously trying to find some kind of logic or sense in his
situation, and so, as if to clarify things to himself, he wrote about the meaning of the war
from what he imagined to be the German point of view. The passage displays an attempt
at identification with the perpetrator which is clearly hampered by Korczak’s failure to
comprehend the nature of Nazi intentions for Jews. He wrote:
We are running a giant enterprise. Its name is war. We work in a
planned, disciplined manner, methodically. Your [you Jews] petty
interests, ambitions, sentiments, whims, claims, resentments, cravings do
not concern us.
Meanwhile, in order not to prolong the matter, things must get a bit rough
and painful, and if I many put it that way, without particular precision,
elegance or even scrupulousness. Just roughly cut for current expediency.
You yourself [the Jews] are longing to see all this over. So are we.
Therefore, don’t interfere.
Jews go East. No bargaining. It is no longer the question of a
Jewish grandmother but of where you are needed most – your hands, your
brain, your time, your life. Grandmother. This was necessary only to
hook you on to something, a key, a slogan.
You say you cannot go East – you will die there. So, choose
something else. You are on your own, you must take the risk. For clearly
we, to keep up appearances, are obliged to bar the way, to threaten,
prosecute and reluctantly to punish.
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And you butt in, uninvited, with a fresh wad of bank notes. We
have neither time nor desire for that sort of thing. We are not playing at
war, we were told to wage it with the greatest possible expedition,
efficiently, as honestly as possible.
The job is not clean, or pleasant, or sweet smelling. So for the
present we must be indulgent to the workers we need…
We are Germans. It is not a question of the trademark, but of the
cost, the destination of the products.
We are the steel roller, the plow, the sickle. So long as it bears
fruit. And it will, provided you don’t interfere, don’t whine, get all upset,
poison the air. We may feel sorry for you at times, but we must use the
whip, the big stick or the pencil, because there must be order.
A poster.
“Whoever does this or that – will be shot.”
“Whoever does not do this or that – we will shoot.”
Someone seems to be asking for it. A suicide? Too bad.
Someone else is not afraid. Hail! A hero?
Let his name shine in letters of gold but – now, out of the way
since there is no alternative.
A third is afraid – livid with fear, constantly runs to the toilet, dulls
himself with tobacco, liquor, women, and obstinately wants his own way.
What would you do with him?50
This entry is quite remarkable, but like the “daydream” passage is also indirect. No
individual is named. Even the nation issuing the imaginary directive or statement of
purpose is only mentioned once. The passage indicates many beliefs about what was
going on, but in the end, Korczak, though attempting to “grapple with the
incomprehensible,” could still not understand it.
It is first important to discuss what Korczak imagined the Germans to be like.
Nazis, according to his scenario are “disciplined” and “methodical,” interested only in the
success of their war at the end of the day. Korczak believes he understands the means
Germans use to achieve their goals; while perhaps amoral and Machiavellian, they can
still be comprehended. Korczak the doctor, the rationalist, mitigates the irrational aspects
of Nazi policy (murdering people who could be working for the war effort, for example)
50
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by implying there must be some “reason” behind it. Like the “rational” German, the
doctor temporarily appropriates and lays out the stereotype of the Jew – a group of people
of “petty interests, ambitions, sentiments, whims, claims, resentments [and] cravings”
with “wads of banknotes”– as if that stereotype is true – thereby staying in character. As
a “German” who makes these assumptions, Korczak asserts that brutality is sometimes
necessary when dealing with these reluctant workers. It makes a kind of sense from this
“logical” perspective that the Nazis must “reluctantly” punish them on occasion. Again,
this “reluctance” reinforces the proposition that German behavior is logical and not based
on irrational or emotional arguments. Korczak does not seem to be overly sarcastic or
cynical here. He genuinely seems either to be trying to come to terms with the Nazi
rationale for persecution, or simply spouting out in anger what he has heard so many
times. Although there is a distinction made between German and Jew in the entry, it is
not on its own based upon the visceral appeal of racism – something the doctor does not
seem to understand. Korczak believes the nature of German war (genocide is not a term
he would allow himself to apply to this situation, even if it had been coined at the time) –
is only to achieve a military victory at all costs.51 He does not comprehend the idea of a
racial war.
Victory, not hatred, demands that protestations, bribes or appeals to sympathy not
reach the German heart. Efficiency is the watchword. “We are the Germans,” he says,
“We are the steel roller the plow, the sickle.”52 As we saw in the previous chapter, during
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particularly stressful moments, the metaphors frequently take over in Holocaust diaries,
and in this instance, like so many others, the perpetrator is reduced to a non-living object
(like Hillesum’s “blue uniform”) or a machine. The words Korczak chooses are
metaphors for tools – for useful appliances that both destroy and create. However, a
change is taking place here. The perpetrator is fragmenting and losing his humanity.
One senses that Korczak is having a hard time keeping this exercise in identification
going. Germans have now been conflated with their products. At this point in the entry,
perpetrators are machines, human only insofar as those they have conquered aid them in
their project. As long as these subjugated folk are pacified and “bear fruit,” the “whips,”
“big sticks,” and the “pencils” will remain quiescent.
It never occurs to Korczak throughout this entire passage that the murder and the
horror he saw around him were the twisted culmination and zenith of that systematic,
rational and efficient character that he was trying to come to terms with. It was not
within the scope of this limited exercise in identification for Korczak to be able to
imagine that it was precisely the harnessing of bureaucracies and the power of the
modern state to a profoundly illogical purpose that was the defining characteristic of the
totalizing system he was attempting to describe. The logic of the Third Reich was not the
logic of the world Korczak knew.
By the time Korczak reaches the line “A poster,” his ability to identify with his
persecutors has completely fractured. He begins to comprehend the no-win position he
and the other Jews of Warsaw find themselves in (“Whoever does this or that – will be
shot. Whoever does not do this or that – we will shoot”). It is at this point that he lays
out the options available as he sees them. It is important to note that the first thing that
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comes to his mind is suicide. Throughout his life, this was Korczak’s fallback position,
and it remains so during the last fortnight of his life. The second option is also in keeping
with Korczak’s narcissistic and self-important nature – to go out in a blaze of glory as a
hero, someone whose “name shine[s] in letters of gold.” The third is to dull the pain or to
continue to retreat from the real problem by resorting to pain killing measures Korczak
considers distasteful, like “tobacco, liquor [and] women.” In the end, we will see that the
“Old Doctor” chose a combination of the first two options as his final method of
resistance against genocide.
The passage analyzed above is similar to the “daydream” entry, but different in
significant ways, showing that Korczak’s view of the world, the war, and his place in
both were coming under intense psychological pressure. Both represent attempts to come
to terms with an impossible situation by mobilizing coping mechanisms which increased
his sense of power. The first entry expresses rage and hatred toward (apparently nonexistent) perpetrators, yet adopts the tactics of the enemy in order to prevent despair and
suicide. The second completes the process of identification with the enemy, yet still
breaks down in the end when Korczak realizes he is not one of them and that he therefore
has only limited options left to choose from.
VII: The End of Defense Mechanisms
The final two passages are the most amazing.53 In them, Korczak first appears to
repeat some of the same motifs that are present in the earlier entries, then, apparently
53
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recognizing that the end had come, switches tactics. In the last seven paragraphs, he
eschews all stylistic pretense, all naïveté, and all forms of literary defense. In those last
moments, he both saw the perpetrators for what they really were, and at the same time
moved toward one final direct assault against those who were taking his life from him.
Taken together, these passages depict a progression that allows us to follow Korczak’s
reactions to perpetrators during his last 24-48 hours in the Ghetto, as well as to trace
changes in the ways he defended himself and his children amid genocidal surroundings.
These last entries of Korczak’s life were most likely written on the morning of 5
August 1942, though it may have been the next day.54 Early in the entry labeled “4
August,” Korczak, clearly despairing, addresses “gentlemen officers.” Exactly which
officers he is speaking to is unclear. It could be SS officers or Wehrmacht officers, but,
more likely than not, he was still distancing himself from the actual perpetrators and the
men he describes are hypothetical representations or abstractions of military leaders, not
real people. It is important to note, however, that he includes himself among these
military men. He writes to them in an intensely sarcastic tone,
(7) You drank, and plenty, gentleman officers, you relished your drinking
– here’s to the blood you’ve shed – and dancing you jingled your medals
to cheer the infamy which you were too blind to see, or rather pretended
not to see.
(8) My share in the Japanese war. Defeat – disaster.
In the European War – defeat – disaster.
In the World War…
I don’t know how and what a soldier of a victorious army feels like.55
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In this portion of the diary, it seems as if Korczak is repeating some of the themes from
earlier entries. The target of his anger is nebulous and not specifically defined, as in the
“daydream” passage. And, like in the “identification” passage, the doctor is apparently
lumping himself in with these men with the jingling medals. In this version of himself,
he is not Korczak the subjected Jew; he is Korczak the army doctor – the officer. In this
way, he retains some sense of privilege and power. However, the bitterness of defeat and
weariness are present in Korczak’s tone of voice as well, as is the narcissism that was
always present. He resents not winning, or not being on the side of the powerful – as if
he still believed this were an ordinary kind of war. He still does not seem to comprehend
what is happening. Genocide (as a concept, not as a word) has not entered his mind.
At the same time, as always, the doctor is astute enough to know that there are
things these officers/people have “pretended not to see.” Since Korczak has included
himself in his conversation of “gentlemen officers” this implies that Korczak knows he is
hiding something from himself. If it is not “the blood,” (and we are not aware that
Korczak ever shed any – and it is obvious that he believes he sees that aspect clearly)
what could it be? It seems things were beginning to break down in his mind and that
protective mechanisms were no longer functioning as they had in the past. In place of
denials, Korczak is beginning to comprehend that the time for real action, which is
necessitated when genuine awareness combines with the complete loss of freedom, has
almost come.
The next two sections (parts 8 and 9) express a deep sadness, but have nothing to
do with perpetrators. It is the final section (10) that is the most poignant and expresses a
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profound change that comes over the Korczak on what may very well have been the last
morning of his life. He wrote.
I am watering the flowers. My bald head in the window. What a
splendid target.
He has a rifle. Why is he standing and looking on so calmly?
He has no orders to shoot.
And perhaps he was a village teacher in civilian life, or a notary, a
street sweeper in Leipzig, a waiter in Cologne?
What would he do if I nodded to him? Waved my hand in a
friendly gesture?
Perhaps he doesn’t even know that things are – as they are?
He may have arrived only yesterday, from far away….56
This passage is striking because, although the suicide/death wish theme is still
present (“My bald head in the window. What a splendid target.”), the understanding of
the perpetrator shifts drastically. Korczak drops the defensive rage present in the
“daydream” sequence, and he does not feel compelled to use metaphors to describe the
Nazi he sees outside his window. There is no wordplay, no sense of alternate meanings
or subterfuge, whether conscious or unconscious. Korczak simply sees a man with a rifle
“looking on so calmly.” The distance he places between them indicates that he has given
up identifying with the perpetrator – though at the same time he does not dehumanize
him or label him a “beast.” Here the diary depicts two men looking at each other through
a window, and Korczak suddenly sees the commonality inherent in their situations. This
is very much like Hillesum’s “blue uniform” passage, which we examined in chapter II:
the perpetrator could be anyone. There is an emptiness here that Korczak attempts to fill
in at the last minute with positive content. The man he sees might be a soldier now, but
perhaps only in the way Korczak was incidentally a medical officer in the Polish Army.
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He could be anything at all…a teacher, a notary, a street sweeper, a waiter.57 Korczak
finally sees this soldier as a man and a human being in a new light – as someone who is
complicated and who has his own thoughts and reasons for doing things – not as someone
controlled by impersonal forces like war. There is the hint of contact (“What would he
do if I nodded to him? Waved my hand in a friendly gesture?”) that implies Korczak’s
recognition of the man’s individual agency. The doctor is stepping out, momentarily at
least, from his accustomed self- absorbed reflection and narcissism. Now, finally, there is
no “crisis of imagination.” Korczak sees the perpetrator. And, in doing so, frees himself
from the need for internal defense mechanisms.
VIII: Conclusion
Why this change in the very last entry of the diary? It would be very interesting
to know exactly when Korczak wrote this last passage. It was written either the morning
before he and the children were sent to their deaths, or the morning the deportation was
ordered. Based on the radical change in perspective, the historian is tempted to place the
timing of this event as late as possible. The theory that he scribbled this entry during the
short period of time he was given to gather the children and their belongings together is
appealing, but not necessary.58 The existence of the orphanage had been threatened for
months, and Korczak was plainly aware that the noose was tightening. It was no longer a
57
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matter of if, but of when Korczak’s carefully constructed world would collapse around
them. The question really is one of the relationship between this final entry and his
subsequent actions that morning rather than of the exact moment the passage was written.
We know beyond any doubt that Korczak cared more for his children than
anything else in the world. We also know that he had a great deal of experience with the
public through the fame he won for his writing, his advocacy for children’s rights, as well
as for his radio show. It is speculative, but a distinct possibility exists that sometime after
he had written parts eight and nine of his final entry he was made aware of the order for
the children’s deportation. It is at this point, I believe, that Korczak penned this final
paragraph. Now, internal mechanisms of defense were rendered obsolete. In view of the
impending deportation and death of the children, it no longer mattered what the doctor
did or did not think of perpetrators. The time for keeping them at bay had passed. This is
why the guard in the last paragraph seems so real compared to other examples we have
seen.
With the move away from internal defense mechanisms of resistance, Korczak
was free to exercise the “options” he had discussed the week before, in the entry written
on 27 July. He could commit suicide, or he could be a hero. With his history of
depressive episodes and melancholy, the first would have been appealing (and he always
kept the poison pills on his body). However, as a figure accustomed to authority,
prestige, and as a man not immune to narcissistic tendencies, the second option might
have been attractive. My contention is that he tried, and succeeded, in accomplishing
both.
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Hyams claims that Korczak specifically asked for and received permission from
an SS Obersturmführer named Klosterman to lead his children to the Umschlagplatz in
place of the regular band of soldiers.59 All witnesses agree that the children were lined
up – as for a parade – complete with flags and banners. Korczak’s familiarity with both
military spectacle and theatrics paid off. The word went out and people began to line the
sidewalks to see the children go by, with the famous “Old Doctor” at their head.60 At the
Umschlagplatz, Korczak knew that the second part of his plan (to become a hero, not just
a suicide) required that he stay with the children – hence his rejection of the possibility of
remaining behind when given the chance. The symbolic cutting of the yellow stars from
the children’s sleeves also seems designed to make the most dramatic impact possible on
eyewitnesses. In the end, by removing those hated stars, the doctor was able to signal
that these were 192 individuals, not 192 Jews. In doing so, he reinforced the concept of
their individual integrity.
What did Korczak believe he was accomplishing by turning his death, and the
children’s death, into a kind of spectacle? I believe his final entry allows us to see that he
had reached a point where he knew internal mechanisms of resistance were futile. He
also knew that he could no longer save the lives of his children. He therefore understood
that another form of resistance was required if anything were to be salvaged of the
children’s memory and innocence. Korczak’s actions are a remarkable kind of resistance
because he halted a downward trajectory towards anonymity and negation – not
figuratively, but literally. He did not allow the Nazis to completely control the way his
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life ended. Korczak was able to make a decision. He was not devoid of any freedom or
volition, and he did not allow his children to disappear anonymously into the genocidal
blackness waiting to receive them. Suicide and theatrics became an act of freedom and a
statement of individuality.
Korczak also achieved his wish of becoming a hero. While it could be argued that
by turning the “last march” of the children into a kind of parade of the doomed bespeaks
a kind of cynicism and manipulation, I believe this was not Korczak’s intent. Just as he
did not want to be deprived of all control and all choice, Korczak did not want his
children to be reduced in death to the kind of anonymity that was the fate of the
thousands of other Warsaw Jews who died before (and after) them. Because of his fame,
Korczak knew that he would be remembered. But for the “Old Doctor,” now seeing quite
clearly what lay before him, staging the “final march” was a heartrending necessity. By
doing so, he engraved the memory of those children in the minds of everyone who saw
them go by.
In a very real way, through Korczak’s efforts, his children did not lose their
humanity or individuality, even though they died together with so many others and their
bodies were obliterated from the face of the earth. The fact that so many books, plays
and accounts of that “last march” have been written is proof that his plan worked. As we
have seen, the nature of genocide is both to completely objectify its victims – to turn
them into numbers or aggregates and so something less than human – as well as to
completely negate victims by submitting them to a completely impersonal and
anonymous death. In the case of Janusz Korczak and his children, the Nazis failed at
both. Even though these victims lost their lives, they remained humans – people whose
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faces and even photographs are still present, and still mean something today. In this
sense, the doctor succeeded, because Hella and Hanna and Zygmus and Sami and so
many others are alive today in the memories and imagination of people around the world.
This is why Korczak’s story is so appealing and why he is a hero to so many.
By maintaining the ability to analyze the situation clearly – by knowing when
to set aside the private defense mechanisms that preserved only his individual life and
peace of mind, Korczak was able to salvage the dignity and memory of 192 other lives.
Paradoxically, through sacrifice and death, Korczak saved himself and his children from
the anonymous fate planned for them by the Nazis. This sacrifice is commemorated today
at the memorial at Treblinka, where 17,000 stones, each engraved with the name of a
town or village decimated by Nazi genocide, have been erected surrounding the site
where the gas chambers once stood. Only one stone has the name of a person on it. This
stone reads “Janusz Korczak (Henryk Goldszmit) and the Children.”
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Conclusion

Directions for Further Thought and Research
“Anyone who has worn a star is marked for ever. He becomes different
from the person who saw a star being worn.”
Abel J. Herzberg, 3 September 1944.
Holocaust diaries represent a large and relatively untapped pool of resources for
the professional historian. The diarists examined here clearly experienced a tension
between the need to testify and the need to avoid written confrontation with their
persecutors. The evidence I have analyzed demonstrates that this tension can be found in
diaries, and that close scrutiny of these points of tension provides unique and valuable
ways for historians to think about how resistance to trauma and the need to testify come
together to tell us something about genocide. This thesis provides a place for scholars to
begin looking at relationships between perpetrators and victims in genocidal context, but
it also points the way to new territory – something important in fields as well-developed
as Holocaust Studies and Comparative Genocide.
Identifying “Presence,” “Dissolution,” and “Absence” in Holocaust diaries
provides a useful framework for classifying victims’ responses to perpetrators. By
discussing ways perpetrators appear in Holocaust diaries, I have developed a novel means
of looking at the problem of psychological resistance to genocide. As I look forward, I
see at least three possibilities further research might profitably consider.
First, in this thesis, I have worked only with published sources. In the future, an
intense engagement with a greater number of unpublished works will enrich the body of
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source material, and offer a means to refute potential methodological critiques suggesting
that the diaries may have been edited or reformulated to some degree after the war,
especially through translation. It is easy to say perpetrators must either be present, absent
or somewhere in-between. It remains to be seen where the majority of these depictions
fall. A more comprehensive examination of both published and unpublished sources
would clarify this point.
Secondly, much more work could be done on the general demographic
distribution of Holocaust diarists. For instance, it also remains to be seen if certain
patterns of dealing with perpetrators were more typical among certain groups than others.
Did assimilated Jews choose forms of representation differently than unassimilated ones?
Did Jews from western and eastern Europe have similar concerns? Again, more
comprehensive research and analysis would both address these questions, and raise new
ones. An approach focusing on class and gender differences in depictions of
perpetrators, or on generational or age disparities in the ways victims psychologically
deal with the trauma represented by Nazis would also be interesting and elucidating. I
have tried to indicate, where possible, reasons why certain diarists may have written as
they did – whether because of environmental or personal factors. A more systematic
study of these differences could prove extremely valuable.
Finally, genocide is not strictly the province of Jewish diarists who wrote during
the Holocaust. Without doubt, diaries have been written during other genocidal moments
as well. One thinks immediately of letters and diaries that surely must have been written
from Soviet gulags, from Cambodian prisons and killing fields, from rape camps in the
former Yugoslavia or during the Rwandan genocide.

A more thorough and comparative
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discussion of ways victims react to perpetrators and to genocide could prove useful in the
broader field of Comparative Genocide, as well as for students of the Holocaust.
The diarists examined here were only a small portion of those who experienced
the Holocaust. The criticisms of Abel Herzberg, the jokes of Emmanuel Ringelblum and
the metaphors of Etty Hillesum are a good place to begin a deeper level of historical
analysis. Although fascinating aspects of Holocaust history are still being uncovered, it
seems to me that the general outlines of the event are well-known. “Events” are much
different from “mentalities.” What concerns me, and the direction I in which I would like
to see the field move, is toward the study, not of events, but of the perceptions and
mentalities created during this incredibly traumatic time. By combining our detailed
knowledge of political, military, cultural and social history with a new focus on diaries
and other primary sources as both literary and historical texts, a more nuanced and
comprehensive view of the Holocaust, and genocide in general, can emerge.
For the time being, I believe it is sufficient to have considered the importance of
Holocaust diaries, both as literary artifacts, as historical documents, and as a means of
psychological resistance. Further study of this topic is not only warranted, but important.
Only future research will tell how valuable this approach will turn out to be, but I am
convinced that increased scrutiny of the most marked points of tension in Holocaust
diaries will tell us important things about victims, about perpetrators, and especially
about ways the two groups thought about each other during moments of trauma and
genocide.
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